Myers v. Baca

Citation325 F.Supp.2d 1095
Decision Date15 July 2004
Docket NumberNo. CV 02-08098 SVW(RZx).,CV 02-08098 SVW(RZx).
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of California
PartiesAndrew A. MYERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Leroy D. BACA, et al., Defendants.

Elizabeth J. Gibbons, Green & Shinee, Encino, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Calvin R. House, Christine Chorba, Gutierrez, Preciado & House, Pasadena, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILSON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs are former trainees at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Academy, who claim primarily that an October 2001 investigation into cheating resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of their persons, and an unconstitutional search of their briefcases. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County, Department, and various Department employees for damages and attorneys' fees. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a)(3).

In its Order of May 9, 2003 ("May 9 Order"), the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' search claim, and continued the motion as to the seizure claim. The Court did conclude, however, that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred. Because the issue is now squarely before the Court, and in light of the developed record and additional legal argument, the Court amends and elaborates upon its earlier ruling.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs' seizure claim, and, therefore hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. Factual Background

Although minor disputes have appeared in the moving papers and hearings over the precise timing of certain events, the parties are in substantial agreement as to most material facts. (See Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Sep. Statement of Uncontroverted Facts.) Where material facts are disputed, the Court views such facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, as it is required to do at this stage of the case. See Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir.2004). Accordingly, the facts presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, along with the inferences rationally flowing from them, are as follows:

In fall 2001, Plaintiffs were employed as Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Trainees at the Department's Academy. At approximately 9:00 a.m. on Friday, October 19, 2001, Trainee Stacie Dobine informed one of her instructors, Defendant Deputy William J. Bartlett, that some members her class (Class 325) possessed and/or were selling test questions for an exam. Bartlett questioned Dobine about the identity of the alleged wrongdoers, but was told only that they were members of the same study group. (Plaintiffs suggest Dobine knew the actual identities, but in any case she did not disclose them.)

Around 9:15 a.m., the members of Class 325, including Plaintiffs, were ordered to open and unlock their briefcases, leave their classroom, and assemble outdoors in platoon formation. For the next hour, the members of Class 325 remained outside while a search of their classroom and briefcases was conducted by certain Defendant officials.1

Class 325 remained outdoors for about an hour, whereupon they were escorted by Academy instructors to classroom K-1, a room they did not regularly use. Upon arrival in room K-1, the trainees were instructed to sit in every other seat, to face forward, not to speak to anyone, and not to leave, read, write, use the phone, or go to the restroom without an escort. The record does not suggest that any instructors remained in the room, but the trainees were informed that they were being videotaped and monitored. (The room was known to Plaintiffs Santa Maria and Ramos to include a one-way mirror where staff instructors could monitor the room's occupants without being observed.) Plaintiffs attest that all of the instructions were given in a loud or gruff manner, a characterization Defendants do not dispute.

At this point, the trainees had not been told why their briefcases had been searched, why they had been ordered outside, or why they were now being sequestered in room K-1. Class 325 remained under these conditions until approximately 2:00 p.m. At that time, the trainees were permitted to retrieve their lunches from their usual room, and were afforded ten minutes in room K-1 to eat.

Following lunch, the class members were ordered to return to their regular classroom (room B-1). At this point, the trainees were informed by Defendant instructor Gregory S. Adams that there was an ongoing investigation into "misconduct." The class also was specifically told at this time that they were not free to leave until they had been interviewed by officials of the Internal Affairs Bureau2 ("IAB"), whom Adams indicated to be in route to the Academy. Plaintiffs attest that these comments were made in a "degrading, threatening, and belittling manner," and that the class members were compared to a disgraced former Los Angeles police officer who had recently been convicted of various criminal abuses of authority. Plaintiffs also attest that they felt if they tried to leave the classroom, they would be physically restrained from doing so.

At this time, and at all times while Plaintiffs remained at the Academy on October 19, Plaintiffs were permitted to retain their departmentally-issued weapons. However, because Plaintiffs were not sworn peace officers, they were not authorized to carry loaded firearms. As such, Plaintiffs carried their weapons in their holsters but with no ammunition in the weapons and with orange tape over both the barrel and the magazine of the weapons.

Between 2:00 and 3:30 p.m., the class was given a regularly scheduled lecture. Following the lecture, at about 3:30 p.m., Defendant Adams again informed the trainees that they were not free to leave, talk, or interact with their classmates until they were interviewed by IAB officials. Again, Plaintiffs attest that they did not feel free to leave and that if they did attempt to leave, they would be physically restrained from doing so.

At approximately 6:00 p.m., the trainees were addressed by Defendant Dennis Burns, the head of the IAB. Burns informed Plaintiffs and their classmates that there was an investigation of "misconduct" underway, but did not specify the allegations. Burns then read off the names of nine trainees, including Plaintiffs, and specifically stated that these nine were not free to leave until they were interviewed by IAB. The other trainees were permitted to leave.

Plaintiffs remained at the Academy until approximately 1:00 a.m. During the remainder of their time in room B-1, Plaintiffs were not permitted to eat (despite a request to do so), and could only use the restroom with an escort. They were allowed to meet with an attorney from their union (the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs ("ALADS")), and were provided one opportunity to call their families regarding their whereabouts or to make childcare arrangements (if necessary). Plaintiffs attest that during this time they continued to feel that if they attempted to leave the Academy facility they would be physically restrained and prevented from doing so.

Although Plaintiffs Myers and Santa Maria were never personally interviewed by any IAB official on October 19, 2001, they did observe certain other trainees being told to report to the staff office for interviews prior to the arrival of the ALADS representatives and attorneys. It appears to be disputed whether and/or when Plaintiff Ramos was ever interviewed, though he states that he was interviewed, and that the interview took place before the ALADS attorneys arrived.

Shortly after midnight, Plaintiffs were escorted to the locker room, where they were instructed to turn in their weapons, batons, and other equipment. At that time, Plaintiffs were told that they could either resign or be fired the following Monday. By Sunday, this decision had apparently been reversed, and Plaintiffs were informed by phone that they could return to the Academy "as if nothing had happened." When they subsequently returned to the Academy, Plaintiffs filed for and were paid overtime for the events at issue.

Defendants' explanation as to why this investigation was so lengthy, while materially undisputed, is a case study in bureaucratic inefficiency. For instance, although a search was completed by Academy instructors within thirty-five minutes of the initial cheating allegation, Department officials believed it was necessary to involve the entire chain of command before proceeding further. As a result, there was a nearly two hour delay while the Sheriff, Undersheriff and other executives attended a graduation ceremony. It would be another two hours before the Internal Affairs Bureau would be contacted, and a large team of investigators assembled, briefed and deployed to the Academy.

Substantial delay is also attributable to the intervention of the trainees' union, which apparently came about by way of a call from a Sheriff's Deputy who had learned of the investigation. The union representatives who responded to the Academy were not authorized to represent the cadets during the interviews. They therefore demanded an end to interviewing, which demand was eventually acceded to. This precipitated another two-hour delay, while union attorneys in route to the Academy wound their way through Friday afternoon traffic.

Upon arrival, and prior to a resumption of the interviews, the attorneys spent two to three hours meeting with their clients and Academy officials. The interviews then proceeded for at least a couple hours, followed by further debate among the investigators as to what to do with the information that had been gleaned. Finally, at about 1 a.m., approximately eight to nine hours after the training for the day would have...

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6 cases
  • McDonald v. Salazar
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 23 Diciembre 2011
    ...of one party to an oral communication recording that communication without the consent of the other party. See Myers v. Baca, 325 F.Supp.2d 1095, 1108 n. 6 (C.D.Cal.2004) (reasoning that “whether the conduct at issue could be criminal is not relevant, but instead, if the central purpose of ......
  • Aguilera v. Baca
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 15 Septiembre 2005
    ...discounted the significance of this fact. Id. 18. The Court does not find the facts of this case analogous to those in Myers v. Baca, 325 F.Supp.2d 1095 (C.D.Cal.2004). First, unlike the trainees in Myers, Plaintiffs were experienced law enforcement officers. Second, unlike the trainees, Pl......
  • Dibenedetto v. Diaz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 1 Febrero 2018
    ...voluntary choices may give rise to a limitation on freedom that does not equate to a seizure by law enforcement." Myers v. Baca, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2004). This is true of the work environment. While it is well-established that "searches and seizures by government employer......
  • Venture v. Lassen Mun. Util. Dist., 2:11-cv-02483-MCE-DAD
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 26 Noviembre 2013
    ...Amendment has not been extended to the type of conduct alleged here." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. 16:3-6 (citing Myers v. Baca, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that "in order for non-law enforcement governmental conduct to be considered a search or seizure under the Fo......
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