Mwangangi v. Nielsen
| Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:19-cv-04105-JMS-MJD,1:19-cv-04105-JMS-MJD |
| Citation | 525 F.Supp.3d 869 |
| Parties | Daudi M. MWANGANGI, Plaintiff, v. Taylor NIELSEN, Blaine Root, Frank Noland, Ben Phelps, Trey Hendrix, and City of Lebanon, Indiana, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Edward G. Bielski, Bielski Law LLC, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.
Elizabeth A. Knight, Lisa A. Baron, Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight, Ltd., Merrillville, IN, for Defendants Taylor Nielsen, Frank Noland, Ben Phelps, Trey Hendrix, City of Lebanon, Indiana.
Daniel Joseph Layden, Daniel J. Paul, Williams Hewitt Barrett & Wilkowski LLP, Greenwood, IN, for Defendant Blayne Root.
On the evening of October 7, 2017, Plaintiff Daudi Mwangangi, who works as a roadside assistance provider, responded to a call to assist a stranded motorist at a gas station in Lebanon, Indiana. Shortly after Mr. Mwangangi finished helping the motorist, seven police officers arrived and then detained, searched, handcuffed, arrested, and jailed him for impersonating a law enforcement officer, a charge that was ultimately dismissed. At the heart of this case is the requirement that investigatory Terry stops be reasonable in scope. In particular, this case serves as a reminder to law enforcement of the Seventh Circuit's repeated admonition that "in the ordinary case a Terry stop should not be functionally indistinguishable from a full-blown arrest" and the use of handcuffs is not part and parcel with a Terry stop, but rather "generally signifies an arrest." Matz v. Klotka , 769 F.3d 517, 527 (7th Cir. 2014).
Mr. Mwangangi has sued the City of Lebanon (the "City"), as well as City Police Officers Taylor Nielsen, Frank Noland, Trey Hendrix, City Police Sergeant Ben Phelps, and Whitestown Police Officer Blayne Root1 in their individual capacities (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"),2 alleging multiple claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Indiana tort law. Mr. Mwangangi has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to some of his § 1983 claims. [Filing No. 74.] The City, Officers Nielsen, Noland, and Hendrix, and Sergeant Phelps (the "City Defendants") have filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 86], and Officer Root has also filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to the claims asserted against him, [Filing No. 82]. Both the City Defendants and Officer Root seek dismissal of all claims asserted against them. These matters are now ripe for the Court's decision.
A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the current version of Rule 56 makes clear, whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co. , 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co. , 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus. , 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller , 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). On review of cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party on each motion. Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines , 789 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2015). However, "[w]hen the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant events, the Court should not adopt the nonmoving party's version of the events when that version is blatantly contradicted by the videotape." Williams v. Brooks , 809 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2016).
The Court need only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has "repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them." Johnson , 325 F.3d at 898.
The following factual background is set forth pursuant to the summary judgment standard detailed above. The facts stated are not necessarily objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable to "the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Premcor USA, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co. , 400 F.3d 523, 526-27 (7th Cir. 2005). Fortunately, the parties largely agree upon the facts in this case because of the extensive video and audio evidence. See Williams , 809 F.3d at 942.
Mr. Mwangangi is a black man who emigrated to the United States from Kenya and has been a naturalized citizen since 2008. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2.] Although he has been in the United States for some time, Mr. Mwangangi speaks with a Kenyan accent. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2.]
Mr. Mwangangi provides roadside assistance to stranded motorists for a company called Finderserve LLC, which subcontracts with larger national automotive assistance and service companies to provide roadside services in the greater Indianapolis area. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2.] When his services are needed, Mr. Mwangangi receives a text or email advising him of the name and location of the motorist in need of assistance. [Filing No. 77-2 at 4; Filing No. 77-2 at 17.] Mr. Mwangangi's job performance is evaluated, in part, on how quickly he responds to requests for assistance. [Filing No. 77-2 at 4.] In addition, pursuant to Finderserve LLC's agreement with the larger national service companies, Mr. Mwangangi is required to keep information about each service call confidential. [See Filing No. 77-2 at 17.]
In October 2017, Mr. Mwangangi drove a dark blue 2003 Ford Crown Victoria (the "Crown Victoria") as his work vehicle. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2.] Mr. Mwangangi had purchased the Crown Victoria some years earlier and has not made changes to the vehicle following his purchase. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2.] He bought it used and has no knowledge as to whether it was previously used as a law enforcement vehicle, but if it had been used as such, by the time Mr. Mwangangi bought the Crown Victoria, any law enforcement-specific equipment or signifiers (such as specialized painting) had been removed or disabled. [Filing No. 77-2 at 2-3.] While there was no red-and-blue light bar atop the Crown Victoria, the vehicle did have a "non-functioning lightbar" in the rear window, with "all wiring cut/removed rendering it a useless shell." [Filing No. 77-2 at 3.] In addition, the Crown Victoria was equipped with flashing clear strobe lights on the exterior corners of the vehicle, which Mr. Mwangangi used to provide additional safety and visibility when he was providing roadside assistance. [Filing No. 77-2 at 3-4.] All parties concede that such clear strobe lights are legal under Indiana law, as is driving with such lights activated. [See, e.g. , Filing No. 77-2 at 3-4; Filing No. 77-3 at 143; Filing No. 77-4 at 156; Filing No. 77-5 at 61.] The Crown Victoria had no red-and-blue lights which, by law, are reserved for the exclusive use on law enforcement vehicles in the state of Indiana. Ind. Code § 9-19-14-5.5(a).
At 9:31 p.m. on October 7, 2017, Mr. Mwangangi received a service request from a company called Agero. [Filing No. 77-2 at 4; Filing No. 77-2 at 17.] The service request indicated that an individual named Charles Palmisano was located at a Speedway gas station at 1618 North Lebanon Street in Lebanon, Indiana, and that his car, a 2012 black Toyota Camry, would not start. [Filing No. 77-2 at 17.] Mr. Mwangangi set out for the Speedway at 1618 North Lebanon Street in his Crown Victoria. [Filing No. 77-2 at 5.] However, when Mr. Mwangangi arrived at that location, he was unable to locate Mr. Palmisano. [Filing No. 77-2 at 5.] A phone call to Mr. Palmisano revealed that he was at a different Speedway gas station on South Lebanon Street. [Filing No. 77-2 at 5.] Mr. Mwangangi arrived at the correct Speedway at approximately 10:16 p.m. [Filing No. 77-2 at 5; see also Filing No. 76 (Ex. 5, Surveillance Video).] Upon his arrival, Mr. Mwangangi located Mr. Palmisano's black Toyota Camry, which was parked at a gas pump, and then parked his Crown Victoria at an angle about two car lengths from Mr. Palmisano's vehicle and engaged his clear strobe lights. [Filing No. 77-2 at 5-6; Filing No. 77-10 at 3.] Mr. Palmisano approached Mr. Mwangangi's vehicle to explain his issues and thereafter Mr. Mwangangi, wearing a reflective safety vest, proceeded to jump start Mr. Palmisano's Camry with a portable battery charger. [Filing No. 77-2 at 6-7; Filing No. 77-10 at 3-4.] Mr. Palmisano explained to Mr. Mwangangi that he was heading...
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