Myers v. Richland County
| Decision Date | 23 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. A3-02-129. |
| Citation | 288 F.Supp.2d 1013 |
| Parties | Earle MYERS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. RICHLAND COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota |
Patricia R. Monson, Nilles, Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, ND, for plaintiff.
Ronald F. Fischer, Margaret E. Moore Jackson, Pearson Christensen, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant.
The plaintiff, Earle Myers, Jr., brings an action against the defendants claiming breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from an alleged violation of a settlement agreement.1 The defendants move to dismiss this federal action because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 As articulated below, the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED (doc. # 14-1), but the defendants' Motion to Strike the plaintiff's prayer relief as it relates to punitive damages is GRANTED (doc. # 14-2).
The plaintiff served as the elected Richland County, North Dakota State's Attorney from 1977 to 2003. The plaintiff's primary duty was to prosecute criminal actions on behalf of the County. He also served as legal advisor to the Richland County Board of Commissioners.
In May of 2000, Jewel Jones-Van Tassel filed an action against the Richland County Commissioners, among others, for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff's deposition was taken because as Richland County's attorney he was familiar with the County's discrimination history and policy.
In December of 2000, the parties settled. Jones-Van Tassel obtained $1.2 million, along with letters of apology, and a commitment of non-disparagement. Paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement provided:
Defendants agree that they will not retaliate with respect to any employment related matter against any former, present, or prospective City or County employee, or individual whose compensation is paid, in whole or part, by the City or County, who have provided any support to Plaintiff, whether by affidavit, deposition testimony, providing information to Plaintiff, or any other manner of support.
In addition, Paragraph 17 provided that "[t]he parties agree that the Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement and Release." At the end of the Jones-Van Tassel litigation, this express retention of jurisdiction was incorporated into the Court's order adopting the settlement. In November of 2002, the plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against Richland County, those serving on its Board of Commissioners as of that date, as well as those serving on its Board of Commissioners as of January 10, 2001 (hereinafter collectively known as "the defendants"). The plaintiff claims the defendants breached the settlement agreement by retaliating against him and preventing his reelection. He also brings claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants present five contentions in their motion to dismiss: (a) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; or (b) if subject matter jurisdiction exists, then the court should decline to exercise it based on 28 U.S.C. § 1367; (c) the plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the settlement agreement; (d) the plaintiff fails to raise a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (e) the plaintiff's claims do not entitle him to punitive damages or attorney fees. The Court will now address each of these contentions.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction that may hear a case only if the Constitution or a federal statute provides the court with jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Gaurdian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Title 28 of the United States Code contains the statutory bases of subject matter jurisdiction. The three types that are most often utilized to provide federal court review are: (1) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, (2) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and (3) ancillary, or supplemental, jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Jackson v. Delaware River and Bay Authority, 224 F.Supp.2d 834, 841 (D.N.J.2002).
Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Whenever it appears by the suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue, the question should be determined at the outset of the action. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir.1990). The burden for proving subject matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff. Nucor Corp. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 891 F.2d 1343, 1346 (8th Cir.1989).
The parties agree that neither diversity nor federal question jurisdiction exist in this case. The plaintiff, as well as each of the defendants, are citizens of and reside within North Dakota. All of the activities in this case occurred within North Dakota. Additionally, all of the plaintiff's claims are based on North Dakota law.
The question then becomes whether the plaintiff's claims fall within the area known as supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). This subsection provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided by Federal statute, in any civil action which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution ... (emphasis added)
This subsection allows state claims such as the plaintiff's breach of contract claim to ride the back of a federal claim as long as that claim has an independent basis for jurisdiction. In the present case, it is undisputed that an independent basis for jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, was present in the Jones-Van Tassel case.
With all that said, supplemental, or what is otherwise known as ancillary jurisdiction, has generally been used for two distinct purposes. The first purpose is "to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80, 114 S.Ct. 1673 The second purpose is "to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Id. Here, the Court is exclusively concerned with the second purpose the ability to vindicate its authority and effectuate its decrees.
In Jones-Van Tassel, this Court expressly reserved jurisdiction to effectuate its decree. See Order, Jones-Van Tassel v. Richland County, (D.N.D Jan. 10, 2001), Case No. A3-99-60 (doc. # 138). It is well-settled that supplemental jurisdiction exists when a Court expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381 114 S.Ct. 1673; Miener v. Missouri Dept. of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (8th Cir.1995)( the case because the settlement agreement did not designate any court as having jurisdiction over future enforcement proceedings); Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir.2000). Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims stem from breach of the settlement agreement, which the Court reserved jurisdiction to enforce.3
Once subject matter jurisdiction has been established, a court may decide whether or not to exercise this jurisdiction. This is a purely discretionary decision. City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997). The relevant factors for such a decision are found in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This section allows district courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction when:
3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
The current action involves run of the mill claims such as breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims are the direct result of the previous federal claim. Therefore, state claims cannot be said to predominate. Without the former federal claim, the state claims would not exist. This Court clearly and expressly retained jurisdiction over claims resulting from any subsequent breach of the settlement agreement, and this Court is in the best position to enforce its own decrees. Furthermore, this claim is not exceptional, it is a breach of contract suit and nothing more. The mere fact that the plaintiff was an elected official does not make this case exceptional. Therefore, after considering all of the factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines the defendant's request to abstain and it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the present case.
In general, strangers to a settlement agreement lack standing to enforce its terms. Pure Country, Inc. v. Sigma Chi Fraternity, 312 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir.2002). However, a third party may enforce a settlement agreement when he shows that "the parties to the [settlement agreement] not only intended to confer a benefit upon that third party, but also intended to give that party a legally binding and enforceable right to that benefit." Id. If a third party...
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