Myers v. State

• Decision Date: 18 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 297, Sept. Term, 2019,297, Sept. Term, 2019
• Citation: 241 A.3d 997,248 Md.App. 422
• Parties: Heather MYERS v. STATE of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

248 Md.App. 422

241 A.3d 997

Heather MYERS

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 297, Sept. Term, 2019

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

November 18, 2020

Submitted by: Haley Licha (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Submitted by: Carrie J. Williams (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Graeff, Leahy, Lynne A. Battaglia (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Graeff, J.

On January 19, 2018, S. N. left her two-year-old daughter with Heather Myers, appellant, an in-home daycare provider. Appellant fell asleep on her living room couch, and she woke up when she heard a thud. She found the child unconscious in a bedroom. The child suffered a catastrophic brain injury

that left her blind and functioning at the level of a 3- to 4-month-old child.

Appellant was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with neglect of a minor, in violation of Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article ("CR") § 3-602.1 (2012 Repl. Vol.). She filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. After the circuit court denied the motion, appellant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute.

On appeal, appellant presents the following question for this Court's review, which we have reworded slightly:

Is CR § 3-602.1, the child neglect statute, unconstitutional because it is vague?

For the reasons set forth below, we answer that question "no," and therefore, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2018, two days after her daughter's second birthday, S. N. dropped off Madi at appellant's residence. S.N. was a single mother working at St. Joseph's Medical Center, and she had hired appellant as her daycare provider on the recommendation of a friend. S.N. paid appellant, an unlicensed provider who had "watched several children throughout the years," more than a hundred dollars a week to care for Madi. Appellant also was caring for her own four-year-old son. S.N., who considered appellant an attentive caregiver and a friend, was not aware that appellant was addicted to heroin.

S.N. left Madi with appellant at approximately 8:30 a.m. that morning. She went to a doctor's appointment, and when she called to check on Madi after her appointment at approximately 10:30 a.m., appellant reported that everything was fine. S.N. then went to work at St. Joseph Medical Center. At approximately 12:19 p.m., she checked her cell phone and saw that she had numerous missed calls from appellant. S.N. recounted what happened next:

I was not supposed to be on my phone, especially while on patient floors but I assumed it was urgent with so many missed calls from [appellant], so I called her back.

Upon calling her back, she told me that there was an accident and that I needed to pick Madi up and take her to the emergency room right away.

Thankfully, I had two nurses sitting in front of me who ... calmed me down and told me what to ask. I proceeded to ask [appellant] two questions, one being if Madi was conscious. Two, if she was breathing. The reason I asked these two questions was because if she was unconscious or not breathing, I simply could not just pick her up and take her to the emergency room, she needed immediate care from EMS.

Upon asking these questions, she reiterated that I needed to come pick Madi up myself right away and take her to the emergency room. I then again asked if she was conscious and breathing, and [appellant] informed me that she was breathing and unconscious.

I informed [appellant] that I am unable to just pick her up and take her to the emergency room, that I was hanging up and she needed to call 911 right away. I also told her to keep her hand on her chest to ensure that she was breathing and to not move her in case of spinal cord injury

.

She called 911, and I ran out of work.

At 12:22 p.m., after speaking with S.N., appellant called 911, reporting that Madi "had fallen from the top bunk." The first responder on the scene found the child "on the floor, immobile, unresponsive and unconscious" next to a four-foot-high loft bed. Appellant told the officer that "Madi was placed on the loft bed for a diaper change," and when appellant went "out to the living room area where the diapers were," the child "must have fallen off the bed, because she had heard her fall when she was in the other room."

When medics arrived moments later, they observed that the child "had raspy breathing," and "her pupils were unevenly dilated, indicating that there was blood or brain injury

." Because "[s]he was suffering from high intracranial pressure," i.e., brain swelling, she was transported by helicopter from a nearby school to Johns Hopkins.

Madi survived after a series of emergency and surgical interventions, including the removal of a portion of her skull. As a result of her injuries, however, which included "acute subdural hemorrhage

causing a midline shift of the brain," she was left blind, and she will forever function at the level of a 3- to 4-month old child, who needs 24-hour care. S.N., who has a bachelor's degree in nursing, quit her nursing job to become Madi's full-time care provider.

After doctors concluded that the child's injuries were inconsistent with a four-foot fall in the manner appellant had described, the police re-interviewed appellant, and she changed her account of what happened. Appellant admitted that she had used heroin the night before Madi's accident, but she denied that she was under the influence when she was caring for Madi.¹ She stated that, on the day of the accident, "she was getting sick from withdraw[al] and was not feeling well," so she laid down on the couch and fell asleep for "over 30 minutes." When she went to sleep, her son was watching his iPad, and "Madi was playing in the living room area."

Appellant stated that she "woke up to a thud." She ran into the bedroom and saw Madi unconscious. She picked Madi up and "tried to wake her up but could not." Appellant was not able to explain how the injuries to Madi occurred, but she indicated that Madi recently had been climbing on the loft bed. When Madi's doctor was advised that she might have climbed up to the top rung of the ladder on the loft bed, he agreed that her head injuries

could have been caused by her falling back and hitting the back of her head.

Appellant was charged with one count of neglecting a minor in violation of CR § 3-602.1(b), which provides that "[a] parent, family member, household member, or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not neglect the minor." "Neglect" is defined as "the intentional failure to provide necessary assistance and resources for the physical needs or mental health of a minor that creates a substantial risk of harm to the minor's physical health or a substantial risk of mental injury to the minor." CR § 3-602.1(a)(5)(i).

On September 11, 2018, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge, asserting, among other things, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to "provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed" or "provide explicit standards of enforcement." She argued that the statute does not identify what conduct might qualify as "neglect," asserting that the statute does not make clear what constitutes "necessary assistance and resources," the child's "physical needs," and a "substantial risk of harm." CR § 3-602.1(a)(5)(i).

Following a hearing, the circuit court denied appellant's motion. The court found that CR § 3-602.1 was constitutional, stating that the legislature intentionally did not provide particular examples of what constituted neglect because each case involves an individual factual determination.

On April 17, 2019, appellant entered a conditional guilty plea. The court sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment, all but 18 months suspended, and three years’ supervised probation.

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[T]he standard of review of the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is whether the trial court was legally correct." Howard v. Crumlin , 239 Md. App. 515, 521, 197 A.3d 574 (2018) (quoting Blackstone v. Sharma , 461 Md. 87, 110, 191 A.3d 1188 (2018) ), cert. denied , 463 Md. 153, 204 A.3d 193 (2019). We review the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc ., 465 Md. 339, 350, 214 A.3d 521 (2019) ; Lipp v. State , 246 Md. App. 105, 110, 227 A.3d 818 (2020).

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that CR § 3-602.1 is "unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to the particular facts of this case." She asserts that the statute "is not sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, and ... it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

The State contends that appellant's challenge "must fail because the constitutional vagueness of § 3-602.1 was decided by the Court of Appeals in Hall v. State , 448 Md. 318, 139 A.3d 936 (2016)." It asserts that, "[b]ecause a majority of the judges in Hall found [CR] § 3-602.1 not to be unconstitutionally vague, that finding constitutes precedent of the Court of Appeals and this Court is bound by it." Recognizing that the five judges who opined on the constitutionality of CR § 3-602.1 were those who wrote or joined concurring and dissenting opinions, the State asserts as an alternative argument that, even if the opinion of the five judges in Hall is not binding precedent, it is, at a minimum, "persuasive and well-reasoned dicta that should be followed by this Court."

In her reply brief, appellant argues that Hall is not "binding precedent." She asserts that the "common thread" in the different opinions is that the evidence "was insufficient to sustain Ms. Hall's conviction for neglect."...