Myers v. State

• Decision Date: 04 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 17A04–1510–CR–1688.,17A04–1510–CR–1688.
• Citation: 66 N.E.3d 1007 (Table)
• Parties: Bryan N. MYERS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

66 N.E.3d 1007 (Table)

Bryan N. MYERS, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 17A04–1510–CR–1688.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Nov. 4, 2016.

Joseph W. Eddingfield, Wabash, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Earlier this year, we issued a memorandum decision in Myers v. State,No. 17A04–1510–CR–1688 (Ind.Ct.App. Apr. 26, 2016).In that interlocutory appeal, Bryan N. Myers challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge of his four class A felony drug dealing charges pursuant to Rule 4(C) of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure.We held that the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion where both he and the State had requested a hearing.We reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Myers's motion for discharge.The trial court conducted the hearing and issued an order with findings of fact and conclusions thereon, again denying Myers's motion for discharge.Having retained jurisdiction, we now conduct our review with the aid of the hearing transcript, exhibits, and amended briefs.Concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Myers's motion for discharge, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2014, Myers was charged in Wabash County with class D felony possession of methamphetamine ("Wabash County Cause").He was released on bond and was residing at his Pike Street home in Wabash.

[3] On June 4, 2014, the DeKalb Countyprosecutor charged Myers with four class A felony drug dealing offenses in two separate two-count causes, 17D02–1406–FA–16("Cause 16")and 17D02–1406–FA–17("Cause 17").¹The following day, the DeKalb Superior Court made a probable cause finding and directed that arrest warrants be issued to the DeKalb County sheriff.At 9:00 a.m. on Friday, June 6, 2014, the arrest warrants were issued under both cause numbers.That same day, the warrants were faxed to the Wabash County Sheriff's Department and stamped received at 1:01 p.m.SeeDefendant's Ex.A (arrest warrants on Causes 16 and 17, identifying Myers and his Wabash address, each including file stamp indicating date and time of receipt by DeKalb County sheriff and date of fax receipt by Wabash County sheriff).That same afternoon, with the DeKalb County warrants in hand, Wabash City Police OfficerKevin Evenson detained and arrested Myers shortly after Myers left his Wabash home.After presenting the warrants to Myers, Officer Evenson signed and dated them as having been served on Myers on June 6, 2014.Id.The date of return of the arrest warrants was left blank.Id.

[4] Myers was jailed in Wabash County over the weekend.On Monday, June 9, 2014, he appeared in court in Wabash County, where his bond was revoked on the Wabash County Cause and he was charged with a new class C felony possession offense.That same day, Auburn City Police OfficerCory Heffelfinger, a drug interdiction officer, went to the Wabash County Jail hoping to interview Myers.Auburn is in DeKalb County.Myers refused the interview, and Officer Heffelfinger returned to DeKalb County.

[5] Myers remained incarcerated in Wabash County for the ensuing eleven months.Sometime around May 15, 2015, DeKalb County Prosecutor ClaraMary Winebrenner learned from conversations with law enforcement personnel (including Officer Heffelfinger) that "Myers was incarcerated or arrested on our cases."State'sEx. 3(Winebrenner's affidavit).On May 19, 2015, Prosecutor Winebrenner filed a motion for an order to transport Myers from Wabash County to DeKalb County, which the trial court granted on May 20, 2015.

[6] On June 8, 2015, Myers was transported from the Wabash County Jail to DeKalb County for an initial hearing on Causes 16 and 17.On June 26, 2015, Myers filed a Rule 4(C)motion for discharge.On July 27, 2015, the State filed its objection to Myers's discharge motion, and both parties requested that the motion be set for hearing.The trial court set dates for pretrial conferences and for a February 2016 trial.

[7]The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Myers's motion for discharge.On August 7, 2015, the trial court issued an order summarily denying Myers's motion.Thereafter, Myers sought and received certification of the order for interlocutory appeal.The motions panel of this Court granted his petition for interlocutory appeal.We reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court should have held a hearing on Myers's motion for discharge.

[8] On May 23, 2016, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Myers's motion.Shortly thereafter, the court issued an order with findings of fact and conclusions thereon, denying Myers's motion.Having retained jurisdiction, we now address the merits of Myers's appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Myers asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge pursuant to CriminalRule 4(C), which states,

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule.Provided further, that a trial court may take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance.Any continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial within a reasonable time.Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged.

[10] In reviewing a challenge to a trial court's ruling on a Criminal Rule 4 motion for discharge, the standard of review depends upon whether the case involves application of the law to undisputed facts or the trial court's issuance of findings resolving disputed facts.Austin v. State,997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039–40(Ind.2013).We review the former cases de novo and the latter cases using a clearly erroneous standard.Id.In reviewing for clear error, we neither reweigh evidence nor determine witness credibility.Id. at 1040.Rather, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and reverse only on a showing of clear error, which is error that "leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."Id.(citation omitted).

[11] The purpose of CriminalRule 4(C) is to promote early trials, not to discharge defendants.Fuller v. State,995 N.E.2d 661, 665(Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied(2014).Subject to the exceptions listed in Rule 4(C), the State has an affirmative duty to bring the defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested.Wood v. State,999 N.E.2d 1054, 1060(Ind.Ct.App.2013), trans. denied(2014), cert. denied.The defendant is neither obligated to remind the court of the State's duty nor required to take affirmative steps to ensure that he is brought to trial within the statutory time period.Id.At the same time, Criminal Rule 4 is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a technical means to escape prosecution.Austin,997 N.E.2d at 1037.When a defendant moves for discharge, he bears the burden of showing that he has not been timely brought to trial and that he is not responsible for the delay.Wood,999 N.E.2d at 1060.Where the record is silent concerning the reason for delay, such delay is not attributable to the defendant.Caldwell v. State,922 N.E.2d 1286, 1290(Ind.Ct .App.2010), trans. denied.

[12] Here, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions thereon include the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

....

11.That the Court was not provided with any evidence that the DeKalb County Sheriff's Department or the DeKalb County Prosecutor's Office was notified by any Wabash County Police Agency that the Defendant had been arrested either on the DeKalb County warrants or on a new Wabash County charge.

12.That on June 9, 2014, Officer Cory Heffelfinger an officer with the Auburn Police Department, a city in DeKalb County, Indiana, attempted to interview the Defendant at the Wabash County Jail, but Defendant refused to speak with Officer Heffelfinger.No evidence was presented to explain how Officer Heffelfinger knew the Defendant was in the Wabash County Jail.

13.That Officer Heffelfinger did not arrest or otherwise transport the Defendant to DeKalb County nor did he notify the DeKalb County Sheriff's Department of the fact that Bryan Myers was being held in the Wabash County Jail or his arrest on new charges in Wabash County or his arrest on the DeKalb County warrants.

14.That between June 9, 2014, and May 15, 2015, it does not appear that any action was taken with regard to either the foregoing DeKalb Countycases nor does it appear that any information was received by the DeKalb County Sheriff's Department or the DeKalb County Prosecuting Attorney's Office about the Defendant in association with said cases.

15.That on or about May 15, 2015, in a conversation with DeKalb County Chief Probation Officer, Katherine Cullum, and Officer Cory Heffelfmger, the DeKalb County Prosecuting Attorney learned that the Defendant might be involved in other drug related activities in the DeKalb County, Indiana, area and that he may be in the Wabash County Jail.

16.That pursuant to [DeKalb County Prosecutor] Winebrenner's Affidavit admitted as State's exhibit 3, a note placed in the Defendant's files memorializing said conversation, stated that the conversation with

...