Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leubrie

• Decision Date: 08 January 1896
• Docket Number: 46.
• Citation: 71 F. 843
• Parties: MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. LEUBRIE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

71 F. 843

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. LEUBRIE.

No. 46.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 8, 1896

Robert Sewell, for plaintiff in error.

Leopold Wallach, for defendant in error.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE Circuit Judge.

This is a writ of error brought by the defendant in the court below to review a judgment for the plaintiff entered upon the verdict of a jury.

The action was on a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant February 3, 1890, to Jay C. Leubrie, and payable to him on the 3d day of February, 1905, if then living, or, if he should die before that time to a sister,-- the plaintiff. The policy was based upon, and recites that it was issued in consideration of an application in writing signed by Jay C Leubrie, which, among other things, contained a warranty that he would not die by his own hand during the period of two years following the issue of the policy. He died within the two years by suicide. The principal defense to the action was the breach of this warranty. Upon the trial evidence was introduced on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show that the deceased was insane at the time he committed suicide. The trial judge instructed the jury, among other things, that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish by a fair preponderance of proof that, at the time the assured committed suicide, his reasoning faculties were so far impaired that he was not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect, of the act, or that he was impelled thereto by an insane impulse which he had not the power to resist, and, if this was established, that his death was not by his own hand within the meaning of the warranty. Exceptions were taken by the defendant which present the question whether this instruction was correct, and also whether there was sufficient evidence to authorize a finding by the jury that the deceased was insane when he committed suicide. Since the case of Insurance Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, it has been perfectly well settled in the courts of the United States that death by the suicide of the assured is not 'death by his own hand,' within the meaning of a condition whereby the policy is to be void in that event, if, at the time of taking his own life, his reasoning faculties were so far impaired that he was not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect, of the act, or when he was impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he had not the power to resist. The doctrine of that case has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the supreme court. Bigelow v. Insurance Co., 93 U.S. 284; Insurance Co. v. Rodel, 95 U.S. 232; Insurance Co. v. Broughton, 109 U.S. 121, 3 Sup.Ct. 99; Insurance Co. v. Crandal, 120 U.S. 527, 7 Sup.Ct 685. Inasmuch as the instruction of the trial judge was an exact statement of this proposition, its correctness cannot be impeached, unless there is a legal distinction between the effect of such a condition when recited in the policy, and when made the subject of a warranty in an application upon which the policy is founded. There is no such distinction. In either case there is a stipulation, upon the literal fulfillment of which the validity of the contract depends; and in either the policy is to be void in the event of a breach,-- a result which, by the condition is expressly and, by the warranty, is impliedly, assented to. Treating it as a condition precedent, performance of which must be averred in the complaint, and affirmatively established in proof, by the party who sues upon the policy, the averment is proved if the evidence shows that the assured was insane when he committed suicide....