Murrell v. State

• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: DAVID M. GLOVER,
• Decision Date: 27 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. CACR10-1025,CACR10-1025
• Citation: Murrell v. State, No. CACR10-1025 (Ark. App. Apr 27, 2011)
• Parties: CHARLES KENNETH MURRELL, JR. APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE

CHARLES KENNETH MURRELL, JR. APPELLANT

v.STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE

No. CACR10-1025

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I

Opinion Delivered April 27, 2011

APPEAL FROM THE BENTON

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[CR-2009-874-2]

HONORABLE DAVID CLINGER,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge

Appellant Charles Murrell, Jr. entered a conditional plea of guilty to the offense of driving while intoxicated after the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. In this appeal pursuant to Rule 24.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was seized pursuant to an unlawful traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, our appellate courts conduct a de novo review based upon the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuitcourt's ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Moss v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 14, ___S.W.3d___.

Background

Officer John Alexander testified that he was on duty the evening of December 19, 2008. He explained that, at approximately 9:46 p.m., his attention was drawn to a GMC Sonoma vehicle, which was traveling northbound on South Eighth Street in Rogers, Arkansas. He stated that the vehicle was driving approximately ten miles below the speed limit and that it was drifting within its lane. He testified that he learned at the law-enforcement training academy that extremely slow driving and drifting are indications of a possibly intoxicated driver.

Officer Alexander explained that he started to follow the vehicle and pulled up behind it to "run" the vehicle's tag. He stated that it came back with "no return." He said that he told the dispatcher that it was an Indian Nations tag from Muscogee and that the dispatcher told him when they ran the tag out of Oklahoma, it came back with two returns, one out of the state and one out of Indian Nations, and that there was no return from either in this case.

Officer Alexander testified that he was not able to see the decal on the tag clearly enough to determine if it was a valid year; that he made the traffic stop and talked to appellant about the tag; that appellant had an expired vehicle registration with him but not a current one; that the license sticker did say 2009, showing that it was valid at the time; however, when he tried to run the tag, he was unable to get any type of return off the tag number out of Oklahoma. He said that appellant told him the car belonged to his father-in-law. OfficerAlexander acknowledged that he could see the 2009 sticker clearly in the courtroom, but stated that he could not read it that night and that he was not familiar with the colors of O klahoma tags.

Following the initial hearing, the submission of briefs, and a follow-up hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, concluding that the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle because of an apparent invalid license tag. At a hearing on June 16, 2010, appellant agreed with the asserted factual basis for his guilty plea, which included the following facts: after Officer Alexander stopped the car, he noticed appellant was extremely loud and slurring his words a little bit; he smelled of intoxicants; and he failed the field-sobriety tests administered to him by O fficer Alexander. The trial court accepted appellant's conditional plea, and this appeal followed.

In Reeves v. State, 20 Ark. App. 17, 21-22, 722 S.W.2d 880, 882 (1987), our court explained:

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." That protection extends to persons driving down the street. If the police stop a vehicle and detain its occupants, a seizure has occurred. Whenever practicable, the police are required to obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. That process turns on the question of "probable cause." However, it has been held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the police may stop persons on the street or in their vehicles in the absence of either a warrant or probable cause under limited circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); and Leopold v. State, 15 Ark. App. 292, 692 S.W.2d 780 (1985). One of those limited circumstances involves cases such as the present one—the investigatory stop.

In determining whether an investigatory stop has been made consistent with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment, we balance the nature and quality of theintrusion against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify that intrusion. Van Patten v. State, 16 Ark. App. 83, 697 S.W.2d 919 (1985). Where felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety are concerned, the government's interest in solving the crime and promptly detaining the

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