Mutual Life Ins Co of New York v. Hurni Packing Co, 66

• Decision Date: 12 November 1923
• Docket Number: No. 66,66
• Citation: 263 U.S. 167,31 A. L. R. 102,44 S.Ct. 90,68 L.Ed. 235
• Parties: MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HURNI PACKING CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

263 U.S. 167

44 S.Ct. 90

68 L.Ed. 235

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK

v HURNI PACKING CO.

No. 66.

Argued Oct. 11, 1923.

Decided Nov. 12, 1923.

Mr. James M. Beck, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 167-173 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Charles M. Stilwill and Edwin J. Stason, both of Sioux City, Iowa, for respondent.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action to recover the amount of a life insurance policy issued by the petitioner to Rudolph Hurni. At the conclusion of the evidence the jury found for the plaintiff, respondent here, under the peremptory instruction of the court, and judgment was rendered accordingly. Upon appeal this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 280 Fed. 18.

There were two trials below. Upon appeal following the first, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground of material misrepresentation by the insured. 260 Fed. 641, 171 C. C. A. 405. Pending the second trial plaintiff amended its reply to the answer and alleged for the first time that this defense was barred, under the terms of the policy, by defendant's failure to contest within two years.

The policy was applied for on September 2, 1915. It was in fact executed on September 7th, but antedated as of August 23, 1915, and was delivered to insured about September 13th. The insured died on July 4, 1917.

The application provides that 'the applicant upon request may have the policy antedated for a period not to exceed six months.' Underneath the heading of the application there was written the direction: 'Date policy, August 23, 1915; age, 47.' The testimonium clause, followed by the signatures of the officials, reads: 'In witness whereof the company has caused this policy to be executed this 23d day of August, 1915.' The policy acknowledges the receipt of the first premium and provides that a like amount shall be paid 'upon each 23d day of August hereafter until the death of the insured.'- The determination of the case depends upon the meaning of a clause in the policy as follows:

'Incontestability.—This policy shall be incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums, provided two years shall have elapsed from its date of issue.'

The trial court held that the words 'its date of issue' were to be construed as referring to the date upon the face of the policy, viz. August 23, 1915, and this was also the view of the Court of Appeals. The first action taken by the insurance company to avail itself of the misrepresentation of the insured was on the 24th day of August, 1917, one day beyond the period of two years after the conventional date of the policy. It is contended on behalf of the insurance company: (1) That the period of incontestability did not begin to run until the delivery of the policy, or, in any event, until its actual execution on September 7th; and (2) that the policy was matured by the death of the insured, and the rights of the parties thereby became fixed so that the incontestability clause never became operative, even within the conventional limitation.

First. The rule is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured. The language employed is that of the company and it is consistent with both reason and justice that any fair doubt as to the meaning of its own words should be resolved against it. First National Bank v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673, 678-679, 24 L. Ed. 563; Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287, 297, 10 Sup. Ct. 1019, 34 L. Ed. 408; Imperial Fire Insurance Co. v. County of Coos, 151 U. S. 452, 462, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231.

The word 'date' is used frequently to designate the actual time when an event takes place, but, as applied to written instruments, its primary signification is the time specified therein. Indeed this is the meaning which its derivation (datus=given) most naturally suggests. In Bement & Dougherty v. Trenton Locomotive, etc., Co. 32 N. J. Law, 513, 515, 516, it is said:

'The primary signification of the word 'date' is not time in the abstract nor time taken absolutely, but, as its derivation plainly indicates, time 'given' or specified, time in some way ascertained and fixed; this is the sense in which the word is commonly used. When we speak of the date of a deed, we do not mean the time when it was actually executed, but the time of its execution, as given or stated in the deed itself. The date of an item, or of a charge in a book account, is not necessarily the time when the article charged was, in fact, furnished, but simply the time given or set down in the account, in connection with such charge.'

This language was used in construing a provision of the New Jersey lien law to the effect that no lien should be enforced unless summons be issued 'within one year from the date of the last work done, or materials furnished, in such claim,' and, specifically applying it to that provision, the court concluded:

'And so 'the date of the last work done, or materials furnished, in such claim,' in the absence of anything in the act indicating a different intention, must be taken to mean the time when such work was done or materials furnished, as specified in the plaintiffs' written claim.'

Here the words, referring to the written policy, are 'from its date of issue.' While the question, it must be conceded, is not certainly free from reasonable doubt, yet, having in mind the rule first above stated, that in such case the doubt must be resolved in the way most favorable to the insured, we conclude that the words refer not to the time of actual execution of the policy or the time of its delivery but to the date of issue as specified in the policy itself. Wood v. American Yeomen, 148 Iowa, 400, 403, 404, 126 N. W. 949; Anderson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 164 Cal. 712, 130 Pac. 726, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 903; Harrington v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 21 N. D. 447, 131 N. W. 246, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 373; Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308, 322,...