Musso-Escude v. Edwards
| Citation | 4 P.3d 151,101 Wash.App. 560 |
| Decision Date | 17 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 44716-5-I.,44716-5-I. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Washington |
| Parties | Maria Laura MUSSO-ESCUDE, Appellant, v. Lawrance EDWARDS and Jane Doe Edwards, husband and wife, Respondents, and Drew C. Nielsen and Jane Doe Nielsen, husband and wife; and City of Bothell, Defendants. |
Franklin William Shoichet, Seattle, for Appellant.
Anne Melani Bremner, Scott D. Bissell, Blake Edward Dias, Stafford Frey Cooper, Seattle, for Respondents.
Maria Laura Musso-Escude appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her claims against Lawrance Edwards, an attorney who prosecuted criminal charges against her on behalf of the City of Bothell. We affirm the dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because Musso-Escude has not shown an infringement of her civil rights. We affirm the dismissal of her state law abuse of process claim because Edwards was acting within the scope of his duties when he offered to dismiss criminal charges against Musso-Escude in return for a release of potential civil claims, and because he is absolutely immune for performing that prosecutorial function.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, as demonstrated by the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file.1 Reasonable inferences from the evidence are resolved against the moving party.2 Summary judgment motions should only be granted if a reasonable person could reach but one conclusion from all the evidence.3 Appellate courts reviewing summary judgments engage in the same inquiry as the trial court (i.e., de novo).4 Where a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is dismissed on summary judgment based upon a claim of immunity, an appellate court assumes that all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true.5 The facts here are set forth accordingly.
Bothell is a non-charter code city subject to the optional municipal code provisions of RCW Title 35A.6 Under RCW 35A.11.020, the city is authorized to adopt and enforce ordinances, and may impose penalties for the violation of such ordinances constituting a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor.
RCW 35A.13.090 requires the city to obtain legal counsel, either by appointment of a city attorney on a full time or part time basis, or by any reasonable contractual arrangement for such professional services. The function of "city attorney" was contractually arranged for with a Seattle law firm.
The Bothell Municipal Code (BMC) does not provide for an office of "prosecuting attorney." Instead, the City contracted with Edwards to provide "all municipal court related prosecution legal services for the City." The contract provided that Edwards:
shall make decisions involving, but not limited to, the charging of crimes, plea agreements, compromises, sentencing recommendations, review and revocation of probation, independently of the City, the Bothell Police Department, and the Chief of Police. These decisions shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of [Edwards] and be made in accordance with accepted prosecutor ethics, cannons, and current practices.
The contract further provided that Edwards would obtain his own liability insurance, he would indemnify Bothell for any claims or losses arising out of his performance of the contract, and his status was that of an "independent contractor." As an independent contractor, Edwards was not afforded sick leave, vacation time, or additional pay for overtime applicable to city employees, and the city was not responsible for payment of his social security taxes or income tax withholding. If Edwards was not available to perform his duties under the contract, such as when he was on vacation, he was required to associate (at his expense) another attorney to perform the services required under the contract.
Musso-Escude was arrested for obstruction of justice contrary to BMC 9.60.10 because she purportedly tried to enter her house after being told not to do so by a Bothell police officer who had followed her home after observing her speeding. Musso-Escude allegedly struggled with the officer after he grabbed her arms. The officer arrested Musso-Escude and took her to the police station.
Edwards offered to dismiss the obstruction charge against Musso-Escude in exchange for her release of potential civil claims in connection with the arrest. In the course of discovery during the instant case, Bothell admitted that Edwards had "sole authority regarding plea negotiations," but denied his authority to negotiate civil actions. Bothell also admitted that Edwards did not obtain specific permission from its officials to negotiate such a release.
After Musso-Escude rejected the release-dismissal offer, Edwards added two additional charges: resisting arrest contrary to BMC 9.60.020 and negligent driving contrary to BMC 10.10.010.7 The charges went to trial and, after Edwards presented the case-in-chief, Musso-Escude moved for a dismissal. That motion was denied (as was a pre-trial Knapstad8 motion Musso-Escude had made).
A jury acquitted Musso-Escude of all three charges. Musso-Escude then filed this suit against Bothell, the police officer that had arrested her, and Edwards. She pled causes of action under state law for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and emotional distress, and further claimed a violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Edwards moved for summary judgment, contending that he was absolutely immune from suit or, alternatively, that Musso-Escude's suit should be dismissed because he was either qualifiedly immune or the claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court concluded that Edwards was absolutely immune from suit and dismissed all claims against him. The claims against the other defendants were settled.
On appeal, Musso-Escude argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her state law claim of abuse of process and her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a codification of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.9 The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...[10]
Where a cause of action is brought under this statute, the first inquiry is necessarily "whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all."11 The United States Supreme Court has found in the First Amendment a constitutional basis for the right of access to the courts, as that access is an aspect of the right of petition.12 The constitutional right of access to the courts is a well established facilitative right "designed to ensure that a citizen has the opportunity to exercise his or her legal rights to present a cognizable claim to the appropriate court and, if that claim is meritorious, to have the court make a determination to that effect and order the appropriate relief."13 "The right of access to the courts is implicated `where the ability to file suit was delayed, or blocked altogether.'"14
Edwards contends that Musso-Escude has not shown a violation of a constitutional right with respect to her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree. Musso-Escude made a bare allegation that Edwards infringed her constitutional right of access to the courts by demanding a release from civil liability and by adding additional charges after that demand was rebuffed. She has not argued how her right of access to the courts or her ability to file suit was delayed, blocked, or implicated by the proffered agreement that she did not sign,15 and no impairment of her rights is clearly set forth in her complaint or her opposition to Edwards' summary judgment motion. Musso-Escude's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails as a matter of law.16
Edwards claims that he is entitled to absolute immunity from Musso-Escude's state tort claims, citing Dang v. Ehredt.17 A review of Dang, and other Washington cases decided upon the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, indicates that our state courts follow federal constructs of such immunity.18 Analysis of a prosecutor's absolute immunity from suit under state law claims tracks common law immunity analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19
Common law immunity is usually afforded to government officials for public policy reasons, including the injustice of finding liability against an official who is charged by law to exercise discretion and a concern that the threat of liability would damper an official's desire to perform his or her duties zealously.20 Two types of common law immunity are recognized, qualified and absolute.21 Absolute immunity protects an official from suit for any act done in the course of performing his or her duties, and serves as a shield from liability even where willful misconduct is alleged.22 Qualified immunity protects an official only for those acts done in good faith.23 In general, executive branch officials are afforded qualified immunity.24
Where a state actor claims immunity against a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they must first show a common-law basis for that privilege.25 As stated by the Court in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons:26
We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy. When [a] prosecutorial function is not within the advocate's role and there is no historical tradition of immunity on which we can draw, our inquiry is at an end.[27]
In Imbler v. Pachtman, a former prisoner whose conviction had been set aside in collateral proceedings sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the...
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