Musson v. Godley

• Decision Date: 22 December 1999
• Citation: Musson v. Godley, 1999 ME 193, 742 A.2d 479 (Me. 1999)
• Parties: Edward MUSSON v. Otis A. GODLEY et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

742 A.2d 479

1999 ME 193

Edward MUSSON v.Otis A. GODLEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued December 8, 1999.

Decided December 22, 1999.

Charles E. Gilbert(orally), Gilbert & Greif, Bangor, for plaintiff.

Edmond J. Bearor(orally), Rudman & Winchell, LLC, Bangor, for defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1]Edward Musson appeals from an order entered in the Superior Court(Hancock County, Mead, J.) finding that Musson failed to establish that he had ousted his cotenant and consequently that he had failed to establish that he had acquired title to property by adverse possession.Because the order of the Superior Court was not final, we remand the case for further proceedings.

[¶ 2] This matter involves a dispute over title to Loon Island (a/k/a Goat Island) on Great Pond in the Town of Great Pond.Musson and Bruce Hathaway purchased the property in question as tenants in common in 1946.Shortly thereafter, Hathaway left the state and had no further involvement with the property.Musson continued his involvement with the property, running a hunting and fishing camp on the land for several decades.Hathaway died in 1991.After Hathaway's estate and Musson were unable to reach an agreement regarding the nature of the estate's interest in the property, the personal representative of the estate sold whatever interest it had in the property to Otis Godley.

[¶ 3] On February 6, 1996, Musson filed suit against Godley, the Hathaway estate, and Seeley Clark(as mortgagee to Godley) seeking betterment compensation for improvements made to the property, a partition of the property, or a declaration that Musson had obtained exclusive title to the property by adverse possession.The Hathaway estate and Godley filed answers and counterclaims.In their counterclaims, they sought an accounting and sought to recover a proportion of profits or earnings from the operation of the business on the property from 1946 to the present.

[¶ 4] After a nonjury trial, the Superior Court found that Musson had failed to establish title by adverse possession because he did not carry his burden of showing a "clear ouster" of his cotenant.With respect to the financial claims, the court ordered that Musson provide an accounting for all income and expenses related to the property.The court, however, declined to rule on the competing requests for monetary awards, and ordered that "[t]he court has left the door open for the parties to return to court upon the issues of partition and money due from one to the other as appropriate."¹

[¶ 5] It is evident, therefore, that Musson's appeal is premature.Although the matter before us involves three separate issues—adverse possession, partition, and income or expense allocation—it does not follow that the resolution of any one of those issues creates an appealable event.Generally, only final judgments are ripe for appellate review."A judgment is final ... when ... `the trial court's action fully decides and disposes of the whole matter leaving nothing further for the consideration and judgment of the trial court.'"Berry v. Berry,634 A.2d 451, 452(Me.1993)(quotingIn re Erica B.,520 A.2d 342, 343-44(Me.1987)).We have provided for a few narrow exceptions to the rule but have limited their application to extraordinary situations.SeeState v. Maine State Employees Ass'n,482 A.2d 461, 464(Me.1984)(discussing the application of the death knell, judicial economy, and collateral order exceptions).

[¶ 6] None of the exceptions applies here.An immediate appellate review is not necessary to prevent an "irreparable injury."SeePlumbago Mining Corp. v. Sweatt,444 A.2d 361, 368(Me.1982).Similarly, the interests of judicial economy do not require immediate review.SeeMilstar Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth.,351 A.2d 538(Me.1976).To the contrary, a review here would not only encourage piecemeal litigation, it would invite the parties to relitigate several aspects of the current case.Finally, the collateral order exception is not applicable to the facts before us.

[¶ 7] In limited instances, when the resolution of one part of an action may be dispositive of the remaining unresolved components of the action, the parties may seek appellate review of one component alone by obtaining a certification of final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ....