Murray v. Corson Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35027,35027
• Citation: 350 P.2d 468,55 Wn.2d 733
• Parties: Hazel M. MURRAY, Respondent, v. CORSON CORPORATION, a corporation, doing business as, Premium Tex, Appellant, Buford V. Seals, Jr., Defendant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 733

55 Wn.2d 733

350 P.2d 468

Hazel M. MURRAY, Respondent, v. CORSON CORPORATION, a corporation, doing business as Premium Tex, Appellant, Buford V. Seals, Jr., Defendant.

No. 35027.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

March 17, 1960.

Rosling, Williams, Lanza & Kastner, Joseph J. Lanza, Seattle, for appellant.

McCutcheon, Soderland & Wells, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Justice.

The plaintiff was injured while she was a passenger in an automobile that she owned, and which, at the time of the accident, was being driven by the defendant Buford V. Seals, Jr., who was employed as general manager of a service station owned by the defendant Corson Corporation. She recovered judgment against both defendants, from which the defendant corporation alone has appealed.

Error is assigned to the denial of various motions predicated upon the insufficiency of the evidence to justify a verdict against the appellant, and to the court's refusal to give certain instructions requested by the appellant.

The evidence tended to show that the appellant owns a so-called 'premium' service station at Corson avenue and East Marginal Way, in Seattle. Seals, an experienced salesman, had been employed as general manager since 1954. There were no limitations upon his authority in his post as general manager; and never having received specific orders, he generally conducted the business as if it were his own. Mechanics were employed at the station to do minor mechanical work, and Seals himself had had experience with reference to gasoline motors and occasionally did some of the manual work at the station.

Tires and accessories were sold through the station, and small appliances and other gadgets were also sold to customers as premiums. Larger appliances were not stocked and none had been sold to customers at the time of the accident involved herein, but catalogues for such appliances were kept on the premises. At a corporation meeting, Seals had proposed a 'discount membership card plan' for the sale of large appliances, but some of the members of the board objected and the matter was tabled.

Seals had met the respondent in 1953, in connection with a business matter. Thereafter, in the fall of 1955, she bought two tires from him. In the spring of 1956, being in need of appliances to furnish two apartments which she was readying for rental, she telephoned Seals and asked if he could get her two stoves and two refrigerators at prices less than she could obtain them from another source; and he told her he would check and let her know.

On the evening of May 11, 1956, she stopped at the station to inquire about the prices. Seals quoted her the prices of three suppliers, but she indicated that she could get the appliances cheaper elsewhere and would not be interested. She then remarked that she had an appointment, but was worried about her car, which had not been running properly. Seals, feeling that the sale was not yet lost and wishing an opportunity to talk with her further, offered to drive the car to see if he could determine the trouble. They thereupon set out, with Seals at the wheel, and drove toward Kent. At intervals, Seals stopped the automobile, got out to look at the engine, and tested various theories he had as to the cause of the trouble.

When they had driven some eight or nine miles in this manner, the respondent asked him to turn around and go back, as she did not want to miss her appointment. He complied with this request and, shortly thereafter, ran through a stop sign and collided with another vehicle, causing the injuries for which the respondent sued in this action.

The respondent, suffering from retrograde amnesia as a result of the accident, could not recall that Seals had discussed the sale of the appliances with her on this trip, but Seals testified that this was his major purpose in offering to test the car and stated that he did discuss the sale several times during the trip.

The appellant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence were based upon its contention that Seals was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. It contends that the action of the board of directors in tabling the proposed 'discount membership card plan' conclusively shows that Seals was not authorized to sell or to attempt to sell major appliances, and that his prime motivation in driving the respondent's automobile was, by his own admission, to attempt to effectuate this sale rather than to...