Mutchler v. Dunlap Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-3132.,06-3132.
• Citation: 485 F.3d 854
• Parties: Carla MUTCHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUNLAP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; Kathy Loede, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

485 F.3d 854

Carla MUTCHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUNLAP MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; Kathy Loede, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-3132.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 15, 2007.

Decided and Filed: May 2, 2007.

ARGUED: David A. Van Gaasbeek, North Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. Karen Soehnlen McQueen, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Canton, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David A. Van Gaasbeek, North Canton, Ohio, for Appellant. Karen Soehnlen McQueen, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Canton, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before COLE, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Carla Mutchler, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, Dunlap Memorial Hospital and Kathy Loede, on her claim that Defendants violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Plaintiff's appeal rests on two claims: first, that she met the "hours of service" requirement for purposes of FMLA eligibility; and second, that Defendants should be equitably estopped from denying her eligibility. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working as a registered nurse at Defendant Dunlap Memorial Hospital ("Defendant Hospital") in September 1997. On May 29, 2002, Plaintiff transferred into Defendant Hospital's so-called "Weekender Program." Through the Weekender Program, participating nurses work two twelve-hour shifts each weekend and one assigned holiday during the year. If the participating nurse works the full forty-eight scheduled hours in a two week period, Defendant Hospital compensates that nurse for sixty-eight hours of work.¹ Additionally, nurses participating in the Weekender Program qualify to receive full time benefits.

On April 24, 2004, Plaintiff requested medical leave to obtain treatment for severe bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome. She sought leave between May 13, 2004 and June 7, 2004 her "expected return date," noting that surgery on her second wrist would occur in June or July.² In a response dated May 4, 2004, Defendant Kathy Loede ("Defendant Loede"), the human resources manager at Defendant Hospital granted Plaintiff's request for medical leave, finding her eligible for FMLA leave and calculating her entitlement "on the basis of . . . a "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the date" leave begins. (J.A. at 196) At that time, Defendant Hospital did not typically verify the hours worked when processing FMLA-protected leave requests. Rather, it apparently relied upon the requesting employee's certification that they had worked the requisite hours.

Plaintiff sustained open carpal tunnel release surgery on her left wrist on May 13, 2004. On or about May 19, 2004, however, Defendant Loede discovered that Plaintiff had not worked the requisite 1,250 hours to qualify for FMLA-protected leave. Rather, Defendant Hospital's payroll records revealed that Plaintiff had worked only 1,242.8 hours in the year preceding the leave.³ Accordingly, on May 21, 2004, Defendant Loede contacted Plaintiff to inform her that she fell short of the hours of service required for FMLA eligibility. Defendant Loede told Plaintiff that Defendant Hospital would honor the FMLA leave through June 7, 2004, but that Plaintiff did not qualify for additional FMLA-protected leave and would receive only non-FMLA leave for any time not previously requested. Nevertheless, on June 1, 2004, Plaintiff scheduled her second surgery for June 3, 2004 Plaintiff's physician estimated that Plaintiff would be prepared to return to work July 5, 2004.⁴

Following her surgery on June 3, 2004, Plaintiff signed a "Request for Leave Not Subject to F.M.L.A." to cover the period from June 3, 2004 to July 5, 2004. In a letter dated June 7, 2004, Defendant Loede informed Plaintiff that "[b]ecause this leave [requested June 3] is for a new health condition and for a new period of leave associated with that health condition, it has been processed in that manner." (J.A. at 421-22; 507) Defendant Hospital treated Plaintiff's second period of leave as not protected under the FMLA. On June 8, 2004, when Plaintiff failed to return to work, Defendant Hospital assigned Ms. Kiko to Plaintiff's previous position in the Weekender Program. Upon her return to work, Plaintiff found that her position in the Weekender Program had been given to Ms. Kiko, and that Defendants had scheduled Plaintiff to work weekdays. Plaintiff protested the change and sought reassignment to the Weekender Program, but her efforts were to no avail.

Plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, alleging violations of the FMLA. Defendants removed the suit to federal district court and, subsequently, filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. Following discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded that Plaintiff did not meet the definition of "eligible employee" under the FMLA. Additionally, the district court found that Plaintiff could not successfully invoke principles of equitable estoppel, either as set forth in the common law or in the FMLA's implementing regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d). Plaintiff timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN "ELIGIBLE EMPLOYEE" UNDER THE FMLA

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Cotter v. Ajilon Services, Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). At the summary judgment stage, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

B. "Eligible Employee" under the FMLA

Plaintiff's eligibility ultimately turns on the meaning of "hours of service" as the phrase is used in the FMLA. Plaintiff does not dispute that she actually worked only 1,242.8 hours during the twelve months preceding her leave. Rather, Plaintiff argues that her "hours of service" include ten additional hours per week — hours not worked, but for which she received compensation under the Weekender Program. The district court concluded that "Defendants were justified in giving [Plaintiff] credit for the hours she actually worked, not the additional bonus hours she received for working on weekends" and that Plaintiff "was therefore not an eligible employee under the FMLA." (J.A. at 576) We agree with the district court and hold that the Weekender Hours do not constitute "hours of service" for purposes of FMLA eligibility.

To be "eligible" under the FMLA, an employee must have been employed by the employer at issue for the preceding twelve months and must have put in at least 1,250 "hours of service" during that time. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a). In calculating the "hours of service," the Act incorporates by reference the legal standards set forth in § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(C). Yet, § 7 nowhere defines "hours of service." See 29 U.S.C. § 207; Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir.2004). Rather, it sets forth the meaning of "regular rate," which primarily guides employers' overtime calculations. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); Ricco, 377 F.3d at 604. Under § 7 of the FLSA, "regular rate" includes "all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee," and expressly excludes several types of compensation not made for hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e); cf. Minizza v. Stone Container Corp., 842 F.2d 1456, 1462 (3d Cir.1988) (finding compensation specifically excluded under § 207(e)(2) shares "the essential characteristic" of not being paid for "hours worked or services rendered").

The FMLA implementing regulations clarify that

[w]hether an employee has worked the minimum 1,250 hours of service is determined according to the principles established under the [FLSA] for determining compensable hours of work (see 29 CFR Part 785). The determining factor is the number of hours an employee has worked for the employer within the meaning of the FLSA. . . . Any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA's principles may be used.

29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the regulations set forth at 29 C.F.R. Part 785 guide the determination of hours worked for purposes of the FLSA, as well as our analysis of the FMLA's "hours of service" requirement. See id.; Family and Medical Leave Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,180, 2,186 (Jan. 6, 1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 et seq.) ("[T]he minimum hours of service requirement is meant to be construed in a manner consistent with the legal principles established for determining hours of work for payment of overtime compensation under § 7 of the FLSA and regulations under the act, . . . specifically 29 CFR Part 785 . . . and . . . 29 CFR 778.103."); S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 23 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 25 (noting the "hours of service" requirement should be construed "under section 7 of the FLSA and regulations under that act, 29 CFR Part 785 (see 29 CFR 778.103)"); see also 29 C.F.R. § 778.103 ("The principles for determining what hours are hours worked within the meaning of the Act are discussed in Part 785 of this chapter.").

The regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 785.1 et seq. "discuss[] the principles involved in determining what constitutes working time." 29 C.F.R. § 785.1. The principles set forth therein, though few, direct a finding that "all hours are hours worked which the employee is required to give his employer." Id. at § 785.7 (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323...