Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett
Decision Date | 24 June 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12–142.,12–142. |
Citation | 186 L.Ed.2d 607,570 U.S. 472,133 S.Ct. 2466 |
Parties | MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC., Petitioner v. Karen L. BARTLETT. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Jay P. Lefkowitz, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Anthony A. Yang, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner.
David C. Frederick, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Michael W. McConnell, Michael D. Shumsky, John K. Crisham, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, Jay P. Lefkowitz, P.C., Counsel of Record, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Steven M. Gordon, Christine M. Craig, Shaheen & Gordon, Concord, NH, Keith M. Jensen, Jensen & Associates, PLLC, Fort Worth, TX, David C. Frederick, Counsel of Record, Brendan J. Crimmins, Joshua D. Branson, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
We must decide whether federal law pre-empts the New Hampshire design-defect claim under which respondent Karen Bartlett recovered damages from petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical, the manufacturer of sulindac, a generic nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID). New Hampshire law imposes a duty on manufacturers to ensure that the drugs they market are not unreasonably unsafe, and a drug's safety is evaluated by reference to both its chemical properties and the adequacy of its warnings. Because Mutual was unable to change sulindac's composition as a matter of both federal law and basic chemistry, New Hampshire's design-defect cause of action effectively required Mutual to change sulindac's labeling to provide stronger warnings. But, as this Court recognized just two Terms ago in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011), federal law prohibits generic drug manufacturers from independently changing their drugs' labels. Accordingly, state law imposed a duty on Mutual not to comply with federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that require a private party to violate federal law are pre-empted and, thus, are "without effect." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).
The Court of Appeals' solution—that Mutual should simply have pulled sulindac from the market in order to comply with both state and federal law—is no solution. Rather, adopting the Court of Appeals' stop-selling rationale would render impossibility pre-emption a dead letter and work a revolution in this Court's pre-emption case law.
Accordingly, we hold that state-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug's warnings are pre-empted by federal law under PLIVA . We thus reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals below.
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., drug manufacturers must gain approval from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing any drug in interstate commerce. § 355(a). In the case of a new brand-name drug, FDA approval can be secured only by submitting a new-drug application (NDA). An NDA is a compilation of materials that must include "full reports of [all clinical] investigations," § 355(b)(1)(A), relevant nonclinical studies, and "any other data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug product obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source," 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(d)(2) and (5)(iv) (2012). The NDA must also include "the labeling proposed to be used for such drug," 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) ; 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(i), and "a discussion of why the [drug's] benefits exceed the risks under the conditions stated in the labeling," 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) ; § 314.50(c)(2)(ix). The FDA may approve an NDA only if it determines that the drug in question is "safe for use" under "the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof." 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). In order for the FDA to consider a drug safe, the drug's "probable therapeutic benefits must outweigh its risk of harm." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000).
The process of submitting an NDA is both onerous and lengthy. See Report to Congressional Requesters, Government Accountability Office, Nov. 2006, New Drug Development, 26 Biotechnology L. Rep. 82, 94 (2007) ( ). In order to provide a swifter route for approval of generic drugs, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, popularly known as the "Hatch–Waxman Act." Under Hatch–Waxman, a generic drug may be approved without the same level of clinical testing required for approval of a new brand-name drug, provided the generic drug is identical to the already-approved brand-name drug in several key respects.
First, the proposed generic drug must be chemically equivalent to the approved brand-name drug: it must have the same "active ingredient" or "active ingredients," "route of administration," "dosage form," and "strength" as its brand-name counterpart. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). Second, a proposed generic must be "bioequivalent" to an approved brand-name drug. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). That is, it must have the same "rate and extent of absorption" as the brand-name drug. § 355(j)(8)(B). Third, the generic drug manufacturer must show that "the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [approved brand-name] drug." § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
Once a drug—whether generic or brand-name—is approved, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any major changes to the "qualitative or quantitative formulation of the drug product, including active ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application." 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i). Generic manufacturers are also prohibited from making any unilateral changes to a drug's label. See §§ 314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.150(b)(10) ( ).
In 1978, the FDA approved a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory pain reliever called "sulindac" under the brand name Clinoril. When Clinoril's patent expired, the FDA approved several generic sulindacs, including one manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical. 678 F.3d 30, 34 (C.A.1 2012) (case below); App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a–145a. In a very small number of patients, NSAIDs—including both sulindac and popular NSAIDs such as ibuprofen, naproxen, and Cox2–inhibitors—have the serious side effect of causing two hypersensitivity skinreactions characterized by necrosis of the skin and of the mucous membranes: toxic epidermal necrolysis, and its less severe cousin, Stevens–Johnson Syndrome. 678 F.3d, at 34, 43–44; Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1872 (31st ed. 2007); Physicians' Desk Reference 146–147, 597 (6th ed. 2013); Friedman, Orlet, Still, & Law, Toxic Epidermal Necrolysis Due to Administration of Celecobix (Celebrex ), 95 Southern Medical J. 1213, 1213–1214 (2002).
In December 2004, respondent Karen L. Bartlett was prescribed Clinoril for shoulder pain. Her pharmacist dispensed a generic form of sulindac, which was manufactured by petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical. Respondent soon developed an acute case of toxic epidermal necrolysis. The results were horrific. Sixty to sixty-five percent of the surface of respondent's body deteriorated, was burned off, or turned into an open wound. She spent months in a medically induced coma, underwent 12 eye surgeries, and was tube-fed for a year. She is now severely disfigured, has a number of physical disabilities, and is nearly blind.
At the time respondent was prescribed sulindac, the drug's label did not specifically refer to Stevens–Johnson Syndrome or toxic epidermal necrolysis, but did warn that the drug could cause "severe skin reactions" and "[f]atalities." App. 553; 731 F.Supp.2d 135, 142 (D.N.H.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Stevens–Johnson Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis were listed as potential adverse reactions on the drug's package insert. 678 F.3d, at 36, n. 1. In 2005—once respondent was already suffering from toxic epidermal necrolysis —the FDA completed a "comprehensive review of the risks and benefits, [including the risk of toxic epidermal necrolysis ], of all approved NSAID products." Decision Letter, FDA Docket No. 2005P–0072/CP1, p. 2 (June 22, 2006), online at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/05p0072/05p–0072–pav0001–vol1.pdf (as visited June 18, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). As a result of that review, the FDA recommended changes to the labeling of all NSAIDs, including sulindac, to more explicitly warn against toxic epidermal necrolysis. App. 353–354, 364, 557–561, 580, and n. 8.
Respondent sued Mutual in New Hampshire state court, and Mutual removed the case to federal court. Respondent initially asserted both failure-to-warn and design-defect claims, but the District Court dismissed her failure-to-warn claim based on her doctor's "admi[ssion] that he had not read the box label or insert." 678 F.3d, at 34. After a 2–week trial on respondent's design-defect claim, a jury found Mutual liable and awarded respondent over $21 million in damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 678 F.3d 30. As relevant, it found that neither the FDCA nor the FDA's regulations pre-empted respondent's design-defect claims. It distinguished PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2567 —in which the Court held that failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are pre-empted by the FDCA's prohibition on changes to generic drug labels—by arguing that generic manufacturers facing design-defect claims could simply "choose not to make the drug at all" and thus comply with both...
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