Murray v. Curtin
| Decision Date | 15 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 2:10-CV-11278 |
| Parties | DAJUAN M. MURRAY, Petitioner, v. CINDI CURTIN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dajuan M. Murray, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Ionia Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. In his habeas petition, filed by attorney Alyson Oliver, Petitioner challenges his conviction for three counts of armed robbery, M.C.L.A. 750.529; one count of fleeing and eluding a police officer, M.C.L.A. 257.602a(2); and being a fourth felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):
Defendant's convictions arise out of the armed robbery of a Cingular Wireless store in Oak Park. A man later identified as defendant entered the store covering his mouth and nose with a black rag, wearing surgical-type gloves, and carrying a gun. The storeowner complied with defendant's demands for cellular telephones, money from the cash register, and a laptop computer. Shortly after the robbery, the police arrived and attempted to pull over a vehicle that was leaving an alley behind the store. The driver of the vehicle refused, and the police pursued the vehicle, which was a rental car that defendant had previously rented and reported as stolen. During the pursuit, the vehicles reached speeds in excess of 80 miles an hour, and defendant ultimately eluded the police. One of the store employees identified defendant as the perpetrator at a photographic lineup the following day.
People v. Murray, No. 270983, * 1 (Mich.Ct.App. June 24, 2008).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id;, lv. den. 482 Mich. 1186, 758 N.W.2d 563 (2008).
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds: (i) the prosecution improperly used a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American woman from the jury; (ii) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the receipt of the pre-sentence report minutes before sentencing; (iii) the trial court erroneously scored Petitioner's sentencing guidelines; (iv) the trial court committed error by scoring offense variables of the sentencing guidelines based on facts that had not been found by the jury or admitted to by Petitioner; and (v) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the sentencing violations. 1
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federalsystem." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.
"[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents.Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979))(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Finally, in reviewing Petitioner's claims, this Court must remember that under the federal constitution, Petitioner was "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
A. Claim # 1. The racially motivated peremptory challenge claim.
Petitioner first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American woman from his jury panel. As a related claim, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the peremptory challenge at the time that it was made.
Respondent contends that the claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to make a timely objection at trial and the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on the failure to object to deny the claim. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffectivefor failing to make a timely objection to the peremptory challenge.
Ineffective assistance of counsel may establish cause for procedural default. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000). Given that the cause and prejudice inquiry for the procedural default issue merges with an analysis of the merits of Petitioner's defaulted claim, it would be easier to consider the merits of this claim. See Cameron v. Birkett, 348 F. Supp. 2d 825, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
During jury voir dire, the prosecutor asked every prospective juror about their occupation, their marital status and, if married, their spouse's occupation. (Tr. 3/27/06, pp. 54, 67-69, 71-72, 75-76, 110, 130, 137-138, 150-152, 155-156, 171-172, 185, 187-188, 191). The prosecutor used two of his twelve peremptory challenges to excuse a pastor and a social worker. (Id., pp. 54, 58, 70-72, 82-83, 107, 121).
Petitioner's attorney exercised eleven of his twelve peremptory challenges during this portion of the voir dire. (Id., pp. 112, 127, 134, 139, 146, 153, 158, 163, 168, 174, 179). During this time period, the prosecutor passed on the jury panel eight times. (Id., pp. 134, 146, 153, 158, 163, 168, 174, 179).
At this point, Juror No. 401, Ms. Kelly Sims was called. (Tr. 3/27/06, p. 179; Tr. 3/28/06, p. 5). After the trial judge asked Ms. Sims some questions, the following exchange occurred between the assistant prosecutor and Ms. Sims:
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