Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hebron

• Decision Date: 20 February 1933
• Docket Number: 30470
• Citation: Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hebron, 166 Miss. 145, 146 So. 445 (Miss. 1933)
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HEBRON

146 So. 445

166 Miss. 145

MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. HEBRON

No. 30470

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 20, 1933

Division A

Suggestion Of Error Overruled April 3, 1933.

APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county HON. W. H. POTTER, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Lula D. Hebron against the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. From judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Reversed, and judgment for defendant.

Reversed, and judgment here for appellant.

R. H. & J. H. Thompson, of Jackson, and Frederick L. Allen, of New York City, for appellant.

By the terms of the policies Mrs. Hebron was entitled to disability benefits and the waiver of premiums only from and after the date defendant received and approved proof of disability.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 813; Berry v. Lamar Life Insurance Company, 142 So. 445.

It was designed to leave the statute of limitations in force as the legislature made it. It did not intend to prevent parties making stipulations amounting to conditions precedent to liability in assuming obligations on contractual matters. In the case before us, the furnishing of proof was condition precedent to waiver of premiums. It is a reasonable and lawful provision.

Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 445.

A soliciting agent of a life insurance company has no authority to vary the terms of a policy, nor to bind the company by representations as to what the policy will contain nor waive any of its provisions.

Truly v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 108 Miss. 453; Continental Casualty Company v. Hall, 118 Miss. 871; New York Life Insurance Company v. O'Dom, 100 Miss. 246-247; Aetna Life Ins. Company v. Johnson, 13 F. 824; Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. McElroy, 38 F. 557; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Roewe, 38 F. 393; Curtis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 55 F. 97.

The furnishing and approval of satisfactory proof of disability is a condition precedent to the right of the insured to claim disability benefits and such benefits commenced as of the date of the filing of such proofs.

Bergholm v. Peoria Life Insurance Co., 284 U.S. 489; Courson v New York Life Insurance Co., 295 Pa. 518, 145 A. 530; Egan v. New York Life Insurance Co., 60 F. 268; Epstein v. The Mutual Insurance Co. of N. Y., 257 N.Y.S. 772; 143 Misc. 587; Jones v. New York Life Insurance Co., 290 P. 333; Parker v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 155 S.E. 617; Perlman v. New York Life Insurance Co., 25 N.Y.S. 645, 234 A.D. 359; Smith v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 134 Kansas 426, 7 P. 65; Wolfe v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 3 Tenn. Appeals 199; Orr v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y., 57 F. 901; Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 29 F. 977; Walters v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 20 S.W. 1038; Dean v. Northwestern Mutual Life Co., 157 S.E. 878; Klein v. Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 88; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Statham, 93 U.S. 24; Hall v. Acacia Mutual Life Association, 46 S.W. 56; Wick v. Western Union Life Co., 104 Wash. 129, 175 P. 953; New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151, 59 A.L.R. 1075; Brams v. New York Life Insurance Company, 229 Pa. 11, 148 A. 885; Hanson v. Northwestern Mutual Co., 229 Ill. 15; Mid-Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Skye, 113 Okla. 184, 240 P. 630; Yokamen v. Columbian National Life Insurance Co., 240 N.Y.S. 666, 136 Misc. 748; Mid-Continental Insurance Co. v. Walker, 260 P. 1109; New York Life Co. v. McCreary, 60 F. 355.

A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right.

Enterprise Mfg. Company v. Oppenheim & Co., 79 A. 1007; State Bank v. City of Anaconda, 111 P. 345; Bank v. Knox, 109 N.W. 201; Currie v. Continental Casualty Co., 140 Am. St. Rep. 300; Alexander v. Bank, 71 S.E. 69; List v. Chase, 88 N.E. 120, 17 Ann. Cas. 61; Barber v. Vinton, 73 A. 881; Missouri Company v. Hendricks, 108 S.W. 745; Kennedy v. Grand Fraternity, 92 P. 971, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 78.

The principle of waiver rests on estoppel; that is, when the plaintiff has been misled into thinking that nothing further will be required of him, and has on that account failed to take further steps which he might have taken, defendant company cannot take advantage of such failure induced by it or its authorized agent acting for it in the matter for the purpose of defeating its liability under the policy.

Griffith v. Anchor Fire Insurance Co., 120 N.W. 90; Ervay v. Fire Association, 93 N.W. 290.

Clearly the effect of section 5196, Code of 1930, must be limited to acts done for and on behalf of an insurance company, either under its instructions or with its knowledge, assent or acquiescence, or subsequent ratification.

Section 5196, Code of 1930; Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Tabb, 49 F. 1019.

By allowing benefits as of March 15, 1931, in pursuance of its adopted rule which was more liberal than required by the policies, defendant did not bind itself to make payments from an earlier date.

Perlman v. New York Life Insurance Company, 25 N.Y.S. 645, 234 A.D. 359; Orr v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 57 F. 901; Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Marshall, 29 F. 977; Bergholm v. Peoria Life Insurance Company, 284 U.S. 489.

Green, Green & Jackson, of Jackson, for appellee.

The cause of action in appellee was at the date of the inception of the disability, that which conferred the right under the policy to compensation, and no stipulation in the policy may defeat appellee of that indemnity wherefor the premium was paid, as such a stipulation is condition varying the six-year period of limitation.

Section 2294, Code of 1930.

It could not have been in the contemplation of the parties that if the insured, who was required to give notice, was unable to do so by reason of the very accident against which indemnity was given, he should therefrom lose such indemnity through no fault of his own.

7 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (3 Ed.), p. 5918.

A condition, in a, contract similar to the one here was formerly held reasonable.

Southern Express Co. v. Hunnicutt, 54 Miss. 566; Baltimore & Ohio Express Co. v. Cooper, 66 Miss. 558, 6 So. 327; Clement v. Telegraph Co., 27 So. 603, 77 Miss. 747, 749; Hartzog v. Telegraph Co., 84 Miss. 448, 36 So. 539; Universal Life Ins. Co. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 232; Bonner v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 36 So. 538.

With that precise right thus to contract theretofore existing whereby an insurance company might exculpate itself from liability for the loss assumed by failure to give notice, pursuant to plenary power to rectify.

Section 3127, Code of 1906; Dodson v. Telegraph Co., 97 Miss. 104, 52 So. 693.

Any contract of insurance which undertakes to, relieve the insurance company from the full responsibility on its contract by requiring any kind of notice for less than the time required by the statute is in conflict with section 2575, Code of 1906, and void.

General Accident & Fire Insurance Co. v. Walker, 55 So. 51, 99 Miss. 404; Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Broom, 111 Miss. 409, 71 So. 653.

There is no essential difference between the effect of the general statute above set out and the special statute (section 2575) now repealed. The interpretation applicable to section 2575 is just as applicable to section 3127. The only difference between the two statutes is that section 2575 was applicable to insurance contracts alone, while section 3127, is a general statute applicable to all contracts, including insurance contracts, since the repeal of section 2575 of the Code of 1906.

Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Broom, 111 Miss. 409; National Casualty Co. v. Mitchell, 138 So. 808, 71 So. 653.

All stipulations in contracts changing the period within which suits must be brought under our statutes of limitations shall be null and void.

Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Smith Motor Sales, 135 Miss. 585, 99 So. 575; Massachusetts Protective Association v. Cranford, 102 So. 171, 137 Miss. 876; United States F. & G. Co. v. Parsons, 122 So. 469, 147 Miss. 325.

When the Code of 1930 was adopted, this judicial decision was read into the law, adopted and is here conclusive.

Masonite Corporation v. Lockridge, 141 So. 759.

A waiver is essentially unilateral in character and results as a legal consequence from some act or conduct, of the insurance company against whom it operates, and no act of the insured, in whose favor it is made, is necessary to complete it; and that a waiver need not be founded upon a new agreement or supported by a consideration , nor is it essential that it be based upon an estoppel.

Stonewall Life Ins. Co. v. Cooke, 144 So. 219.

Every person who shall examine into or adjust or aid in adjusting any loss for or on behalf of any such insurance Company, whether any such acts shall be done at the instance, or request, or by the employment of the insurance company, shall be held to be the agent of the company for which the act is done, whatever conditions or stipulations may be contained in the policy or contract.

Section 5196, Code of 1930; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 125 Miss. 367, 88 So. 11; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Loving, 140 So. 727, 728.

The decisions of this court have made an agent the alter ego of the company within the scope of his authority.

Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Ruble, 160 Miss. 206.

When the appellant made a payment antedating the date whereat the contractual obligation to pay arose, unless there were a waiver of the proof, thereby of necessity under this contract the insurance company by payment, waived the proof, and the effect of the condition therefrom arising, because, unless there were such waiver, no payment whatsoever would...