Myers v. Maris

• Decision Date: 30 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 1--474A52,1--474A52
• Citation: 326 N.E.2d 577,164 Ind.App. 34
• Parties: William Eugene MYERS, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. J. Lee MARIS, Appellee (Defendant below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 577

326 N.E.2d 577

164 Ind.App. 34

William Eugene MYERS, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. J. Lee MARIS, Appellee (Defendant below).

No. 1--474A52.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

April 30, 1975.

Clelland J. Hanner, John E. Dowd, Rockville, Frank N. Howard, McGaughey, Howard & Morell, Crawfordsville, for appellant

R. M. Kroger, Kroger, Gardis & Regas, Indianapolis, Carl F. Henthorn, Harding & Henthorn, Crawfordsville, Alfred V. Ringer, Williamsport, for appellee.

LYBROOK, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant William Eugene Myers initiated this action seeking, on various theories, recovery for work performed and, further, claiming damages allegedly incurred through reliance on an oral agreement to extend or renew a farm lease. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted the motion of defendant-appellee J. Lee Maris for judgment on the evidence, which ruling is assigned as error in this appeal.

Prior to 1966, Myers owned and operated a farm in Fountain County. Maris owned a 205 acre farm in the same vicinity. In 1964, Maris, as owner, and Myers, as tenant, executed a lease of the 205 acre farm, which read in pertinent part:

'* * * WITNESSETH: that said owner hereby rents and leases to said tenants from March 1, 1964 to March 1, 1965, the following described real estate situated in Parke County, Indiana, to-wit:

The farm of 205 acres known as the 'Scott land', the legal description of which is contained in the deed to said Maris recorded in Deed Record _ _, at page _ _.

And in consideration therefor, said tenants agree to pay as rent one-half (1/2) of all grain grown on said premises. . . .

It is further agreed that said farm shall be operated in compliance with the program of the Parke County A.S.C. and that all feed-grain payments shall belong to said owner. That said parties shall cooperate with each other in the production of crops and management of said farm for the greatest possible ultimate benefit of both parties consistent with modern farm practice, but that said owner shall have the right to determine ultimately all questions as to the management of said farm and to the planting of said crops thereon.

Said tenants further agree to operate said farm in a good, husband--like manner and to keep all weeds mowed or sprayed. . . .

That said tenants shall give possession of said premises at the expiration of this tenancy without further notice or demand. * * *'

While the term of the lease was limited to one year, Myers remained in possession of and farmed the land during 1965. On November 1 of that year, Myers was served with a notice to quit and deliver up possession 'at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy.'

The Parke County A.S.C. program to which the lease referred is supervised by the U.S. Department of Agriculture through the Agriculture Stabilization Conservation Service. A farmer electing participation in the program as it existed during 1964 was required to leave a certain percentage of his tillable acreage unplanted, control the growth of weeds on the unplanted land, and certify compliance with the program by a certain date. Participation in and compliance with the program requirements entitled the farmer to governmental payments. Maris registered his farm for the A.S.C. program in both 1964 and 1965. In accordance with the program guidelines, only eighty-five acres were planted in crops.

The farm was found not to be in compliance and a letter, dated September 16, 1964, was sent to Maris stating that his unplanted land would have to be cleared of weeds and seeded or no A.S.C. payment would be made. The failings noted in the letter were corrected and Maris received the payments in 1964 and 1965.

Myers did not testify at trial. Rather, evidence of the relationship between the parties was presented by Myers' son, Courtney, who assisted in his father's farming operations during the period in question. During 1964 and 1965, Myers, with Courtney's Courtney testified that he was present during three conversations between Myers and Maris. The first of these conversations took place during the latter part of 1964. Therein, Myers requested a contract for the following year. Maris responded that no contract was necessary and that Myers could continue to farm the land as long as he desired. In the spring of 1965 as the land was being prepared for planting, Myers again requested a contract. Again, Maris responded that none was necessary. During a conversation in the summer of 1965, Maris stated that in the next year the entire farm could be planted with corn. Myers responded that he would have to purchase more equipment to be able to handle the whole farm in corn. Following the acquisition by Myers of approximately $20,000 of farming equipment, he was served with the notice to quit. Thereafter, Myers sold both the additional equipment and his own 150 acre farm and acquired a smaller farm. In this action, Myers sought damages due to alleged detrimental reliance on the representation that he could continue to farm Maris' land.

assistance, cleared the unplanted land of weeds by discing a total of eight times for the purpose of compliance with the A.S.C. program. Courtney testified that care for the unplanted acreage was not Myers' responsibility under the lease agreement and that Maris agreed to pay Myers for tilling the unplanted land. In the fall of 1965, Myers sent Maris a bill for the discing. This sum remained unpaid and recovery therefor is sought in this action.

I.

Motions for judgment on the evidence (directed verdict) are governed by Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 50. The granting of such a motion and direction of a verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence is proper only in the absence of evidence or reasonable inference on at least one essential element of the plaintiff's case. Mamula v. Ford Motor Co. (1971), 150 Ind.App. 179, 275 N.E.2d 849; Johnson v. Mills (1973), Ind. App., 301 N.E.2d 205. The evidence must be without conflict and susceptible of but one inference, that being in favor of the moving party. Wroblewski v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. (1971), 150 Ind.App. 327, 276 N.E.2d 567; Memorial Hospital of South Bend v. Scott (1972), Ind.App., 290 N.E.2d 80; Johnson v. Mills, supra. In examining the evidence the trial judge must draw all fair and rational inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion and give that party every favorable intendment of the evidence. Jordanich v. Gerstbauer (1972), Ind.App., 287 N.E.2d 784.

In reviewing a judgment entered on a directed verdict, this court applies the same standards which govern the trial judge in ruling upon the motion. Our task, therefore, is to determine whether there was any evidence requiring submission of the cause to the jury. See, Galbreath v. City of Logansport (1972), Ind.App., 279 N.E.2d 578; Smith v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co. (1974), Ind.App., 311 N.E.2d 462. Since recovery was sought on two separate claims--compensation for work performed and damages incurred through detrimental reliance--each must be hereinafter considered separately.

II.

No error has been demonstrated in the entry of judgment on the evidence with respect to Myers' claim for compensation for work performed.

Courtney Myers testified that the unplanted land was disced a total of eight times during the crop years 1964 and 1965. That some of this work was performed subsequent to March 1, 1965, the date upon which the written lease expired, does not affect our inquiry. As our Supreme Court stated in Harry v. Harry (1891), 127 Ind. 91, 26 N.E. 562:

'It is well settled that where the duration of the tenancy is definitely fixed 'The tenant is still a tenant by contract. Tinder v. Davis, 88 Ind. 99; Coomler v. Hefner, 86 Ind. 108; Bollenbacker v. Fritts, 98 Ind. 50; New York, etc., R.W. Co. v. Randall, 102 Ind. 453, 26 N.E. 122.' See also, Walsh v. Soller (1934), 207 Ind. 82, 190 N.E. 61, rehearing denied, 207 Ind. 82, 191 N.E. 334.

by the terms of the agreement under which the tenant goes into possession of the premises which he is to occupy, and he continues to occupy after the close of the term without a new [164 Ind.App. 40] contract, the rights of the parties are controlled by the terms and conditions of the contract under which the entry was made.

Therefore, we must examine the written agreement in an attempt to ascertain the respective rights and liabilities of the parties.

In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of a written contract is a question of law to be resolved by the court. Wilson v. Kauffman (1973), Ind.App., 296 N.E.2d 432; Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. McCracken (1973), Ind.App., 295 N.E.2d 375. The test for determining ambiguity is whether reasonable men would find the contract subject to more than one construction. Ebert v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co. (1973), Ind.App., 303 N.E.2d 693; Hauck v. Second National Bank of Richmond (1972) Ind.App., 286 N.E.2d 852. Application of this test to the contract in the case at bar compels the conclusion that it is subject to but one reasonable construction, being that Myers was obligated thereunder to perform the work for which he now claims entitlement to compensation. The contract recited that Myers was leasing the entire 'farm of 205 acres.' The 'farm' was to be operated in accordance with the A.S.C. program. Further, Myers agreed to operate the 'farm' in a good husband--like manner and keep the 'farm' clear of weeds.

While the word 'farm' in the granting clause was defined as the entire 205 acres, including both planted and unplanted ground, Myers apparently would have the word limited in the clause providing for weed control to include only the 85 acres on which he was growing corn. However, appellant has wholly failed to propound any reason for the adoption of such a varying interpretation. In fact, appellant's argument with respect to his claim for compensation for work performed is ...