Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.
Decision Date | 05 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. S095213.,S095213. |
Citation | 28 Cal.4th 828,123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40,50 P.3d 751 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | Betty Jean MYERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Bourdette & Partners, Philip C. Bourdette and Andre P. Gaston, Visalia, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wartnick, Chaber, Harowitz & Tigerman, Harry F. Wartnick, Madelyn J. Chaber, San Francisco; Law Offices of Daniel U. Smith, Daniel U. Smith, Los Angeles, and Ted W. Pelletier for Patricia Henley, Leslie Whiteley and Leonard Whiteley as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dennis Eckhart, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter M. Williams, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin and H. Joseph Escher III, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Michael R. Doyen, Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Daniel P. Collins, Los Angeles, and Ronald L. Olsen for Defendant and Respondent Philip Morris Incorporated.
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold and Frederick D. Baker, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.
William L. Gausewitz for The Alliance of American Insurers, The American Insurance Association, The National Association of Independent Insurers, The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies and The Reinsurance Association of America as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Fred Main for California Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
In 1995, the California Legislature found that "[t]obacco-related disease places a tremendous financial burden upon the persons with the disease, their families, the health care delivery system, and society as a whole," and that "California spends five billion six hundred million dollars ($5,600,000,000) a year in direct and indirect costs on smoking-related illnesses." (Health & Saf.Code, § 104350, subd. (a)(7).) To obtain compensation for the physical and mental suffering and staggering expenses inflicted by tobacco-related illness, users of tobacco products and their families have sought relief in our courts through product liability lawsuits against manufacturers and sellers of tobacco products. In dealing with those lawsuits, courts have not been free to apply ordinary principles of tort law because, as we shall explain, the Legislature has enacted statutes that directly control the extent to which our courts may award damages against tobacco companies in product liability actions.
The statutes at issue are two successive versions of section 1714.45 of California's Civil Code.1 The first version, which we here sometimes refer to as the Immunity Statute, granted tobacco companies complete immunity in certain product liability lawsuits as of January 1, 1988.2 (Added by Stats.1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778.) The second version, which we here sometimes refer to as the Repeal Statute, rescinded that immunity 10 years later on January 1, 1998. (Stats.1997, ch. 570, § 1.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has certified to us a question asking whether the Repeal Statute governs "a claim that accrued after January 1, 1998, but which is based on conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 1998." (Myers v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc. (9th Cir.2001) 239 F.3d 1029, 1030 (Myers)
.)
Our answer is this: The Immunity Statute applies to certain statutorily described conduct of tobacco companies that occurred during the 10 year immunity period, which began on January 1, 1988, and ended on December 31, 1997. With respect to such conduct, therefore, the statutory immunity applies, and no product liability cause of action may be based on that conduct, regardless of when the users of the tobacco products may have sustained or discovered injuries as a result of that conduct. That statutory immunity was rescinded, however, when the California Legislature enacted the Repeal Statute, which as of January 1, 1998, restored the general principles of tort law that had, until the 1988 enactment of the Immunity Statute, governed tort liability against tobacco companies. Therefore, with respect to conduct falling outside the 10 year immunity period, the tobacco companies are not shielded from product liability lawsuits.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described the background of this case as follows: (Myers, supra, 239 F.3d at p. 1030
.)
The Ninth Circuit's description continues: (Myers, supra, 239 F.3d at p. 1031
.)
We start with a review of the Immunity Statute and two California cases that have construed that statute, American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal. App.3d 480, 255 Cal.Rptr. 280, a decision of the state Court of Appeal, and Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 103, 928 P.2d 1181, a decision of this court.
Enacted as part of the Willie L. Brown, Jr.—Bill Lockyer Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987, former section 1714.45 (the Immunity Statute) provided in full:
We now discuss the two California decisions that have interpreted the Immunity Statute.
The state Court of Appeal's 1989 decision in American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280 (American Tobacco), which was authored by Presiding Justice J. Anthony Kline, was the first to construe the Immunity Statute. In that case, the court described the Immunity Statute as the result of a "`peace pact'" or "compromise between parties seeking and opposing comprehensive changes in California tort law who had been locked in a long political struggle that had reached [a] stalemate." (American Tobacco, supra, at pp. 486-487
, 255 Cal.Rptr. 280.) Those involved included major special interest groups such as insurers, physicians, manufacturers, and the plaintiffs lawyers. (Id. at p. 486, 255 Cal.Rptr. 280.)3 The Court of Appeal in American Tobacco characterized the Immunity Statute as so "poorly drafted" that "on its face[, it was] amenable to two diametrically opposed interpretations, each of which conflict[ed] in some way with the words" used by the Legislature. (American Tobacco, supra, at p. 485, 255 Cal. Rptr. 280.) But legislative history, the court noted, indicated that the Immunity Statute's intent was to ensure that "`highcholesterol foods, alcohol, and cigarettes that are inherently unsafe and known to be unsafe by ordinary consumers, [were] not to be subject to product liability lawsuits.' " (American Tobacco, supra, at p. 487, 255 Cal.Rptr. 280, italics added.) In light of that legislative intent, the Court of Appeal in American Tobacco concluded that the statutory immunity was very broad, providing "nearly complete" immunity for manufacturers and sellers of tobacco and the other enumerated products. (Ibid.)
In 1997, some eight years after the Court of Appeal's decision in ...
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