Mwimanzi v. Wilson, Case No. 20-cv-79 (CRC)
Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-79 (CRC) |
Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
Citation | 590 F.Supp.3d 231 |
Parties | Mbalaminwe MWIMANZI, Plaintiff, v. Joshua WILSON, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Annamaria Kimball, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Arthur B. Spitzer, Scott Michelman, Michael Krevans Perloff, Tara Patel, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of the District of, Kayla M. Scott, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Kerslyn D. Featherstone, Stephanie Marie Corcoran, Office of Attorney General, Public Interest Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge On January 15, 2019, while executing a search warrant for a private residence, Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") Officer Joshua Wilson conducted a personal search of a visitor to that apartment—plaintiff Mbalaminwe Mwimanzi. Mwimanzi brought suit against the District of Columbia and Wilson to challenge the legality of various aspects of his search. Now before the Court are dispositive motions concerning three claims: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District challenging, under the Fourth Amendment, the D.C. statute and MPD policy that authorized the search; a § 1983 claim against Officer Wilson, based on allegations that the search he conducted was unduly aggressive and sexually invasive, also in violation of Mwimanzi's Fourth Amendment rights; and a common law battery claim against both Wilson and the District, based on the same allegations concerning the manner of the search.
The Court sides mostly with Mwimanzi. The Court will first grant his request to add a § 1983 claim against the District related to Officer Wilson's decision to conduct the search, which was not included in the original complaint. Mwimanzi is also entitled to partial summary judgment on this new claim because the relevant portions of D.C. Code § 23-524(g) and MPD General Order 702.03 § VII(F)(8)(f) are unconstitutional at least in circumstances that resemble Mwimanzi's. Those provisions authorize officers executing a premises search warrant to search any person found inside for property named in the warrant that could be hidden on the body. Such a broad license to search beyond the face of the warrant—at least when no other circumstances tie the person searched to wrongdoing at a residence—runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, under the guidance set out in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) and related case law.
As to Mwimanzi's manner-of-search claims, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As explained in more detail below, Mwimanzi's Fourth Amendment and common law battery claims can survive summary judgment to the extent they focus on the allegedly over-aggressive and invasive nature of the search. Officer Wilson is not entitled to qualified immunity on any constitutional claim relating to such allegations, and neither defendant is entitled to a qualified privilege with respect to the related battery claim. However, the Court will grant the defendants summary judgment on these claims insofar as Mwimanzi seeks to challenge the mere fact that Wilson conducted a full search—including of Mwimanzi's groin area. Although the scope of the search was indeed unlawful, that limitation was not clearly established at the time of the search. For those reasons, the Court will grant Mwimanzi's motion to amend his complaint, grant his motion for summary judgment, and grant in part and deny in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
In his § 1983 claim challenging Officer Wilson's authority to search him, Mwimanzi asks the Court to hold that a provision of D.C. law and an MPD policy implementing that statute are either facially unconstitutional, or violate the Fourth Amendment as applied here. The Court begins with a brief overview of the two provisions.
Only the second authorized rationale—to find concealable property—is at issue here. The MPD standing order on search warrants implements this statute. In relevant part, it provides that an officer executing a search warrant "may search any person on the premises to the extent reasonably necessary to ensure safety and/or find contraband or property enumerated in the search warrant." MPD General Order 702.03 § VII(F)(8)(f).
On January 15, 2019, an officer with the MPD applied for a warrant to search the residence at 769 Quebec Place, NW, Apartment 2.1 Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 1–2; Pl.’s SMF I, ¶¶ 1–2. According to the affidavit supporting the warrant application, over the previous months, several neighbors and attendees at community meetings had complained about drug activity in the apartment. Specifically, they alleged that the apartment's resident, Margie Whitehead, "allow[ed] multiple individuals into her apartment in order to deal drugs." Pl.’s Ex. D at 3 ("Warrant & Aff."), ECF No. 30-6. A confidential informant corroborated the complaints. Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 3–5.
Based on that application and affidavit, a Superior Court judge found probable cause to believe that drugs and narcotics, drug paraphernalia, cash, and other instruments of the drug trade were concealed in the Quebec Place apartment. Warrant & Aff. at 1. The judge therefore issued a warrant to search for the named items at the "Residence known as 769 Quebec Place #2." Id. Later that day, a team of MPD officers, including defendant Joshua Wilson, received a copy of the search warrant and, at a briefing, learned the details of the MPD investigation set out in the warrant affidavit. Defs.’ SMF ¶¶ 8–9; Pl.’s SMF I, ¶¶ 8–9.
MPD executed the search warrant on the night of January 15. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 10; Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 3. Around 9 p.m., officers knocked on the apartment door. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 3. After waiting five to ten seconds with no answer, officers broke down the door, entered, and ordered everyone inside to lie on the ground and submit to handcuffing. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF III, ¶ 2; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF IV, ¶ 9. Mwimanzi was one of at least four individuals inside the apartment that night. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 2; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶¶ 2–3; Defs.’ Ex. D ("Body-Worn Camera Footage") at 2:19:13–2:19:20. Over the course of the next several minutes, MPD officers subjected Mwimanzi to three different searches of varying scopes.
After Mwimanzi was handcuffed, an MPD officer first patted him down and pulled out a wallet from his coat pocket to check for identification. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 4; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 4. That initial pat down did not turn up any drugs, weapons, or other contraband. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 6; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 6. Mwimanzi was soon searched again, apparently by MPD Officer Jose Seijo.2 Pl.’s SMF II, ¶¶ 8–9. According to Mwimanzi, this second encounter constituted a full search—"more intrusive[ ]" than the mere frisk the first officer had performed. Id. ¶ 9. The defendants dispute this characterization; in their view, the record does not support a finding that this second interaction was more than just a pat down. See Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 9. Whatever its scope, this encounter did not turn up drugs or other contraband either.3 Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 11; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 11.
After Mwimanzi sat back down, Officer Wilson approached him and ordered him to stand. Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 13. Wilson called out to other officers on the scene to ask whether Mwimanzi had been searched yet—to which one responded, apparently, "a Seijo search."4 Id. Wilson then began to conduct a full search of Mwimanzi. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s SMF II, ¶¶ 18–23. At his deposition, Wilson testified that, when deciding to search Mwimanzi, he relied only on the information in the warrant and the authorization in MPD General Order 702.03. See Pl.’s SMF III, ¶ 17; Defs.’ Resps. to Pl.’s SMF III, ¶¶ 16–17.
Wilson's search, which took under a minute, focused largely on Mwimanzi's groin and buttocks. See Defs.’ SMF ¶ 18; Pl.’s SMF II, ¶¶ 20–21; see also Body-Worn Camera Footage at 2:19:50–2:20:34. The parties dispute the reason Officer Wilson targeted Mwimanzi's groin area, as well as the nature and scope of the intrusion. Although Wilson's body-worn camera captured the encounter, including Mwimanzi's contemporaneous reactions, the camera angle largely does not show Wilson's hands or Mwimanzi's groin and buttocks—the key area of dispute.
In Mwimanzi's telling, Wilson directed his search at the "groin out of a desire to humiliate or otherwise harm him"—an allegation he says is supported by Wilson's "targeting" of the "testicles and buttocks to the exclusion of other body parts"; "the aggressive, humiliating way" he conducted the search, despite Mwimanzi's repeated protestations that Wilson was "fondling" him; and the fact that Mwimanzi had already been searched without turning up any contraband. See Pl.’s SMF I, ¶ 18; Pl.’s SMF II, ¶ 28. In his deposition, Mwimanzi also testified extensively about how Wilson conducted the search. He recounted that Wilson, through his pants, had "squeeze[d] [his] butt cheeks," and "rub[bed]" and "squeez[ed]" his testicles. Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. Amend, Opp'n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., and Contingent Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pl.’s Combined Br."), ECF No. 30, Ex. A ("Mwimanzi Dep.") at 66:5–18. Mwimanzi also described feeling "pressure on [his] anus because [Wilson] put his finger there." Id. at 66:7–8. On the video, Mwimanzi can be heard repeatedly...
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