Mustapha v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Decision Date | 22 May 1967 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 3210. |
Parties | Elizabeth MUSTAPHA v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Aram A. Arabian, Providence, R. I., for plaintiff.
John F. Dolan, Providence, R. I., for defendant.
The issue before the court is one of initial impression never having been raised in this state since the adoption of the Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act in 1912.
This action is brought by Elizabeth Mustapha, an employee of Patton-MacGuyer Company, who was injured at the plant on September 4, 1962 in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. The defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, is the workmen's compensation insurance carrier for Patton-MacGuyer Company and has entered into payments of the statutory benefits to the plaintiff.
This action is brought pursuant to the third-party liability provision of the Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act, which allows an injured employee to accept workmen's compensation benefits and also proceed against a third person who caused the injury.
Section 28-35-58 of the Rhode Island General Laws reads as follows:
The plaintiff alleges in her complaint, paragraphs five, six and seven that:
a) The defendant, as workmen's compensation insurer of Patton MacGuyer Co., conducted periodic safety inspections of the Patton-MacGuyer machinery and plant;
b) that the defendant "had a duty based upon an undertaking which is distinct from the contract of workmen's compensation insurance, to inspect and provide safety measures in the operation and maintenance of said Patton-MacGuyer machinery and equipment" and
c) that the defendant negligently failed to perform this duty causing the plaintiff to be injured.
In other words, there is no allegation of a contractual undertaking but that the defendant voluntarily undertook to conduct the inspection in question.
The defendant moved under rule 50(a) of F.R.Civ.P. for a motion for directed verdict on the ground that it is not subject to liability as a third-party tortfeasor under the Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant contends that as workmen's compensation insurer of plaintiff's employer, it shares the tort immunity of her employer from a third-party action under the provisions of the act.
Thus, the question before this court is entirely one of law: Is the workmen's compensation insurance carrier of the plaintiff's employer, who must pay the statutory benefits provided by the Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act, also subject to liability under the third-party liability provisions of that act (Sec. 28-35-58)?
In determining this question, the court must look to the scope and purpose of the act along with all the applicable provisions in order to get a more comprehensive insight as to what the legislature actually intended. The language of an act is, of course, the fundamental guide to legislative meaning and purpose, but it is the language of the act as a whole that is to be read and not the words of a section or provision in isolation. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co. (8 Cir. 1945), 150 F.2d 988, 993, 161 A.L.R. 370.
The scope and purpose of the act were set out for this court by Judge Day in Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., (D. C.R.I.1954), 122 F.Supp. 806, 810.
It is clear a reading of the act shows that the legislature did not specifically grant immunity to a compensation insurer from being amenable to suit as a third-party tortfeasor, but numerous provisions equating the workmen's compensation insurer with the employer does negative an intent to hold it, the insurer, liable to suit as a third party.
Several pertinent provisions of the act which point this up are:
Considering these two sections together with Section 28-29-20, which provides that the right to compensation is in lieu of common law rights and remedies, the right of compensation from the workmen's compensation carrier bars, by its very language, a common law tort action against such workmen's compensation insurance carrier.
Section 28-36-8—Subrogation of insurer to right of employer—"When any employer is insured against liability for compensation and the insurer shall have paid any compensation for which the employer was liable, or shall have assumed the liability of the employer thereof, the insurer shall be subrogated to all the rights and duties of the employer and may enforce such rights in its own name."
Throughout the whole context of the act, the words "employer" and insurer are used interchangeably, thus denoting an equating of the two. See, for example, in addition to those already mentioned Sec. 28-35-3, Sec. 28-35-7, Sec. 28-35-13, Sec. 28-35-39, Sec. 28-35-40, Sec. 28-35-41, Sec. 28-35-45, etc.
Turning once more to the third party liability provision, Sec. 28-35-58, supra, it seems very doubtful, upon a close reading of it that the legislature ever contemplated a compensation insurer being brought in as a third party. The reasoning behind this statement is that there is a clear division between "a person so liable to pay damages" and "a person liable to pay compensation." As the defendant argues, a workmen's compensation insurer cannot be held to fit both of these descriptions. Also, the use of the words "some other person than" would seem to contemplate a stranger to the workmen's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 84-1909
...Cal.App.2d 416, 46 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1965); Gerace v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 264 F.Supp. 95 (D.D.C.1966); Mustapha v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 268 F.Supp. 890 (D.R.I.), aff'd 387 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.1967); Matthews v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968)......
-
A AND B CONST., INC. v. Atlas Roofing and Skylight Co.
...their employer, and employers are deprived of certain common law defenses previously made available to them. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F.Supp. 890 (D.R.I.1967). The RIWCA recognizes, however, that an employee might be injured under circumstances that create a cause of action ag......
-
Cline v. Avery Abrasives, Inc.
...States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Theus, 493 P.2d 433 (Okl.); Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 631 (C.C.A. 1st), affg. 268 F.Supp. 890 (D.R.I.); Horne v. Security Mut. Casualty Co., 265 F.Supp. 379 (E.D.Ark.).3 See, Beasley v. MacDonald Engineering Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So.2d 84......
-
Matthews v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
...Act). Horne v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F.Supp. 379, 387 (E.D.Ark.) (Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act). Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F.Supp. 890, 893--895 (D.R.I.) affd. 387 F.2d 631, 632 (1st Cir.) (Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act). Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar......