Muzzy v. State By and Through Rutland County State's Attorney
Decision Date | 21 September 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-039,89-039 |
Citation | 583 A.2d 82,155 Vt. 279 |
Parties | Jay Edward MUZZY v. STATE of Vermont, Acting By and Through the RUTLAND COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY and the Rutland County Public Defender. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Michael Ledden of Medor & McCamley, Rutland, for plaintiff-appellant.
Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall, P.C., Rutland, for defendant-appellee.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and PECK, GIBSON, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ.
Plaintiff sued defendant Rutland County State's Attorney after being arrested and detained on a DWI charge that the deputy state's attorney had previously agreed to dismiss in connection with a plea agreement on another charge. The deputy state's attorney who negotiated the plea agreement neglected to secure the dismissal of the DWI charge and plaintiff's unwarranted arrest followed. Plaintiff appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis of official immunity. We affirm.
Judicial officers, including prosecutors, have absolute immunity from civil suits to the extent that the actions complained of are associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and are within the general authority of the officer. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173, 174, 287 A.2d 841, 843 (1972). * This protection encompasses any act closely associated with litigation or potential litigation, but does not cover administrative functions, Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1987); Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-72 (2d Cir.1986), or investigative functions that are not a part of the judicial function. See Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1104 (Wyo.1982). Accordingly, absolute immunity is extended to prosecutorial activities that concern, among other things, the decision whether to prosecute and the conduct of a plea bargain. Barbera, 836 F.2d at 99-100.
When a prosecutor performs a quasi-judicial act, "his motive for acting is not subject to inquiry in a private suit," Polidor, 130 Vt. at 174, 287 A.2d at 843, even if there is a claim of willful or malicious conduct. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 402 (2d Cir.1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927). Thus, an inquiry into the discretionary or ministerial nature of the act is not appropriate unless the act triggers only qualified immunity. Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 185, 559 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1989). Furthermore, absolute immunity protects acts of negligence or oversight that occur within the scope of the prosecutor's quasi-judicial authority. See Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir.1977) ( ); see also Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d at 1100 () .
The claim against the district attorney in Atkins--that he failed to properly supervise his investigators by verifying that the proper person was named in the indictment--is similar to the claim here that the state's attorney failed to adequately supervise his staff regarding the handling of the second DWI charge. The court in Atkins determined that the acts of the district attorney and his underlings were within their quasi-judicial authority rather than their investigative "police-related" role. 556 F.2d at 488-89. Similarly, we conclude that acts related to the dismissal or processing of an information, as in the instant case, are within the prosecutorial function and therefore absolutely immune from civil suit. See Polidor, 130 Vt. at 175, 287 A.2d at 843 ( ).
We recognized in Levinsky that such a policy may leave some plaintiffs without civil redress, 151 Vt. at 198, 559 A.2d at 1086; nevertheless, we pointed out that it would be impossible to confine complaints to the guilty officers without hampering the efficiency and efficacy of the office, and concluded that it would be better to leave a few wrongs unredressed by civil action than to subject judicial officers to constant threat of retaliation. See id. [155 Vt. 282] at 184, 199, 559 A.2d at 1078, 1087; see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425, 96 S.Ct. at 992 (); Blake, 651 P.2d at 1103 ( ).
Affirmed.
Regarding the doctrine of official immunity, the record is unclear as to whether the neglect leading to plaintiff's unwarranted arrest was the result of a failure to do a ministerial function by a deputy prosecutor or someone working in a clerical position in the state's attorney's office, or a failure by a deputy prosecutor to undertake the proper steps in exercising a...
To continue reading
Request your trial- Grega v. Pettengill
- Zullo v. State
-
Zullo v. State, 2017-284
...sovereign immunity is "derived from the concept that 'the KingPage 14 can do no wrong' "), overruled on other grounds by Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 281, 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990); J. Friesen, supra, § 8.03[2], at 12 ("Over the last thirty or forty years, the doctrine of sovereign immunity ha......
- Zullo v. State
-
Ruminations
...[12] Massachusetts v. United States, 338 U.S. 611, 639-640(1948). [13] State v. Bevins, 148 Vt. 186, 188 (1987). [14] Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279 (1990), overruled by O'Connor v. Donovan, 191 Vt. 412, 424 (2012) (no sound basis to deny state's attorneys the same immunity for "high executive......