Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Decision Date22 October 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-4126-SAC.,95-4126-SAC.
PartiesVaughn L. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas

Kirk W. Lowry, Palmer & Lowry, Topeka, KS, for Vaughn L. Murphy.

Leonard Singer, Allan L. Bioff, Brian J. Finucane, Sharon D. Hess, James R. Holland, II, Bioff, Singer & Finucane, Kansas City, MO, for United Parcel Service, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CROW, District Judge.

Vaughn L. Murphy brings this employment discrimination action against his former employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Specifically, Murphy claims that UPS terminated his employment due to his disability, hypertension. According to Murphy, he suffers from high blood pressure. Unmedicated, Murphy's blood pressure runs at approximately 250/160. Murphy contends that his high blood pressure limits his major life activities of walking, seeing, lifting, climbing, performing manual tasks, eating, exercising, hearing and working.

In August of 1994, Murphy was hired as a mechanic by UPS. Prior to hiring Murphy, UPS required him to pass a physical. Murphy initially "passed" the physical examination and was issued a Department of Transportation Health Card. Upon closer inspection, UPS subsequently discovered that Murphy's high blood pressure precluded him from holding a valid DOT Health Card and required Murphy to take another blood pressure test. Murphy's blood pressure was 160/102, above UPS' and the DOT's upper threshold. Based upon this determination UPS fired Murphy.

Murphy contends that this act by UPS violated the ADA. Murphy contends that he was a qualified mechanic and that UPS' act of firing him violated the ADA. Murphy contends that driving a truck was a marginal duty and that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate his disability.

UPS denies Murphy's claims. First, UPS contends that Murphy's high blood pressure does not qualify as a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second, UPS contends that its decision to terminate Murphy was based upon his inability to lawfully perform an essential function of the job — operate a large truck. Due to Murphy's high blood pressure, he could not meet the minimally acceptable standards set by the DOT. Finally, UPS contends that it compliance with DOT regulations is a complete defense to Murphy's ADA claim, or in the alternative, that there was no reasonable accommodation available which would have permitted Murphy to perform the essential functions of his job.

This case comes before the court upon UPS' motion for summary judgment (Dk.39). Murphy has filed a response and UPS has filed a reply. The court, having considered the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, grants UPS' motion.

Summary Judgment Standards

A court grants a motion for summary judgment if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law governing the suit dictates which facts are material or not. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]here are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).

The movant's burden under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to lay out the basis of its motion and to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). "A movant is not required to provide evidence negating an opponent's claim." Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th Cir.1992) (citation omitted).

If the moving party meets its burden, then it becomes the nonmoving party's burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991); see Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) ("If the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party then has the burden to come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to the non-moving party's case."). When the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at trial, "Rule 56(e) ... [then] requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Mares v. ConAgra Poultry Co., Inc., 971 F.2d 492, 494 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings." Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir.1992) (citations omitted); see Martin, 3 F.3d at 1414 (non-moving party cannot rest on the mere allegations in the pleadings). "Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment." Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 929 (7th Cir. 1995); see Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st Cir.1993) ("Optimistic conjecture, unbridled speculation, or hopeful surmise will not suffice."). The court views the evidence of record and draws inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d at 1273.

More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure "designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 1." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion is not the chance for a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or decide upon competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).

Uncontroverted Facts

Murphy has had high blood pressure (hypertension) since he was ten years old. The only limitation placed Murphy by a physician related to his high blood pressure is that he was instructed to not hold a job requiring repetitive lifting of 200 pounds.

For over 22 years, Murphy has performed mechanic jobs that did not require DOT certification without any limitation resulting from hypertension other than the self-imposed restriction of using a lever to lift heavy objects, not running to answer the phone, not working above his head and not performing heavy or very heavy work. Murphy contends that medicated hypertension otherwise limits his ability at times and under some circumstances to run, eat, exercise, breath, hear and see.1 However, Murphy's own physician and UPS' medical expert each testified that Murphy's hypertension does not significantly restrict his activities and that in general he can function normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do.

In early August 1994, Murphy applied for a position as a mechanic at UPS. Murphy knew that driving would be part of his job duties as a UPS mechanic. Murphy also knew that as a condition of his employment, he would be required to take and pass a DOT physical and obtain a DOT health card. On August 18, 1994, Murphy was hired by UPS to work as a mechanic.

The UPS job description for mechanic states that the essential functions include a commercial driver's license, meeting DOT regulations and operating a standard transmission. DOT regulations define a "commercial motor vehicle" as "... any self-propelled or towed motor vehicle used on public highways in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property when: (a) The motor vehicle has a gross weight rating of 10,001 or more pounds ..." 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. UPS considers driving commercial motor vehicles an essential function of Murphy's job as mechanic. As a mechanic, Murphy drove UPS vehicles with grass weight ratings of 10,001 or more pounds. Murphy and other UPS mechanics were expected and required to drive tractor trailers and package cars. A tractor trailer has a gross weight rating of 55,000 pounds, while a package car has a gross weight rating of 12,000 to 20,000 pounds.

Murphy and other UPS mechanics were expected and required to drive tractor trailers and package cars to perform "road tests" and "road calls." During a "road test," a mechanic takes the vehicle being repairing out on the road to diagnose the problem or determine if the previously diagnosed problem has been fixed. During a "road call," a mechanic has to deliver an operating vehicle to a driver whose package car has broken down, fix the broken vehicle, and drive it back to the facility. Sometimes packages on board were traveling in interstate commerce.

During the five weeks that Murphy worked for UPS, he performed road tests on UPS vehicles between 12 and 18 times. Because he worked the night shift, Murphy's driving of commercial vehicles would primarily be performing road calls on tractor trailers and road tests on package cars. All of the vehicles which Murphy worked were commercial motor...

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