Murray v. Pennington

• Decision Date: 03 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No: 11-162-GFVT
• Citation: Murray v. Pennington, Civil No: 11-162-GFVT (E.D. Ky. Aug 03, 2012)
• Parties: JAMES MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. FRED PENNINGTON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

JAMES MURRAY, Plaintiff,

v.FRED PENNINGTON, Defendant.

Civil No: 11-162-GFVT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION LONDON

Dated: August 3, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION&ORDER

Before the Court are the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the PlaintiffJames Murray and the DefendantFred Pennington.In their respective motions, the parties assert they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there are no genuine issues of material fact.For the reasons stated below, Murray's Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED, and Pennington's Motion for Summary Judgment will be DENIED in part, and GRANTED in part.

I.

This case arises out of an incident that occurred on June 21, 2010.[R. 1, at 2.]Murray was driving on a public road in Laurel County, Kentucky.[Id.]Pennington, while on duty as a Kentucky State Police officer, stopped Murray's vehicle after he suspected Murray had improperly passed another vehicle.[Id.]During the stop, Pennington ordered Murray to exit his vehicle.[Id.]Some point after Murray got out of his vehicle, Pennington made a sweeping motion with one of his legs that knocked Murray's legs from underneath him causing him to fall to the ground.[Id. at 3;R. 26, at 2.]Murray was then arrested for reckless driving and taken to Laurel County DetentionCenter where he stayed for approximately 11 hours.[R. 1, at 3.]After his release from the detention center, Murray sought medical attention and discovered he had suffered broken ribs as a result of the fall caused by the leg sweep.[Id.]There are other facts pertinent to this matter, but they are in dispute and will be outlined in more detail below.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25(1986)."A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows 'that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"Olinger v. Corp. of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582(E.D. Ky.2007)(quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255(1986)).Stated otherwise, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424(6th Cir.2002).The movant may satisfy its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate there is a genuine issue.Hall Holding, 285F.3d at 424(citingCelotex, 477 U.S. at 324).Moreover, "the nonmoving party must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact.It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment."Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424(internal citations omitted).Finally, the trial court is under no duty to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact," and "the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact."In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655(6th Cir.2001).In applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566(6th Cir.2001)(citingLiberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).

III.

A.

In his Complaint, Murray asserts four federal claims and several state claims against Pennington.[R. 1.]The federal claims alleged against Pennington consist of excessive force (Count 1), unlawful arrest (Count 2), unlawful detention and confinement (Count 3), and cruel and unusual punishment (Count 4) all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[Id. at 3.]The state claims include false imprisonment, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence.[Id. at 3-4.]Pennington opposes several of these claims on substantive grounds and on the basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity and state immunity.

1.

Before the Court addresses the issues as they relate to qualified immunity, it must first resolve Pennington's assertion that Murray's claims fail because of insufficient service of process.

Murray served Pennington by way of summons and complaint through certified mail at KSP Post 11, London, Kentucky.[R. 3-3] Murray filed a return of service with this Court, but it did not indicate that Pennington endorsed the certified mail return receipt for the summons and complaint.[Id. at 4.]Instead, it reflected that the return receipt was signed by Patsy Young.[Id.]Pennington asserts he explicitly preserved in his Answer the right to assert insufficient service of process as a defense.[R. 5, at 8;R. 26, at 6.]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) sets the proper way to serve an individual defendant.An individual may be served by following state procedures or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally; by "leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there;" or by delivering a copy "to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)-(2).

Kentucky Rules of Court 4.01(a) authorizes service upon an individual defendant via certified mail.Specifically, the rule provides that a return receipt shall be proof of the time, place and manner of service.CR4.01(a).Further, service on an authorized representative constitutes service on a government official, so long as United States postal regulations permit it.CR4.01(a).Moreover, CR 4.04 grants that personallydelivering a copy of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive such documentation is appropriate.CR 4.04.

Here, Pennington is not entitled to dismissal on this issue.He cites two cases, Simon v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 2008 WL 1991710, *2(Ky. App.2008)(unpublished), andDouglas v. University of Kentucky Hospital, 2008 WL 2152209, * 2-3(Ky. App.2008)(unpublished), but fails to explain how their holdings are apropos to this matter.The resolution of this issue hinges on whether Patsy Young was an "authorized representative."But no argument is proffered by Pennington discrediting Patsy Young's status as such.Absent further explanation, the Court will not dismiss on this ground.

2.

Turning to Pennington's other arguments, he first asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Murray's federal claims.[R. 26, at 7.]"[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231(2009).A two-step analysis is utilized in evaluating claims of qualified immunity.First, "[t]aken in a light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right."Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201(2001).Second, was the right at issue "clearly established."Id."The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199(2004)."The burden of convincing a court thatthe law was clearly established rests squarely with the plaintiff."Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 1000(6th Cir.1999)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).Although at one time courts were required to follow these steps sequentially, the Supreme Court has abandoned that position and now permits courts to "exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand."Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.Qualified immunity analysis for federal claims is "essentially identical to the qualified immunity inquiry under [Kentucky] state law."Jefferson Cnty. Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 837(Ky.2004);see alsoYanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 521-23(Ky.2001).

Pennington asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment as to Murray's unlawful arrest claim.According to Pennington, Murray was arrested for reckless driving based on "[his] first-hand observation of Murray exceeding the speed limit and illegally passing another vehicle on Parker Road."[R. 26, at 11.]Pennington argues as further proof that Murray resolved the reckless driving charge by way of agreed disposition with the Commonwealth.[R. 26, at 11.]He charges that such a resolution is "fatal to any challenge of probable cause on grounds of judicial estoppel."[Id.]Pennington asserts, "[Murray] is bound by his decision to achieve an agreed disposition of the traffic offense in exchange for completion of an online driving course.[R. 26, at 12.]Murray, however, contends "Pennington never articulated any facts to justify an arrest over the issuance of a traffic citation."[R. 31, at 7.]Murray then...