Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Graves

• Decision Date: 03 March 1928
• Docket Number: No. 3614.,3614.
• Citation: 25 F.2d 705
• Parties: MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. GRAVES et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

25 F.2d 705 (1928)

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. GRAVES et al.

No. 3614.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

March 3, 1928.

Arthur G. Dickson, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Frank E. Donnelly, of Scranton, Pa. (Dickson, Beitler & McCouch, of Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Chester H. Ashton, of Knoxville, Pa., and T. A. Crichton, of Wellsboro, Pa. (Crichton & Owlett, of Wellsboro, Pa., of counsel), for defendants in error.

Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge.

This was an action in assumpsit to recover double indemnity for death by accident under the provisions of a life insurance policy on the life of Thomas W. Graves. The policy was for $10,000. It provided, however, that if death resulted directly from bodily injury, "independently and exclusively of all other causes, and that such bodily injury was effected solely through external violent and accidental means," the company would pay, instead of the face amount of the policy of $10,000, double indemnity, or $20,000. Double indemnity, however, was not payable if the death of the insured resulted from his own act.

The defendant company contends that the insured committed suicide, and so the beneficiary is not entitled to double indemnity. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, say that the death of the insured was purely accidental. The case was tried to the court and jury on this issue. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant brought the case here on writ of error.

The main issue here is whether or not the defendant was entitled to binding instructions. It insists that, while there is a presumption against suicide, the physical facts surrounding the death completely rebut this presumption, and there was nothing to submit to the jury.

In order to overcome the presumption against suicide, the evidence must show that the death was self-inflicted, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Weaver (C. C. A.) 8 F.(2d) 680; or facts inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of death by accident, Ætna Life Insurance Co. v. Tooley (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 243; or the existence of such circumstances and conditions as to leave room for no other reasonable hypothesis than that of suicide, Wilkinson v. National Life Association of Des Moines, 203 Iowa, 960, 211 N. W. 238.

Did the evidence show these necessary facts so clearly as to leave no question for the jury? In other words, was there any evidence from which the jury could reasonably draw the inference that the death was accidental rather than suicidal? Where the facts in any particular case are disputable, or are of such character that different minds might reasonably draw different conclusions therefrom, it presents a question for the determination of the jury. Teis v. Smuggler Mining Co. (C. C. A.) 158 F. 260, 269, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893; Gudfelder v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 207 Pa. 629, 57 A. 70. Where there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the submission of the case to the jury, and this is true, whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony or, the facts being undisputed, fairminded men might honestly draw different conclusions from them. 38 Cyc. 1567; Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co. (C. C. A.) 90 F. 774; Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Murray (C. C. A.) 102 F. 264, 271; Railroad Company v. Stout, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664, 21 L. Ed. 745; Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed. 235; Richmond & Danville Railroad Co. v. Powers, 149 U. S. 43, 13 S. Ct. 748, 37 L. Ed. 642. Did the application of these rules of law require the direction of a verdict or submission of the case to the jury?

On the morning of his death, January 8, 1924, Mr. Graves went to the home of Mr. William O'Connor and got a rifle, which he had loaned to him several weeks before for a hunting trip, together with some shells. He returned home and told Mrs. Graves that he was going to send the rifle to his brother-in-law in Tioga, which is about 20 miles from Wellsboro. He took the rifle to the basement, but could not find burlap in which it was to be wrapped preparatory to shipping. He came up and found the burlap in his automobile. He talked with Mrs. Graves, told her what he intended doing that morning, played with the baby, and went to the basement again, taking the burlap. The rifle was discharged shortly thereafter, and Graves was instantly killed. The bullet entered his chest and passed through him, slightly upward. One exploded shell was found in the gun and one cartridge.

No one was present when the rifle was discharged, and so the question of how the deceased came to his death depended entirely upon circumstantial evidence. The burlap in which the rifle was to be wrapped was cut or torn into strips wide enough to be used for the purpose of wrapping the gun, and these were found on the basement floor. This would seem to indicate a purpose to send the gun to his brother-in-law, and that he had gotten it with that intention, and not with the idea of taking his life.

There was further evidence that his foot was caught in the burlap, which might have caused him to fall, and the rifle to be accidentally discharged. He acted in a perfectly natural manner that morning, and there was nothing in what he said or did to indicate that he was contemplating suicide. There was evidence showing that a short time before, while on a hunting trip, the gun was discharged accidentally, without pressure on the trigger or any apparent cause therefor.

The defense seeks to show that the deceased committed suicide and that the motive for so doing was that his accounts as treasurer of the county of Tioga were short to the extent of $10,000 or more. This was relevant testimony for the jury to consider. The deceased had been going over his accounts on the previous day, preparatory to turning over his office to his successor; but the plaintiffs say "there was no evidence showing that the deceased knew his bank balance did not equal the amounts due from him, and there was evidence adduced by the plaintiff below that his deposits were made both by himself and his clerk," and that the auditor's report, which would officially show the amount due from him to the county, would not be made and filed for nearly a month thereafter. This shortage, therefore, might or might not have actuated him. If he did not know of the shortage,...