Murray v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 January 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 3510,3511.,3510 |
| Parties | MURRAY v. UNITED STATES. FAHY v. SAME. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Benedict J. Short, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error Murray.
Lee O'Neill Brown, of Ottawa, Ill., for plaintiff in error Fahy.
Edwin A. Olson, U. S. Atty., and John Elliott Byrne, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Chicago, Ill.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs in error were indicted, with seven others, for the violation of sections 197 and 37 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. §§ 10367, 10201). All counts of the indictment charged all nine defendants as principals. The first five counts charged them with robbing a person having custody of the mails, and in effecting such robbery putting the life of the custodian in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons. Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 charged them with robbing the custodian of the mails, and count 11 with conspiracy to commit the several crimes set out in counts 1 to 10, inclusive. The six actual perpetrators of the robbery pleaded guilty, and three of them became witnesses for the government. One of the defendants was acquitted, and the plaintiffs in error, Murray and Fahy, were convicted on all counts, and sentenced to 25 years in the penitentiary. They sued out separate writs of error.
Murray assigned 198 alleged errors, covering nearly 100 pages of the printed record, and Fahy adopted Murray's assignments as his. In view of the number and volume of Murray's assignments, this short cut of Fahy is to be commended. Only 13 of all this multitude of assignments are mentioned in the briefs, and some of these are frivolous, as, for example, No. 4, that a verdict finding plaintiffs in error guilty of simple robbery and of robbery with dangerous weapons is inconsistent and repugnant. Of course the more serious crime includes the simpler one. Every person who robs with a dangerous weapon robs nevertheless. Another example is No. 5, that there is no evidence whatever to sustain the verdict against Fahy. There is abundance of evidence in the record to sustain the conviction of both plaintiffs in error, if the jury believed it. The credibility of it and the weight of it were for the jury alone to determine.
The assignments of error chiefly relied upon, except those relating to the refusal of the court to give requests for instructions Nos. 2 and 6, involve an erroneous view of the law of conspiracy, and of the rules of evidence applicable to a crime committed by several persons and charged against them jointly. The joint enterprise charged in the indictment and shown by the evidence had for its object the robbery of the mails at a time and under circumstances to be determined upon. It was a general plan to rob mails going out of Chicago, when the opportunity was favorable and when the promise of reward was sufficient. The evidence shows that the defendants in this case had no moderate appetite for loot. A possible haul of $100,000 was scorned by them. They sought to and actually did steal many times that amount The evidence discloses, not several joint enterprises and conspiracies to rob particular shipments of mail, but one general plan and design to rob the mails at such time and place as circumstances might warrant. While the plan for a time contemplated a robbery of trucks passing through the streets of Chicago, at another time the robbery of a certain mail supposed to carry $100,000 to Indianapolis, and finally the robbery which was actually effected, it was one continuous general plan and conspiracy to effectuate the robbery which was finally committed. The crime was so charged and evidence was introduced from which the jury might find the existence of such a conspiracy and that all the defendants were members of it. When once such a conspiracy, such a joint understanding, has been established and is pending, any act done or declaration made by any party to the understanding, in furtherance of the object of it, is admissible in evidence. Tested by this rule, all the criticisms of the rulings of the court upon what is called hearsay evidence disappear.
Some of the testimony of Glasscock, one of the accomplices, is much complained of in this respect and illustrates the contentions made. He...
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