Myers v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Quincy

• Decision Date: 29 October 1942
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 9342.
• Parties: MYERS v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF QUINCY.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

316 Ill.App. 177

44 N.E.2d 755

MYERS

v.YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF QUINCY.

Gen. No. 9342.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Oct. 29, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Adams County; Fred G. Wolfe, Judge.

Action by Arch Myers against Young Men's Christian Association of Quincy, Illinois, for a personal injury sustained as a result of collapse of bleachers at soft ball park. From a judgment for plaintiff for $1,750, the defendant appeals and plaintiff assigns cross-error.

Judgment reversed.

Lancaster & Nichols, of Quincy, for appellant.

Henry W. Pollock, of Quincy, for appellee.

RIESS, Presiding Justice.

An action at law in tort was filed in the Circuit Court of Adams County by Arch Myers, plaintiff-appellee herein, against the defendant-appellant, Young Men's Christian Association of Quincy, Illinois, a corporation, seeking recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff while exercising due care for his own safety, as a proximate result of the collapse of a tier or row of bleachers negligently maintained by the defendant in a defective and dangerous condition at its soft ball park, during the progress of a night ball game sponsored by the defendant, to which park the plaintiff had paid an admission fee as a spectator. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of $1,750 in favor of the plaintiff, after denial of defendant's motions for a directed verdict. Subsequent motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were also denied and judgment was entered on the verdict against the defendant on December 15, 1941, from which judgment the defendant has perfected its appeal to this Court.

Defendant-appellant, by its answer admitted that plaintiff was a spectator and was injured at a soft ball game in progress on the night of August 13, 1941, in a soft ball park operated by defendant in Quincy, but denied that it negligently and carelessly maintained defective or dangerous bleachers, or that the same collapsed and injured plaintiff as a result of negligent maintenance by the defendant as alleged or that plaintiff exercised due care and caution for his own safety. Defendant further admits and avers that it is known as and is a charitable association and corporation but denies that it was operating its soft ball park for profit, or that a profit was obtained therefrom, and states that it is a duly chartered Illinois Corporation not for pecuniary profit; that the amount fixed for admission was a nominal charge designed to cover the expense of operating the ball park; that the object and purpose of operating said park was to carry out the corporate objects and purposes of the defendant in providing wholesome recreation for young men engaged in industries; that said object and purpose as stated in its Articles of Incorporation is “the spiritual, intellectual, social and physical welfare of young men”; that the defendant has no stock or stockholders; that none of the income of the defendant inures to the benefit of any person; that it is supported largely by gifts and donations made through Community Chest of Quincy, Inc.; that any income received by the defendant from the operation of the park was devoted solely toward the expense of carrying out of such corporate objects and purposes. No reply was filed to the answer.

The second count of the complaint alleged that defendant carried Public Liability Insurance to protect it from any loss which might occur, or any liability which might accrue, should it become liable through its negligence for injuring any individual in and about its ball park, which latter count was stricken from the complaint by the Court upon defendant's motion therefor. To this ruling, plaintiff-appellee has excepted and assigned cross-error on appeal.

Defendant-appellant, as grounds for reversal, alleged prejudicial error in overruling the various motions interposed by the defendant; in holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies herein; in sustaining plaintiff's objections to the introduction of defendant's Charter setting forth its corporate powers, objects and purposes as a charitable corporation, and in entering judgment for the plaintiff.

The facts, briefly stated are as follows: Plaintiff-appellee Myers, a machinist employed in an industrial plant at Quincy, accompanied by his wife and two friends went to the soft ball park operated by defendant-appellant on Wednesday evening, August 13, 1941, where he had frequently attended games during that and previous summers. They purchased tickets for which a twenty-five cents admission fee to the ball park was paid and sat together on the third row from the top of a ten seat tier of open bleachers, where plaintiff usually sat. After about two hours, the section of bleachers in which plaintiff was sitting leaned over toward the north and collapsed. When the bleachers started to go down, plaintiff turned and sought to arise. His right foot was caught in the bleachers, resulting in injuries to his right ankle and the calf of his left leg. Prior thereto, no section of the bleachers, which were open to view to all persons had collapsed or caused any accident or injury. The bleachers had been moved to and used at another place on the preceding Sunday by the Knights of Columbus and had been returned and set up in the Y. M. C. A. park on Tuesday; on Tuesday night preceding the accident on Wednesday, they had been filled to capacity. No proof was offered by the plaintiff as to any specific defect or faulty construction of the bleachers occupied by plaintiff, who contended that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.

Witness Heald, defendant's General Secretary, testified that he saw the bleachers frequently and there was nothing wrong with this section to his knowledge. That “The price of admission charged for that park has not been sufficient to provide any profit to the Young Men's Christian Association.”

Witness Harry Hall, Program Secretary and Physical Director of the Y. M. C. A. testified that no boards were broken; that he had charge of the soft ball program and as far as he knew nothing was wrong with this section of bleachers, which had been in regular use without any previous accident occurring. Secretary Hall further testified that the soft ball park was conducted as part of the association's program under the terms of its Charter to furnish wholesome recreation in the afternoon for boys and in the evening hours for young men employed in industries; that there was not room where the Y. M. C. A. building, gymnasium, swimming pool, billiard tables, pulley weights and physical equipment is located downtown, for a soft ball park for use in connection with such activities of the Y. M. C. A.; that this enterprise was connected with the corporate objects and purposes of the association as a charitable corporation and not for pecuniary profit; that the Young Men's Christian Association is a charitable corporation, having no stock or stockholders, and no person receives any profit from its operation; that the income is derived solely from membership dues, temporary rentals, the Community Chest and its commercial features.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the cause was dismissed as to co-defendant George Durst for want of proof of plaintiff's allegations that he had carelessly and negligently rented defective bleachers to defendant Y. M. C. A. and had permitted use thereof at the time of plaintiff's alleged injuries. No appeal was taken from that order.

In passing upon the contentions of the appellant, which are assigned as prejudicial and reversible errors on the part of the Trial Court, we are first confronted with the contention that the defendant association is a charitable corporation and therefore, under recognized principles of law heretofore uniformly applied by the Courts of Review of this State, is not liable to respond in damages for the torts of its agents or servants, while acting in the furtherance of the purposes and objects of such association as defined in its corporate Charter. While this principle of law has not been applied or adhered to in all States and has been applied with certain restrictions and limitations in some other jurisdictions, it has been uniformly recognized and applied by the Courts of Review of this State.

In the case of Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 2 A.L.R.,N.S., 556, 4 Ann.Cas. 103, an action at law in tort was filed against said University Corporation seeking recovery of damages by a student who had lost an eye through injuries proximately caused by the negligence of one of the professors employed by the defendant. The defendant denied liability for the negligence or tortious act of its employee on the ground that it was a non-profit charitable corporation and institution, and therefore could not be held to respond in damages for any such alleged negligent injuries. Upon this issue, the above principle was directly applied by the Supreme Court, which stated the applicable and controlling principle (218 Ill. at page 385, 75 N.E. at page 993) in the following language: “That the appellee, though a private, and not a public, corporation, being a purely charitable institution, is not answerable for the negligent acts of its employés, is held but with little diversity of opinion.” In relation to its corporate purposes, it was there likewise said (218 Ill. at page 383, 75 N.E. at page 992): “It is clear from the reading of this charter that the appellee's entire funds, whether from tuition fees received from students or other sources, must be used solely for educational purposes. The appellee corporation has no capital stock, it cannot declare dividends or share profits, and everything that it has is held in trust to be applied in such manner as to best accomplish the purpose for which it was created, viz., the diffusion of knowledge and learning.” The reason and basis for such...