Murray v. Lyng, Civil 4-85-611.

Decision Date19 May 1987
Docket NumberCivil 4-85-611.
PartiesDebra MURRAY and Annadine Houle, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Richard E. LYNG in his capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and Leonard Levine, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

James E. Wilkinson, The Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, Inc., and Laurie N. Davison, Minneapolis, Minn., appeared on behalf of plaintiffs.

Elissa G. Mautner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., appeared on behalf of defendant Richard E. Lyng.

Patricia A. Sonnenberg, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., appeared on behalf of defendant Leonard Levine, but did not participate in the proceedings.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DIANA E. MURPHY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Debra Murray and Annadine Houle brought this action on behalf of themselves and a class of Minnesota foster parents and food stamp recipients against defendant Richard E. Lyng, as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (the "Secretary"), and defendant Leonard Levine, as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services.2 Plaintiffs challenge regulations of the United States Department of Agriculture that require foster children to be included in their food stamp "households" and foster care maintenance payments to be included as unearned income in their food stamp "income." 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1, 273.9(b)(2)(ii). These regulations allegedly reduce plaintiffs' food stamp allotments. Plaintiffs' first three causes of action allege that the household and income regulations are not reasonable constructions of provisions of the Food Stamp Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(d)(6), (5), and (9). Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges that the regulations violate their right to due process by creating an irrebutable presumption that the amount of foster care payments exceeds the cost of providing that care. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the regulations violate their right to equal protection by providing foster child households with fewer food stamps than otherwise similar households not providing foster child care.

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the regulations violate the Food Stamp Act and the Constitution, injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from continuing to enforce the regulations, and injunctive relief requiring defendants to restore to plaintiffs the food stamps they would have received since April 1984 absent the regulations. Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 1343.

The court has previously denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs' uncontested motion for class certification. Now before the court are cross motions for summary judgment.3

Background

Plaintiffs Debra Murray and Annadine Houle are licensed foster parents who provide care for foster children placed in their homes by the Hennepin County Bureau of Social Services.4 They each receive monthly foster care maintenance payments to cover the costs of providing for their respective foster children. In addition, they each receive, or have received, food stamp allotments. They allege that these allotments would have been greater had the Secretary's regulations not included the foster children in their food stamp "households" and the foster care maintenance payments in their income.5 Plaintiffs Murray and Houle are the named representatives of a class defined as "all persons in Minnesota whose Food Stamp benefits have been reduced, terminated or denied from May 1, 1984 onwards as a result of their receipt of foster care maintenance payments."

A. The Food Stamp Act

In passing the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2029, Congress sought to "safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." 7 U.S.C. § 2011. Under the Act, the states administer the food stamp program in accordance with federal statutes and regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 2020. The federal government provides the entire funding for the cost of the benefits and for at least 50 percent of each state's administrative costs. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013, 2025.

Food stamps are distributed on a household basis. The Act defines a "household" as:

(1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption; except that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member.

7 U.S.C. § 2012(i). The Minnesota Department of Human Services Food Stamp Manual utilizes a similar definition. § III-C.

In 1978, the Secretary promulgated a regulation under the statute which provided that "in no event shall nonhousehold member status ... be granted to children under 18 years of age under the parental control of an adult member of the household." 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a)(3)(ii) the "household" regulation. This regulation was recently amended to provide that "children under 18 years of age under the parental control of an adult household member living with others shall be considered as customarily purchasing food and preparing meals together, even if they do not do so." 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a)(2)(i)(B). The Secretary interprets the regulation to require the inclusion of foster children in the foster parent's food stamp household.

The Food Stamp Act defines "household income for purposes of the food stamp program" as:

all income from whatever source excluding only ... (5) reimbursements which do not exceed expenses actually incurred and which do not represent a gain or benefit to the household ... (6) moneys received and used for the care and maintenance of a third-party beneficiary who is not a household member ... (9) the cost of producing self-employed income....

7 U.S.C. § 2014(d). These three exclusions from household income form the basis for plaintiffs' first three causes of action. The Secretary has promulgated a regulation under this statute which includes "foster care payments for children or adults" as unearned income. 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(b)(2)(ii) the "income" regulation. Minnesota also defines unearned income to include foster care payments. Minnesota Department of Human Services Food Stamp Manual § V-E-1(i).

B. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act

The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679a, provides federal financial assistance to the states in providing foster care and adoption assistance to children. With this financial support, state programs make "foster care maintenance payments" to children who meet the statutory requirements. The Act defines such payments as "payments to cover the cost of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child's personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, and reasonable travel to the child's home for visitation." 42 U.S.C. § 675(4). Along with payments from state funds, Minn.Stat. § 256.82, the Act provides financial support for foster care in Minnesota.

Discussion

Both parties have moved for summary judgment, thus effectively agreeing that no genuine issues of material fact remain. The parties disagree, however, as to which side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 Plaintiffs' complaint asserts three statutory and two constitutional causes of action. Plaintiffs' statutory arguments should be considered first to avoid needless constitutional adjudication, if possible. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Analysis of the issue should start with the statute. "An agency's construction of a statute under its enforcement jurisdiction is generally accorded deference if the construction `has a reasonable basis in law and is consistent with the congressional policy behind the statute.'" Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 516 (8th Cir.1987) (quoting International Nutrition, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 676 F.2d 338, 342 (8th Cir.1982)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). This deference has limits, however. "Courts are the final authorities on such issues of statutory construction and remain free to set aside an agency's construction of a statute if it does not have a reasonable basis in law or if it frustrates congressional policy." Metropolitan Medical Center & Extended Care Facility v. Harris, 693 F.2d 775, 780 (8th Cir.1982) (citation omitted); see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).

Plaintiffs argue that foster care payments should not be considered to be part of their income for the purposes of calculating food stamp allotments because the payments are for the "care and maintenance of a third party beneficiary, who is not a household member," and therefore should be excluded under 7 U.S.C. § 2014(d)(6). According to plaintiffs, foster children are not household members, but rather, are properly classified as "boarders" because they reside with others and pay compensation for lodging and meals. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(c)(1).

The Secretary responds that the third-party beneficiary exclusion is inapplicable to foster children. According to the Secretary, foster children and foster families are likely to "purchase food and prepare meals together," thereby constituting a household under the statutory...

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4 cases
  • Murray v. Lyng, 87-5331
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 16, 1988
    ...enforcement of certain Department regulations under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2011-2029 (the Act). See Murray v. Lyng, 667 F.Supp. 668, 675 (D.Minn.1987). The first of the challenged regulations requires that in determining the size and resources of a family applying for fo......
  • Foster v. Celani, Civ. A. No. 85-320.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • July 1, 1987
    ...reference to foster children was removed so that foster children could be included in the boarder category. Cf. Murray v. Lyng, 667 F.Supp. 668, 673 (D.Minn.1987) (concluding that "the removal of the reference to foster children in 1977 itself suggests that Congress did not intend foster ch......
  • Rios v. South Dakota Dept. of Social Services, s. 15683
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 5, 1987
    ...children should not be included as members of food stamp households. See Foster v. Celani, 683 F.Supp. 84 (D.Vt.1987); Murray v. Lyng, 667 F.Supp. 668 (D.Minn.1987). The substance of these cases is that the federal regulations requiring such inclusions in unearned income are contrary to Con......
  • Lemons v. Mycro Group Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • August 20, 1987

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