Myers v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 06 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | 89-3550,Nos. 89-3533,89-3576 and 89-3661,s. 89-3533 |
| Citation | 916 F.2d 659 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15742A Doris MYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States, Defendant-Appellee. Carolyn L. GRIMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of the United States, Defendant-Appellee. Althea D. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, as U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. Mary COHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Sarah H. Bohr, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Christine Bradfield, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Atlanta, Ga., Ralph Lee, John Lawlor, Asst. U.S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant-appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and ESCHBACH *, Senior Circuit Judge.
These consolidated cases involve the question of when a claimant who obtains full benefits from the Secretary of Health and Human Services subsequent to a district court remand must file a petition for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 1 ("EAJA"). 2 In each of the four cases before us, the claimant applied for either Social Security disability benefits, Supplemental Security Income, or both, and was denied benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (hereinafter "the Secretary"). Each claimant then initiated judicial review of the Secretary's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). Consistent with the magistrates' recommendations concerning the issues raised in each of the four cases, the district court ordered the cases remanded to the Secretary for additional proceedings. Subsequently, the Secretary determined that each of the four claimants was entitled to full receipt of the benefits requested.
In each case, the parties then returned to the district court and informed the district court of the Secretary's new decision. The district court in each case then entered an order affirming the Secretary's decision and dismissing the litigation. Subsequent to these dismissal orders, each of the claimants filed a motion for attorney's fees under the EAJA; none of the four claimants' motions were filed within thirty days of the district court's orders dismissing the litigation. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the applications for attorney's fees, ruling that it did not possess jurisdiction to consider the applications because they were not filed in compliance with the EAJA's mandate that fee applications be filed "within thirty days of final judgment in the action." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(B).
The claimants now appeal, arguing that the district court's conclusions in the various cases are inconsistent with the EAJA and rest on a misconception of the law concerning the Secretary's ability to appeal district courts' orders in Social Security cases. Finding ourselves in agreement with the claimants in three of the four cases presented, we vacate the district court's orders and remand those cases for further proceedings. Although we are not in total agreement with the district court's analysis in the fourth case, given the particular facts presented, we affirm the district court's conclusion that it was without jurisdiction to consider the petition filed in that case.
These appeals involve the attempts of four claimants, Doris Myers, Althea Parker, Carolyn Grimes, and Mary Cohen, to obtain attorney's fees under the EAJA after having successfully challenged the Secretary's decision denying requested Social Security disability or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits. We briefly summarize the proceedings leading up to the present appeal in each case.
Doris Myers: Myers applied for both SSI and Social Security benefits on May 15, 1986. After her application was denied, she requested and was granted an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ, although finding that Myers suffered from severe hypertension and atherosclerotic vascular disease, concluded that Myers did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments which met or equaled one listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404 and 416, Subpart P, App. 1 (1986). The ALJ found that Myers's allegations of pain were not credible and were unsubstantiated by objective medical evidence; the ALJ further determined that Myers possessed the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities which were not strenuous. As a result of these findings, the ALJ ruled that Myers was not entitled to receive benefits under either program.
Myers timely requested review of her petition before the Appeals Council, which denied her petition for review. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), she then initiated civil proceedings in the Middle District of Florida.
While her case was pending, Myers received notices from the Secretary that, on the basis of a subsequently filed application for benefits, she had been awarded Social Security disability benefits commencing July 21, 1987 and SSI benefits commencing September 17, 1987. As a result, the issue in the federal court litigation became solely a question of whether the Secretary erred in not also awarding Myers disability benefits from May 15, 1986 through July 21, 1987, and SSI benefits from May 15, 1986 through September 17, 1987.
For approximately two months, Myers and the Secretary unsuccessfully engaged in settlement negotiations. Once negotiations for settlement became futile, Myers filed a motion to remand the case to the Secretary for consideration of new, noncumulative evidence which became available after the Secretary's decision was rendered. In response, the Secretary conveyed his agreement with Myers's position, stating that "The Defendant has no objection to the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and agrees to pay benefits to the claimant from the onset date of May 2, 1986, the date she became disabled."
In light of this representation, the magistrate recommended the case be remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings. On June 23, 1988, the district court adopted this recommendation and remanded the case over the objection of Myers, who argued that judicial economy would best be served by immediately resolving the case on the basis of the Secretary's apparent concession.
On September 7, 1988, the Appeals Council issued a decision finding that Myers was entitled to Social Security and SSI disability insurance benefits for a period of disability commencing May 2, 1986. On November 8, 1988, Myers returned to the district court and requested that the district court enter a judgment reversing the Secretary's initial decision and awarding her Social Security and SSI disability benefits consistent with the Appeals Council's decision.
On November 28, 1988, having received no filing from the Secretary, the district court issued a judgment affirming the Secretary's decision on remand and dismissing the case. A little less than three months later, on February 27, 1989, Myers moved for attorney's fees pursuant to the EAJA. The district court sua sponte issued a show cause order questioning whether Myers's petition for EAJA attorney's fees was timely filed. After receiving briefing from both parties, the district court concluded that Myers's motion was untimely and dismissed her attorney's fee request. Myers v. Sullivan, 710 F.Supp. 1333 (M.D.Fla.1989).
Althea Parker: Parker filed four applications for Social Security benefits and supplemental income on July 10, 1979, June 22, 1981, January 11, 1982, and March 29, 1983. Each application was denied by the Secretary. After the March 29, 1983, application was denied, Parker commenced suit in federal district court to review the Secretary's denial of that application. In this suit, she alleged that the Secretary erred in concluding that she did not suffer from a severe impairment.
Over the objections of the Secretary, the magistrate reviewing the case concurred with Parker. The magistrate found that the ALJ erred in concluding that Parker was not suffering from a severe impairment. Finding that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support this conclusion, the magistrate recommended the case be remanded to the Secretary for further consideration. This recommendation was adopted by the district court and the case was remanded.
Upon remand, the Secretary concluded that Parker was entitled to receive benefits with an onset date of December 1, 1982. Parker returned to district court, this time challenging the onset date selected by the Secretary. She argued that the Secretary should have reopened her earlier applications for benefits in light of the fact that she was suffering from a mental impairment and was proceeding without counsel at the time that those applications had been denied. Relying principally upon Elchediak v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 892 (11th Cir.1985), the magistrate concluded that the Secretary should have reopened Parker's applications if Parker's mental illness disability was responsible for her failure to challenge the Secretary's denial of her earlier applications. The magistrate recommended that the case be remanded to the Secretary for consideration as to whether Parker's mental illness prevented her from pursuing her initial claims.
The district court adopted this recommendation and the case was remanded to the Secretary a second time. Upon this second remand, the ALJ recommended that Parker be awarded benefits commencing on January 8, 1979. This recommendation was adopted by the Appeals Council on March...
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Preliminary Sections
...2005); Stewart v. Apfel , Case No. 99-6132, 245 F.3d 793 (Table) 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 33214 (11th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000); Myers v. Sullivan , 916 F.2d 659 (11th Cir. 1990); Stratton v. Bowen , 827 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1987); Flynn v. Heckler , 768 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir. 1986) About the Authors Al......