Murray v. Wetzel, Civil No. 3:17-CV-491
| Decision Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:17-CV-491 |
| Parties | IRVING MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
This is an action filed by the pro se plaintiff, Irving Murray, who was formerly incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy. Murray brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights when they denied him adequate treatment for his Hepatitis C, failed to accommodate his need for a top bunk, and retaliated against him for filing grievances.
Several defendants in this case have now filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, summary judgment.1 Defendants Cowan, Palmigiano, and Millercontend that Murray's claims against them are unexhausted, and that his complaint fails to sufficiently allege First and Eighth Amendment violations. For the reasons that follow, we will recommend that the defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Irving Murray was incarcerated at SCI Mahanoy in October 2016 after he violated his parole. (Doc. 1, at 15). On October 25, Murray was moved from the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") to general population, and claims he was told tooccupy the top bunk in his cell. (Id., at 16). According to Murray, when he asked the officer on duty if he could be assigned to the bottom bunk because of his epilepsy and fall precautions, he was told that he had no medical restrictions in his file. (Id.) The next day, the plaintiff experienced a sleeping seizure, during which he fell out of the top bunk and was injured. (Id.) Murray claims that he was not given proper treatment for his injuries, even though the grievances attached to his complaint indicate that he was seen the same day and given x-rays and Ibuprofen for the pain. (Doc. 1-1, at 47). Murray further alleged that he was subjected to retaliation after filing grievances about his housing and bunk concerns. (Doc. 1, at 19).
In addition to his claim concerning his fall and subsequent injuries, Murray also alleges that he had Hepatitis C, and that the defendants failed to treat his condition. Fairly construed, Murray's complaint asserts that the DOC had access to new medications to treat Hepatitis C, but that the prison's policy was to monitor inmates whose conditions were not as severe as others. (Id., at 21-22). Murray claims that he repeatedly requested testing, liver biopsies, and anti-viral medications, but was denied these treatments in favor of a protocol to "monitor" inmates' conditions. (Id., at 27-28). He contends that the defendants chose to monitor inmates rather than treat them because of the cost of the medications used to treat Hepatitis C. (Id., at 29). Murray filed several grievances about his treatment, but only appealed one grievance to final review, which was denied.
Finally, scattered throughout the plaintiff's complaint are allegations that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. He claims that certain correctional defendants retaliated against him after he filed a grievance about the fall from his bunk. (Id., at 19). Murray alleges that these defendants moved him to a new unit, effectively denying him mental health programming, and that he was warned by the defendants to "drop the grievances." (Id.) Additionally, Murray also asserts that some of the defendants falsified his medical records in order to deny him treatment. (Id., at 29).
Murray initiated this action on March 20, 2017. (Doc. 1). His complaint contains allegations against twenty-two defendants, including correctional and medical staff, some of whom have been dismissed from this action. On April 11, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was denied by this court on January 10, 2018. (Docs. 13, 109). Subsequently, on March 29, the moving defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (Doc. 144). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution. (Docs. 145, 214).
The defendants have moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." With respect to this benchmark standard for legalsufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not "assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council ofCarpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and thendetermine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.' In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaintsatisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. (1955)). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, [ ] "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'"
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950....
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