Murry v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 12 September 2014
• Docket Number: Record No. 131137.
• Citation: 762 S.E.2d 573
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Ronald Stuart MURRY, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

762 S.E.2d 573

Ronald Stuart MURRY, Jr.

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 131137.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Sept. 12, 2014.

Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes; Benjamin & DesPortes, Richmond, on briefs), for appellant.

Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

Opinion by Chief Justice CYNTHIA D. KINSER.

The defendant, Ronald Stuart Murry, Jr., is subject to a probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer. The probation condition is not reasonable in light of the offenses for which Murry was convicted, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Hanover County, Murry was convicted of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2–61; ¹ four counts of aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Code § 18.2–67.3(A)(1); and one count of aggravated sexual battery, in violation of Code § 18.2–67.3(A)(3). The victim, B.W., was Murry's stepdaughter. At trial, she testified about sexual abuse starting at the age of five and culminating in rape after she reached the age of 13. Murry denied the allegations of sexual battery but admitted to having sexual intercourse with B.W. when she was 13 years old. He claimed, however, that the intercourse was not against B.W.'s will and that he did not use any threats, force, or intimidation against her. The circuit court rejected Murry's testimony, finding it to be “incredible” and concluding that the “ongoing relationship and the grooming behavior ... he encouraged from the time she was five years old [was] a much more credible explanation for how [the rape] occurred when she was thirteen.”

At sentencing, the circuit court imposed terms of incarceration for each of the convictions, totaling 156 years and 7 months.² The court suspended 140 years of the sentences for the period of Murry's “natural life,” leaving a term of active incarceration of 16 years and 7 months. The court further ordered that upon release from incarceration, Murry would be on supervised probation for an indefinite period. As a condition of Murry's probation, the court ordered, inter alia, that Murry “shall submit his person, property, place or residence, vehicle, and personal effects, to search at any time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any Probation Officer or Law Enforcement Officer.”

Murry objected to this probation condition, arguing that the Fourth Amendment waiver was “not really necessarily appropriate” because the convictions did not involve illegal substances or firearms. The circuit court overruled the objection, stating:

I agree with the Commonwealth that [Murry] groomed this child from an early age to accept his physical advances and that he manipulated her into this at the same time that he was presenting to everyone in his family and everyone in the community what a good person he would be ... to have with children. I mean it's classic predatory behavior.... And, even at this point ..., he does not accept responsibility for that, he exhibits distorted behavior about his own role in this.... And, in order to protect the community at the time that he's finally released, I want ... law enforcement to have the ability to go directly into his house at any time to see what he's doing.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Murry challenged the probation condition requiring waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Murry v. Commonwealth, 62 Va.App. 179, 181, 743 S.E.2d 302, 303 (2013). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, concluding that the challenged probation condition “is reasonable under the facts of this case.” Id. at 189, 743 S.E.2d at 307.

We awarded Murry this appeal. As he argued in the Court of Appeals, Murry asserts that the condition of probation requiring him to submit to searches of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any probation or law enforcement officer with or without a search warrant or reasonable cause throughout the term of his probation is both unreasonable under Virginia law and unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

ANALYSIS

We review conditions of probation imposed by a trial court as part of its sentencing determination for abuse of discretion. Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735, 652 S.E.2d 109, 111 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion “when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; [or] when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.” Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston–Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260, 661 S.E.2d 415, 445 (2008) (“The abuse-of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Probation is a form of criminal sanction, like incarceration, imposed by a trial court after a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Pursuant to Code § 19.2–303, “[a]fter conviction, whether with or without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on probation under such conditions as the court shall determine.” This statute authorizes a trial court to impose such reasonable terms and conditions of probation as it deems appropriate. Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478, 484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952) (decided under predecessor statute, former Code § 53–272). The only statutory limitation on the court's exercise of its discretion is “one of reasonableness.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 580, 585, 507 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1998). Probation conditions must be reasonable in light of the nature of the offense, the defendant's background, and the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 585, 507 S.E.2d at 342; see also State v. Allah, 750 S.E.2d 903, 911 (N.C.Ct.App.2013) (discussing that probation conditions must bear a reasonable relationship to the offenses committed by the defendant, tend to reduce the defendant's exposure to crime, and assist in the defendant's rehabilitation) (citing State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 180, 282 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1981)); Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1258 (Wyo.2002) (holding that “probation conditions must be reasonably related to rehabilitation, to the criminal conduct for which the probationer was convicted, and to the deterrence of future criminal conduct”).

Murry argues that the circuit court abused its discretion because the probation condition is not reasonably related to the offenses for which he was convicted, his background, or any surrounding circumstances and amounts to a “lifetime waiver” of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.³ The Commonwealth responds that the probation condition is reasonable in light of the circuit court's findings that Murry groomed his victim from an early age, was able to conceal his reprehensible conduct from his family and the community, and never accepted responsibility for his behavior. According to the Commonwealth, the probation condition is necessary to verify Murry's compliance with other probation conditions and to protect the public. Because the probation condition here implicates Murry's Fourth Amendment rights, to determine whether it is reasonable we must measure Murry's privacy interests against the Commonwealth's interests in imposing the condition in light of Murry's offenses, his background, and the surrounding circumstances. See Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding that when a defendant contends that a probation condition is “unduly intrusive on a constitutional right,” a review of the condition must balance the constitutional rights enjoyed by the probationer and the legitimate needs of law enforcement); Jones, 41 P.3d at 1258 (determining the reasonableness of a probation condition waiving Fourth Amendment rights “requires a balancing of the interests of the state and the privacy interests of the probationer”).

Probation is “one point ... on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164. “Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,’ ” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164), “but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation conditions].” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Because “[a] [s]tate's operation of a probation system ... presents ‘special needs' beyond normal law enforcement” to ensure that probation restrictions are followed, “departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements” for searches may be justified. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873–74, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The permissible range of departure, however, “is not unlimited.” Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164.

In Knights, the Supreme Court of the United States determined the reasonableness of a search of a probationer by balancing “ ‘on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion...