Murphy v. Town of Darien
Citation | 210 A.3d 56,332 Conn. 244 |
Decision Date | 09 July 2019 |
Docket Number | SC 19983 |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Parties | Jamey MURPHY et al. v. TOWN OF DARIEN et al. |
James J. Healy, Hartford, with whom were Joel T. Faxon New Haven, and, on the brief, John P. D'Ambrosio, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Robert O. Hickey, with whom, on the brief, were Beck S. Fineman Stamford, and Kerianne E. Kane, Bridgeport, for the appellee (defendant Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company).
Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, D'Auria, Mullins and Kahn, Js.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (railroad act), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., preempts the negligence claims brought by the plaintiff, Jamey Murphy, individually and as executrix of the estate of her late husband, Kevin Murphy (decedent), against the defendant Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company.1 We conclude that the railroad act does not preempt the plaintiff's negligence claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant on that ground.2
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On March 4, 2013, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the decedent, was walking on the platform adjacent to the westbound tracks at the Noroton Heights train station in Darien. The decedent was awaiting his commuter train to New York City. On that morning, there was a patch of ice on the platform, which measured approximately nine feet long and approximately one foot wide. As the decedent was walking on the platform, he encountered the ice patch, slipped and fell onto the westbound track closest to the platform.
At that time, one of the defendant's trains was coming around a curve and approaching the Noroton Heights station on the track closest to the westbound platform. This train was scheduled to travel through the Noroton Heights station without stopping and to do the same through four other commuter stations before completing its express route to Stamford. This type of train is referred to as a "through train."
As the train approached the Noroton Heights station, the engineer sounded the train's horn. He then saw an object on the track. When the engineer realized it was a person, he sounded the horn again and applied the emergency brake. Nevertheless, the train struck the decedent. As a result of the collision, the decedent suffered severe trauma and was pronounced dead at the scene.
The plaintiff subsequently brought this action against the defendant. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Specifically, the operative complaint3 alleges that the decedent's injuries and death were proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant when "it violated practices and customs with respect to track selection by moving a through train traveling in excess of seventy miles per hour on the track immediately adjacent to the platform when reasonable care and general practice of [the defendant] required that train to be on an interior track away from the platform." The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant's negligence caused her to suffer loss of spousal consortium. After discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed an objection.
In support of that motion, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff's negligence claims were preempted by federal law. Specifically, the defendant asserted, in pertinent part, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the railroad act. The trial court agreed with the defendant, concluding that, "[t]o the extent that the plaintiff's claim is viewed as relating to rail safety, it is preempted by the [railroad act]." Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon in favor of the defendant. This appeal followed.4
On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court incorrectly concluded that her claims were preempted by the railroad act. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the railroad act only preempts claims where a federal regulation covers the subject matter, and no such regulation exists for track selection. In response, the defendant asserts that the trial court properly granted its motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff's claims are preempted by the railroad act. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim is covered by federal regulation—namely, regulations addressing speed and track classification. We agree with the plaintiff.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucenti v. Laviero , 327 Conn. 764, 772–73, 176 A.3d 1 (2018). "[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri , 317 Conn. 223, 236, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).
In the present case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was insufficient because the negligence claims raised therein were preempted by the railroad act. Accordingly, resolution of this appeal requires us to examine the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's negligence claims are preempted by the railroad act.
In doing so, we note that the question of whether the plaintiff's negligence claims are preempted by the railroad act is one of law, and, therefore, our review is plenary. "Whether state causes of action are preempted by federal statutes and regulations is a question of law over which our review is plenary." Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. , 314 Conn. 433, 447, 102 A.3d 32 (2014) ; see also Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC , 285 Conn. 498, 502–504, 940 A.2d 769 (2008) ( ). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnik , 244 Conn. 781, 794, 712 A.2d 396, cert. denied sub nom. Slotnik v. Considine , 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S. Ct. 542, 142 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1998).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hackett v. J.L.G. Properties, LLC , supra, 285 Conn. at 503–504, 940 A.2d 769.
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...law, arising under the supremacy clause of the United States constitution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Darien , 332 Conn. 244, 249, 210 A.3d 56 (2019), cert. denied sub nom. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Murphy, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 847, 205 L. Ed. 2d 468 (202......
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...2018] ), nor do they substantially subsume the subjects of the codes upon which Marletta's opinions rely (see Murphy v. Town of Darien , 332 Conn. 244, 255-256, 210 A3d 56, 65 [2019], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 847, 205 L.Ed.2d 468 [2020] ). First, 49 CFR 213.109 is titled "Cross......
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...substantially subsume the subjects of the codes upon which Marletta's opinions rely (see Murphy v Town of Darien, 332 Conn 244, 255-256, 210 A.3d 56, 65 [2019], cert denied - U.S. -, 140 S.Ct. 847 [2020]). First, 49 CFR 213.109 is titled "Crossties," and paragraph (f) directs the reader to ......