Muskegon Tp. v. Continental Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1956
• Docket Number: M,No. 5,No. 19,5,19
• Citation: 346 Mich. 218,77 N.W.2d 799
• Parties: TOWNSHIP OF MUSKEGON, a municipal corporation, County of Muskegon, a municipal corporation, Orchard View Rural Agricultural School Districtuskegon Township, a municipal corporation, Plaimtiffs and Appellees, v. CONTINENTAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation doing business in the State of Michigan, Defendant and Appellant, and United States of America, Intervening Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 799

77 N.W.2d 799

346 Mich. 218

TOWNSHIP OF MUSKEGON, a municipal corporation County of Muskegon, a municipal corporation Orchard View Rural Agricultural School District No. 5 Muskegon Township, a municipal corporation Plaimtiffs and Appellees, v. CONTINENTAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation doing business in the State of Michigan, Defendant and Appellant, and United States of America, Intervening Defendant and Appellant.

No. 19.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 28, 1956.

Butzel, Eaman, Long, Gust & Kennedy, Detroit, Joseph T. Riley, Muskegon, Victor W. Klein and Clifford W. Van Blarcom, Detroit, of counsel, for plaintiffappellant appellant Continental Motors Corp.

Charles K. Rice, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Hilbert P. Zarky, Lyle M. Turner, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Wendell A. Miles, U. S. Atty., Robert J. Danhof, Asst. U. S. Atty., Grand Rapids, for intervening defendant-appellant.

Charles A. Larnard, Muskegon, for Muskegon Tp., plaintiff-appellee.

Robert A. Cavanaugh, Muskegon, for Muskegon County, plaintiff-appellee.

Street & Sorenson, by Harold M. Street, Muskegon, for School District, plaintiff-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

BLACK, Justice.

This case is a direct descendant of Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Muskegon, 346 Mich. 141, 77 N.W.2d 370. It marks the second and separate effort of a corporation hailing from Virginia and doing business for profit in Muskegon township to find legal means of transferring its more than substantial share of the cost of local govermnent to the shoulders of local payers of property taxes.

The property known in the records of both cases as Plancor 166 was deeded May 6, 1953 by RFC to the United States with result that on the next ensuing tax day (January 1, 1954) Plancor 166 concedely became and remained exempt from taxation. The fact of such conveyance was noted in the cited case at page 146 of 346 Mich., at page 372 of 77 N.W.2d and it with this suit transfers judicial attention from determination of validity of property taxes levied against Plancor 166, when title thereto stood in the name of RFC, to question whether the plaintiff taxing authorities lawfully assessed Continental, as continuing lessee for profit of Plancor 166 after title thereto passed to the United States, pursuant to P.A.1953, No. 189. ¹

Turning now to Comtinental's status under said act 189 in conjunction with the present suit: The supplemental agreement, by which Continental continued to use and occupy Plancor 166 following transfer of title to the United States, contains this self-explanatory covenant:

'6. The Contractor ² shall pay to the properly constituted authority or authorities as and when the same may become due and payable all taxes, assessments, excises and similar charges which may be lawfully taxed, assessed or imposed upon the Contractor with respect to or upon Plancor 166 or any part thereof, provided, however, that such taxes, assessments, excises or similar charges shall be prorated and apportioned as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date of determination thereof respectively. Nothing herein contained, however, shall prohibit the Contractor from contesting in good faith the validity of any such taxes for assessments.'

The 1954 assessment having been levied against Continental under said act 189 in the total sum of $84,051.76, and Continental having refused to pay, this suit to recover the levy followed. Trial to the court, Honorable Raymond L. Smith, circuit judge presiding, resulted in judgment for the plaintiff local units in accordance with their declaration and the present appeal by Continental to this Court. The substantial questions before us are stated by Continental as follows:

'1. Does Act No 189 of the Public Acts of Michigan for 1953 impose an ad valorem property tax or a privilege tax?'

'2. Is Act No 189 of the Public Acts of Michigan for 1953 invalid because it attempts to impose an ad valorem tax upon real property which was owned by the United States, was used solely for its benefit and was otherwise immune from local ad valorem taxation by the mere device of stating that it was taxing the lessees or users thereof in the same amount and to the same extent as though such lessee or user was the owner of such property and thus attempts to defeat the impact of Federal constitutional immunity?'

'4. Even if Act No 189 of the Public Acts of Michigan for 1953 imposes a privilege tax is it invalid as a privilege tax because it is discriminatory in purpose and effect, and is primarily directed at Federally-owned property and designed to subject to state taxation property which is constitutionally immune from such taxation?'

Stated questions 1 and 2 were firmly resolved against Continental's contention in United States v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 601, 77 N.W.2d 79, and it is unnecessary to repeat what was said of such issues on that occasion. Stated question 4, dealing with alleged invidious discrimination against lessees of tax-exempt property engaged as the statute says in 'business conducted for profit', deserves and will receive consideration.

Continental's counsel say, in support of question 4:

'It should also be noted that those subject to the Act are obliged to pay a tax which they cannot collect from the owner. No remedy has been provided for that purpose and any remedy, if it had been provided, would be ineffective against the sovereign rights of The United States. On the other hand, lessees of the vast bulk of the real property in this State, if they are taxed at all under 7.3 M.S.A., are given an effective remedy to collect such taxes from the owner of such realty [7.97, M.S.A.]. Thus, those few subject to Act 189, who use Federally-owned tax-immune realty, find themselves carrying a burden not imposed upon any other lessee or user of real property in this State. This too constitutes an unlawful discrimination against those engaged in the use of Federally-owned real property.'

The contention is without merit. Indeed, when it is searchingly examined in light of the companion records that are before us, we should in my view conclude that the legislature by act 189 has wisely effectuated its continuing duty of providing equal burdens and equal privileges for those of corresponding or similar situation. Without act 189 a lessee or user for profit of federally-owned tax-immune realty becomes specially privileged and notably favored over his local classmates, and I refer to that class which directly shares the burdens as well as the benefits of local government. As counsel for plaintiffs say:

'When a large and valuable piece of property ...