Myers v. State

Decision Date22 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. 64A03-9808-CR-349.,64A03-9808-CR-349.
Citation714 N.E.2d 276
PartiesBristol C. MYERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Larry W. Rogers, Harper & Rogers, Valparaiso, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

William H. Wagner, Mark E. Schmidtke, Kevin G. Kerr, Hoeppner, Wagner & Evans, Valparaiso, Indiana, Amicus Curiae, Attorneys for Valparaiso University.

Henry C. Ryder, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, Indiana, Amicus Curiae, Counsel for Hanover College.

Ken Elmendorf, Elmendorf & Meyer, Brownsburg, Indiana, Amicus Curiae, Counsel for Marian College.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, A. Scott Chinn, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RUCKER, Judge

While driving his car near the campus of Valparaiso University, Bristol C. Myers was arrested by a University police officer and thereafter charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor1 and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content greater than .10% as a Class C misdemeanor.2 After a bench trial Myers was found guilty of the Class A misdemeanor. He now appeals raising three issues for our review which we rephrase as follows: 1) does Ind.Code § 20-12-3.5-1 et seq., which permits the creation of university police forces, violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; 2) are university police officers required to complete training conducted by the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy; and 3) did the officer lack reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop? We conclude the statute is not unconstitutional; university police officers are not required to complete training conducted by the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy; and the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

We therefore affirm.

The following facts pertinent to this appeal are not disputed by the parties. Valparaiso University is an institution of higher learning affiliated with the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod. It describes itself as a "church-related university" dedicated to the exploration of the "cultural and religious heritage of mankind." R. at 66 (quoting VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY, 1997-1998 GENERAL CATALOG 5). Valparaiso University is under neither the control nor the authority of any church body, but is an independent institution owned and operated by the Lutheran University Association, a non-profit Indiana corporation. The University receives no direct support from any church body and is accredited by the North Central Association ("NCA"). Valparaiso University operates a university police department whose officers are appointed by the governing board of the University pursuant to Ind.Code § 20-12-3.5-1.

Myers is a law student at Valparaiso University. In the early morning hours of October 4, 1996, he exited the parking lot of a friend's home located across the street from the law school. At the same time, Officer Jason Ezell of the Valparaiso University Police Department was patrolling the streets on and near the University campus. Officer Ezell observed Myers driving his pick-up truck left of center on a two lane street on campus. The officer followed Myers for approximately one block and observed him make a slow left-hand turn into the oncoming lane of traffic of a main east/west street also on campus. According to the officer the truck was driving so slowly that he "thought the vehicle was going to come to a stop and park against traffic but it continued on." R. at 115. Myers then continued westbound where he turned left onto another street. By this time Myers was apparently off campus. In any event as he made the turn, the passenger door of his truck swung open appearing to strike a parked vehicle. The officer followed Myers for a short distance and then activated his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop. When Myers exited his truck, Officer Ezell observed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and he had an odor of alcohol on his breath. When asked if he had consumed any alcoholic beverages that night, Myers responded affirmatively. In addition to failing a "walk and turn" field sobriety test, Myers scored .16% on a chemical breath test. Myers was ultimately arrested and charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content greater than .10%. He was also given a traffic citation for driving left of center and for an "equipment violation" related to the door of his truck swinging open. Myers filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence based on three grounds: 1) the exercise of police power by a private religious institution is unconstitutional; 2) the arresting officer, an employee of a religious institution, had not undergone the training statutorily required of officers employed by the State and therefore lacked authority to make an arrest; and 3) the officer lacked both reasonable suspicion to stop Myers and probable cause to arrest him. The motion was denied. After a bench trial Myers was convicted of driving while intoxicated as a Class A misdemeanor. This appeal followed.

I.

Over Myers' objection the trial court admitted evidence of the chemical breath test as well as testimony concerning other indicia of Myers' intoxication. In his first challenge to the trial court's ruling Myers contends the trial court erred in admitting any evidence seized as a result of his arrest because the statutory authority under which the arresting officer purportedly acted is unconstitutional. The statute in question is Ind.Code § 20-12-3.5-1 which provides:

The Ball State University board of trustees, Indiana State University board of trustees, the trustees of Indiana University, the trustees of Purdue University, University of Southern Indiana board of trustees, the board of trustees of Vincennes University, and the governing board of any other college, university or junior college that is accredited by the North Central Association is authorized:
1) To appoint police officers for the institution for which it is responsible;
2) To prescribe their duties and direct their conduct;
3) To prescribe the distinctive uniforms for the police of the institution or campus; and
4) To designate and operate emergency vehicles.

(Emphasis added). According to Myers, "this is a case where a statute vests governmental power in the hands of a private institution dominated and controlled by religion." Brief of Appellant at 10 (emphasis omitted).

We begin our analysis with well settled principles. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and such presumption continues until clearly overcome by a showing to the contrary. Finney v. State, 491 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ind.Ct.App.1986); Lewis v. State, 484 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). All doubts are resolved in favor of a statute's constitutionality. Regan v. State, 590 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). The burden is on the party challenging a statute to demonstrate its unconstitutionality. Finney, 491 N.E.2d at 1031.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. Amend. 1. At issue in this case is the free exercise clause. The Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion" when scrutinizing challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether it violates the First Amendment. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n. 31, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965 n. 31, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973)). Indeed the Court has engaged in a robust debate concerning Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Nonetheless the Court has consistently used a three-pronged analytical scheme articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) as a guide in detecting unconstitutional government action. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 385 n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2148 n. 7, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (writing for the majority Justice White noted that "there is a proper way to inter an established decision, and Lemon however frightening it might be to some, has not been overruled.") The analytical scheme, known as the "Lemon test," is stated as follows: "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13,91 S.Ct. at 21113 (citations omitted). We apply the test here as a guide in evaluating the constitutionality of Ind.Code § 20-12-3.5-1.

Myers does not contend that the statute has anything other than a secular or legislative purpose. Indeed our own review of the statute reveals nothing that indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to either aid, promote, restrict, hinder, or otherwise affect religion or any religious organization. On its face the statute is neutral and applies to any post-secondary educational institution, public or private, that is accredited by the North Central Association.4 The ability of a post-secondary educational institution to create a police force is not dependent upon its status as a secular or sectarian institution. We view the purpose of the statute here as merely extending to NCA accredited institutions of higher learning the police power of the State in order to protect persons and property located on or near their premises. This is clearly a secular legislative purpose.

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