Myers v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.

Citation160 Pa.St. 386,24 A. 747
PartiesMYERS v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.
Decision Date13 July 1898
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
24 A. 747
160 Pa.St. 386

MYERS
v.
BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 13, 1898.


Appeal from court of common pleas, Philadelphia county.

Trespass for personal injuries by Harvey K. Myers against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. Verdict and judgment for plain tiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

J. M. Vanderslice and Thad. L. Vanderslice, for appellant.

Samuel Peltz, for appellee.

WILLIAMS, J. The rule is now well settled in this state that one approaching a railroad crossing upon a public highway muststop look, and listen, at a convenient distance from the railroad track, before venturing to go upon it. This rule is imperative. If one disregards it, and suffers injury in the attempt to cross, the presumption of negligence on his part is a presumption juris et de jure. Having contributed to his own injury, he is remediless. If the traveler complies with the rule, and can see or hear a moving train approaching the crossing, what must he do? It follows logically from the rule now so firmly established that he must wait for the approaching train to pass. If he does not do so, he crosses at his peril. He has notice that the train is coming. He knows—he is bound to know— that trains are moved at a high rate of speed, reaching, and sometimes exceeding, a mile in a minute. He is without exact knowledge of the actual rate at which the train he sees or hears is coming, and the only safe thing he can do is to wait. If he does not wait, but risks his safety on his own calculation of the chances that he will be able to cross the track before the train can reach him, he must not complain of the consequences if his calculation fails, and disaster overtakes

him. It will not do to say that a jury may review his calculation, and pass upon its reasonableness. That would destroy the rule, and leave the question of contributory negligence to depend upon a measure that would change with every change of jurors, and with the exigencies of every case. Seeing or hearing the approaching train, the traveler is warned of his danger. To wait is safe. It is the only course he can take that is free from danger. If he goes on in the face of a known danger, without an imperious necessity compelling it, negligence is a presumption of law.

In this case we encounter another question. The plaintiff says he complied with the rule. At about 15 or 20 feet from the track he says he stopped his team, looked each way along the railroad, and listened; and...

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