Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 14 June 1894 |
Citation | 62 F. 24 |
Parties | MURRAY v. CHICAGO & N.W. RY. CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Rickel & Crocker, for plaintiff.
Hubbard & Dawley, for defendant.
In the amended petition filed in this cause it is averred that during the years 1875 to 1887, inclusive, the plaintiff was engaged at Belle Plaine, Iowa, in the business of buying and shipping to Chicago grain, cattle, and hogs, the same being shipped in car-load lots over the line of railway owned and operated by the defendant company; that, at the several times when the shipments were made, the defendant company had posted at its stations, including that at Belle Plaine printed lists containing the tariff rates charged by the company for the transportation of freight over its line that, when plaintiff shipped his stock, he applied to the defendant and its station agent at Belle Plaine for the lowest freight rates charged, and was answered by the defendant and its station agent that the posted rates were the lowest and only rates charged by the company, no rebates or concessions in any form being made therefrom to any one; that thereupon the plaintiff shipped his stock, and paid the posted rates therefor; that in fact such representations were false, and were made to mislead the plaintiff; that in fact, as the defendant and its agents well knew, rebates and concessions were then being made to other parties who were competitors in business of the plaintiff, to the great injury of plaintiff; that the fact that these rebates were allowed to the competitors of plaintiff was kept concealed by the defendant, and was not discovered by the plaintiff until within 18 months previous to the commencement of this action; that upon shipments of grain made from points west of Belle Plaine to Chicago the defendant charged the shippers thereof some $15 per car less than it was then charging the plaintiff for shipping the same kind of grain from Belle Plaine to Chicago, thus discriminating against the plaintiff, and compelling him to pay an excessive and unreasonable rate. To recover the damages claimed to have been thus caused him, the plaintiff brought this action in the superior court of the city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, whence it was removed to this court upon the application of the defendant company. On part of the defendant, a motion for a more specific statement has been filed, followed by a demurrer, and both have been submitted to the court.
The principal point made in the demurrer is that the petition on its face shows that the shipments made from Belle Plaine Iowa, to Chicago, Ill., were in the nature of interstate commerce, the regulation of which is reserved to congress, exclusively, by section 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States, and that, at the dates of the several shipments in the petition described, there was no act of congress or other law regulating commerce between the several states. If I understand correctly the position of the defendant company, it is that, as this action was commenced in the state court, this court, upon removal, succeeds only to the jurisdiction which the state court might have exercised rightfully in case no removal had been had; that in the state court the action could not be maintained for two reasons: First, that as section 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States confers the right to regulate interstate commerce exclusively upon congress, thereby depriving the states of the power to legislate touching the same, it follows that state courts are deprived of all jurisdiction over cases growing out of interstate commerce; and, second, that there is no common law of the United States; that the common law of England has become the common law of the several states, in such sense that each state has its own common law; and that the common law of the state of Iowa cannot be applied to interstate commerce, in view of the provisions, already cited, of the constitution of the United States. Dealing with these propositions in the reverse order of their statement, is it true that the principles of the common law are not in force in the United States with respect to such subjects as are placed within the exclusive control of congress? It will not be questioned that, before the Revolution, the common law was in force, so far as applicable, in the several colonies then existing. Thus, in U.S. v. Reid, 12 How. 361-363, it is said: 'The colonists who established the English colonies in this country undoubtedly brought with them the common and statute laws of England, as they stood at the time of their emigration, so far as they were applicable to the situation and local circumstances of the colony.'
When the constitution of the United States was adopted, it was based upon the general principles of the common law, and its correct interpretation requires that the several provisions thereof shall be read in the light of these general principles. The final disruption of all political ties between the colonies and the mother country did not terminate the existence of the common law in the colonies. It came originally into the several colonies, not by force of legislative enactments to that effect by the parliament of Great Britain, and the effect of which might be held to have terminated when the colonies became independent, but, as is said by Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the supreme court in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137-144:
'Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation.'
In Cooley, Const. Lim. 31, it is said:
Thus it appears that, when the constitution of the United States was adopted, the general rules of the common law, in so far as they were applicable to the conditions then existing in the colonies, and subject to the modifications necessary to adapt them to the uses and needs of the people, were recognized and were in force in the colonies, and the people thereof were entitled to demand the enforcement thereof through the judicial tribunals then existing.
The adoption of the constitution did not deprive the people of the several colonies of the protection and advantages of the common law. The constitution itself recognizes the fact of the continued existence of the common law, and indeed it is based upon the principles thereof, and its correct interpretation requires that its provisions shall be read and construed in the light thereof. By section 2, art. 3, of the constitution it is declared that:
'The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution; the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made, under their authority; * * * to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. * * * '
In this section we have a clear recognition of the existence of the several systems of law, equity, and admiralty. The section does not create these systems, but, recognizing their existence, it declares the extent of federal jurisdiction in regard thereto. The rules and principles which form the laws maritime are not created by the constitution, for, as is said by Chief Justice Marshall, in Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511-546:
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