Myers v. Garff, Civ. No. C86-0693G.
| Decision Date | 04 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. C86-0693G. |
| Citation | 655 F. Supp. 1021 |
| Parties | Morris B. MYERS, Plaintiff, v. Regnal W. GARFF, Jr., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Royal K. Hunt, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
Stephen J. Sorenson, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants.
On December 29, 1986, this court heard oral argument on cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff was represented by Royal K. Hunt and defendants were represented by Stephen J. Sorenson. After argument this court granted defendant Regnal W. Garff's motion for summary judgment with regard to all claims for monetary damages. The parties were ordered to file contemporaneous supplemental memoranda on the issue of exhaustion of available state remedies, after which the matter was to be submitted for resolution without further oral argument. Based upon review of those supplemental memoranda this court is fully advised and sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order.
The facts in this case are undisputed. On November 19, 1981, an order was entered in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake county, State of Utah, requiring that guardianship of plaintiff's son be transferred to the Utah State Division of Youth Corrections for placement into a suitable treatment facility. Thereafter, the Utah State Attorney General's office filed a petition with the Juvenile Court to receive contribution from plaintiff for support and other expenses expended in caring for plaintiff's son. According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-49(1) (1977) the Juvenile Court may enter such an order "after due notice and hearing ... and depending on the parent's financial resources and other demands on their funds." The statute further provides that an order entered by the Juvenile Court "may be enforced by contempt proceedings, and shall also have the effect of a judgment at law." Id. at § 78-3a-49(2). On November 7, 1984, plaintiff failed to appear at a hearing conducted by defendant Judge Regnal W. Garff, Jr. ("Judge Garff") and attended by a representative of the Utah State Attorney General's office. Judge Garff then entered judgment for $1650 in favor of the State of Utah. On November 20, 1985, an Order to Show Cause was issued by Judge Garff directing plaintiff to appear on January 30, 1986, and show cause why he should not make payments to the state for expenditures on behalf of his son. On February 19, 1986, Judge Garff entered a Bench Warrant for plaintiff's arrest as a result of his failure to appear at the scheduled January 30, 1986 hearing. On March 31, 1986, plaintiff appeared at a hearing before Judge Garff which also was attended by defendant Michael F. Skolnick ("Skolnick"), an Assistant Utah State Attorney General. After hearing testimony from plaintiff, Judge Garff stated:
On April 18, 1986, Judge Garff signed an order directing plaintiff to repay his obligation through supervised community service. Judge Garff also ordered that plaintiff appear before the court on July 17, 1986, to determine whether his obligation had been satisfied. On July 22, 1986, Judge Garff entered a Bench Warrant for plaintiff's arrest as "a defaulting person in that he failed to attend a court hearing on July 17, 1986, after receiving notice in open court." On July 30, 1986, plaintiff was arrested and jailed.
Plaintiff asserts that defendants Garff, Skolnick, and Attorney General David L. Wilkinson ("Wilkinson") have violated plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and plaintiff's right to be free from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. The essence of plaintiff's complaint seems to be that by ordering plaintiff to perform community service to satisfy a civil judgment, defendants have subjected plaintiff to peonage under 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982). Congress enacted the predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1994 pursuant to its authority under section two of the Thirteenth Amendment to enforce the prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143, 35 S.Ct. 86, 88, 59 L.Ed. 162 (1914). The Supreme Court has defined peonage as follows:
It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness.... Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by provision of some law. But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to breach it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuation of the service.
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216-17, 25 S.Ct. 429, 430, 49 L.Ed. 727 (1905). A number of issues are raised with regard to application of the peonage statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, to these facts.1 However, after careful review this court has determined that resolution of such issues must be made in the state courts of Utah.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183, 81 S.Ct. 473, 481, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court even if the alleged conduct was also violative of state law. The court concluded that the "federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is involved." Id. However, a plaintiff's ability to seek relief in federal rather than state court is limited by the doctrine of abstention as developed by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine is that "a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent immediate irreparable injury." Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69, 91 S.Ct. 764, 766, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971).
In Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) the Supreme Court extended Younger abstention to the context of a civil case. In Huffman the court determined that a public nuisance statute, as applied to a motion picture theatre, was "more akin to criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." Id. at 604. In addition, the court emphasized the principle of comity in avoiding interference with ongoing civil actions brought by the state. Id. at 599-604, 95 S.Ct. at 1205-1208. Based upon that principle the Supreme Court reversed an order by the district court which had declared the nuisance statute unconstitutional and enjoined the state proceeding. Id. at 612-13, 95 S.Ct. at 1212. The Supreme Court next applied Younger abstention in a civil context in the case of Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). In Juidice a judgment debtor was held in contempt after disobeying a subpoena to appear in supplemental proceedings brought by judgment creditors to enforce their judgments. Rather than seek relief in state court, the judgment debtors brought a class action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin the state contempt proceedings based upon federal constitutional grounds not previously raised. The Supreme Court stated:
These principles of comity apply to a case in which the State's contempt power is involved. A State's interest in the contempt process, through which it vindicates the regular operation of its judicial system, so long as that system itself affords the opportunity to pursue federal claims within it, is surely an important interest.... The contempt power lies at the core of the administration of a State's judicial system.... Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a finding of contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature, we think the salient fact is that federal-court interference with the State's contempt process if "an offense to the State's interest ... likely to be every bit as great as it would be were this a criminal proceeding." ... Moreover, such interference with the contempt process not only "unduly interferes with the legitimate activities of the State," ... but also "can readily be interpreted `as reflecting negatively upon the state courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles.'"
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