Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n

• Decision Date: 28 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20120232.,20120232.
• Citation: 308 P.3d 461
• Parties: Michael R. MURRAY, Petitioner, v. UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, Utah State Parks and Recreation, and Workers Compensation Fund, Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

308 P.3d 461

Michael R. MURRAY, Petitioner,

v.UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, Utah State Parks and Recreation, and Workers Compensation Fund, Respondents.

No. 20120232.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 28, 2013.

Benjamin T. Davis, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

James R. Black, Salt Lake City, Jamison D. Ashby, Sandy, for respondents.

Chief Justice DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this case to determine two questions. First, we must decide whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing a Labor Commission decision, which applied law to fact, for an “abuse of discretion” rather than as a mixed question of law and fact. Second, we must decide whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that an employee who injured his back when a small wave unexpectedly rocked his boat failed to establish that it was his act of steadying himself, rather than a preexisting back condition, that was the legal cause of his injury. We conclude that the court of appeals should have reviewed the Labor Commission's decision in this case as a traditional mixed question of law and fact. But we ultimately uphold the court of appeals' conclusion that the employee failed to establish legal cause.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. On July 13, 2008, Petitioner Michael R. Murray was working as a park ranger for Utah State Parks and Recreation. At approximately 11:00 a.m. that day, Mr. Murray was preparing to go on boating patrol at Red Fleet State Park. The patrol boat was tied by both the bow and the stern to the end of a dock that extended thirty-five to forty feet into the water. The boat and dock were located in an area that was “usually ... a no-wake zone.” Mr. Murray started the boat and untied the bow. He then went to untie the stern. The cable at the stern was locked with a combination lock. Mr. Murray bent over the edge of the boat, the height of which was slightly above his knees, at a thirty-five to forty degree angle. He was holding the cable and the lock in his left hand and entering the combination with his right. At the time, Mr. Murray was wearing a fifteen-pound service belt and a one-pound inflatable life jacket.

¶ 3 While he was in this position, a five- to six-inch wave from another boat's wake unexpectedly rocked the patrol boat, causing Mr. Murray to lose his balance. Mr. Murray steadied himself by shifting his right foot against the side of the boat, grabbing the side of the boat with his right hand, and twisting his body. He immediately felt a slight pain in his lower back, but he nevertheless went on patrol. The pain worsened over the next two to three hours to the point that Mr. Murray was forced to leave work early. The pain continued to increase over the next several days, and he sought medical attention.

¶ 4 On September 29, 2008, Mr. Murray filed a worker's compensation claim with the Utah Labor Commission (Commission). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Murray's claim. She found that the accident aggravated a preexisting lower-back condition that had been “mostly asymptomatic” prior to the accident. She concluded that although the “unexpected” wave was the factual cause of Mr. Murray's injury, it was not the legal cause because it did not cause him “to go through any unusual exertions. He lost his balance a little but did not drop the lock or fall and was able to steady himself easily.”

¶ 5 Mr. Murray petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ's decision. The Commission affirmed, reasoning that “simply losing and regaining one's balance while bending over slightly, even if unexpected, is not an unusual or extraordinary exertion.”

¶ 6 Mr. Murray appealed the Commission's order to the Utah Court of Appeals. ¹ The court reviewed the Commission's order under an “abuse of discretion” standard,² concluding that “the Legislature granted the Labor Commission discretion to apply the law to the cases before it.” ³ Applying that standard, the court ruled that the Commission's determination that Mr. Murray failed to prove legal causation was “reasonable” and affirmed.⁴ Mr. Murray filed a timely petition for certiorari, which we granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A–3–102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 “On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the [agency].” ⁵ And “[t]he correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns, in part, on whether it accurately reviewed the [agency's] decision under the appropriate standard of review.” ⁶

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 We first consider whether the plain language of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) ⁷ necessarily incorporates standards of review so as to preclude application of our well-established approach to mixed questions of law and fact. Second, we consider whether the Commission's application of the law to the facts of Mr. Murray's case involved discretion, which would qualify it for an “abuse of discretion” standard of review on appeal. Finally, we consider whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that Mr. Murray failed to establish that his work-related accident, rather than his preexisting back condition, was the legal cause of his injury.

I. UNDER A PLAIN–LANGUAGE INTERPRETATION OF UAPA, SECTION 63G–4–403 INCORPORATES STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR SOME, BUT NOT ALL, AGENCY ACTION AND DOES NOT FORECLOSE OUR TRADITIONAL APPROACH FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The court of appeals relied on UAPA to determine which standard of review applies in this case,⁸ concluding that, under our UAPA precedent, “questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are generally reviewed for correctness.” ⁹ It also recognized an exception to this correctness standard that applies when “the [L]egislature has either explicitly or implicitly granted discretion to the agency to interpret or apply the law.” ¹⁰ Relying on this approach, the court determined that when a statute delegates discretion to an agency, it must review the agency's action for an abuse of discretion.¹¹

¶ 10 Mr. Murray contends that we have effectively overruled the approach relied on by the court of appeals. He points out that in Drake v. Industrial Commission¹² and Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission,¹³ which both involved Commission decisions, we employed our traditional approach for determining the appropriate standard of review. Under this approach, we first characterize the “issue as either a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question requiring application of the law to the facts” and then apply the corresponding level of deference to the decision under review.¹⁴ Mr. Murray claims that we should follow the same approach here and review his case as a traditional mixed question of law and fact.

¶ 11 The court of appeals faced a difficult decision in this case given our inconsistent precedent on UAPA standards of review. The court was certainly correct that UAPA applies to Mr. Murray's case. Because Mr. Murray seeks relief from the Commission's order denying him compensation benefits, we agree that UAPA governs our review of his claims on appeal. ¹⁵ But under the interpretation of UAPA we announce below, we disagree that UAPA necessarily forecloses our traditional approach for determining the appropriate standard of review.

¶ 12 In Morton International, Inc. v. Tax Commission, we stated that UAPA “incorporates standards that appellate courts are to employ when reviewing allegations of agency error.” ¹⁶ We derived these standards from what is now section 63G–4–403 of UAPA, which addresses judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings.¹⁷ Specifically, we considered what standard of review UAPA requires for an agency's interpretation or application of the law under what is now section 63G–4–403(4)(d).¹⁸ We concluded that UAPA incorporated a correctness standard for an agency's “interpretation or application of a statutory term.” ¹⁹ We further concluded that the only exceptions to this correctness standard are those instances where the Legislature has either explicitly or implicitly delegated discretion to an agency to interpret or apply the law.²⁰ If an agency indeed has such discretion, then under our interpretation of UAPA in Morton, we must review the agency's action for an abuse of discretion.²¹

¶ 13 As the court of appeals recognized in its opinion in this case, we have a significant amount of precedent applying Morton's interpretation of UAPA. ²² But we took a different approach to reviewing agency applications of law to fact beginning with Drake v. Industrial Commission. In Drake, we analyzed the “special errand” rule to determine whether an employee was injured within the scope and course of her employment for purposes of receiving benefits under the Workers Compensation Act.²³ In selecting a standard of review, we turned to State v. Pena, a criminal case that analyzed the level of deference appropriate for a trial court's determination of a mixed question of law and fact.²⁴ Relying on Pena, we recognized that “[w]hether an employee was injured while on a special errand is ... [a] highly fact-sensitive [question of law].” ²⁵ Thus, we stated it “is a question that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such decisions.” ²⁶ We accordingly applied a standard of review affording some deference to the Commission's decision.²⁷

¶ 14 We later decided Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission.²⁸ There, we relied on Drake for selecting a standard of review for a Commission decision applying the “going and coming” rule to determine if an employee was injured within the scope and course of employment.²⁹ We characterized the standard of review applied in Drake as “conditionally deferential” and concluded that, like “special errand” cases, Commission decisions concerning the “going and coming” rule also required...