Myers v. Fresno Cnty. Jail, Case No. 1:20-cv-00381-AWI-EPG
| Decision Date | 29 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:20-cv-00381-AWI-EPG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | ANTHONY E. MYERS, Plaintiff, v. FRESNO COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants. |
Anthony E. Myers ("Plaintiff") is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 13, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against Fresno County Jail, Fresno Police Department, Fresno Sheriff/SERT, American Ambulance, and Community Hospital (collectively "Defendants"). (ECF No. 1). On April 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"). (ECF No. 4). In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that his right to a speedy trial has been violated, excessive force was used in effectuating Plaintiff's arrest, and while in detention unknown technology was used to induce various bodily reactions in Plaintiff akin to assault and sexual assault.
The Court entered a screening order on August 10, 2020. (ECF No. 8). The Court found that Plaintiff failed to state any cognizable claims and gave Plaintiff thirty days from the date of service of the order to file a second amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wishes to stand on the FAC, subject to the undersigned issuing findings and recommendations to the assigned district judge consistent with the screening order. (ECF No. 8 at 12-14).1
On August 12, 2020, the Court received a "packet" of documents, the purpose of which Plaintiff stated was to "amend and append to current filings."2 (ECF No. 9 at 1). The Court notes that although this packet was received after issuance of the August 10 screening order, it is reasonable to assume that Plaintiff did not file the documents with the benefit of the legal standards set forth in the screening order. The packet consists of, inter alia, a police event report, various paperwork related to insurance claims, an automobile repair invoice, court documents related to a Fresno County Superior Court case, letters written by Plaintiff to an insurance company and a law firm, and copies of documents previously submitted to this Court.
The documents in the packet are generally not pertinent to the claims in the FAC and do not alter the analysis set forth in the screening order. Accordingly, for the reasons described in the screening order (ECF No. 8) and set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's case be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners3 seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
The Court may also screen a complaint brought in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is
///frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) ().
In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that a SERT officer used "'pain compliance' in the form of elbow strikes and head butts in addition to double tossings in a 'Rodney King styled' beatdown" when arresting Plaintiff without a warrant. (ECF No. 4 at 4). Plaintiff also alleges that a non-SERT officer admitted to tasing, headbutting, and elbowing as part of "pain compliance." (Id.). Plaintiff appears to contend that he has not waived his right to a speedy trial.
The FAC further alleges that some unknown technology4 "forced dream induced ejaculations called 'Minds Eye,' simulated anal penetration, induced erections, 'so called' 'analdilations,' induced diarreah [sic], extreme cramps, disruption of breath and normal breathing, chest pains[.]" (ECF No. 4 at 4).
The Court notes at the outset that is unclear what relief Plaintiff seeks in the instant proceeding and whether Plaintiff intends to state a habeas claim. In the FAC, Plaintiff makes references to both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the habeas corpus statute.
Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action. Some cases are hybrids, with a prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages, but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground for denying release short of serving the maximum term of confinement.
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-51 (2004) (citations omitted).
"In cases where a prisoner's section 1983 complaint evince[s] a clear intention to state a habeas claim, [the Ninth Circuit has] said that the district court should treat the complaint as a habeas petition." Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Padilla v. Ackerman, 460 F.2d 477, 478 (9th Cir.1972); Bennett v. Allen, 396 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir.1968)). "When the intent to bring a habeas petition is not clear, however, the district court should not convert a defective section 1983 claim into a habeas petition." Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. As noted above, the relief that Plaintiff seeks in the instant proceeding is unclear and Plaintiff makes references to both § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute. Accordingly, the Court declines to convert the FAC into a habeas petition.
The Court further notes that a jurisdictional issue may exist with claims that Plaintiff may state in a § 1983 action. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that to recover damages for "harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. The favorable termination rulelaid out in Heck preserves the rule that claims which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, must be brought by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750-751.
Here, it appears that Plaintiff may be involved in criminal proceedings related to the allegedly unlawful arrest at issue in the FAC. Plaintiff also appears to allege that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. If success on Plaintiff's claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, then: (1) the claim must be brought by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus; and (2) would be subject to the favorable termination rule, which requires the conviction or sentence to have been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated, before Plaintiff could recover damages. Also, if a plaintiff files any "claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial[,] it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating...
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