Mykland v. CommonSpirit Health
| Decision Date | 16 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-05061-RAJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | STEPHANIE MYKLAND, Plaintiff, v. COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH, d/b/a CHI FRANCISCAN HEALTH and as SAINT CLARE HOSPITAL, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for a More Definite Statement or to Strike Complaint (Dkt. # 7), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Dkt # 19), and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Dkt. # 23). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. For the reasons below, Plaintiff's motions to remand and strike are DENIED, and Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part with leave to amend.
Plaintiff Stephanie Mykland was a nurse at St. Clare Hospital in Lakewood, Washington. Dkt. # 17-2 ¶ 4.1. The hospital is owned and operated by her employer, CommonSpirit Health (“CommonSpirit”). Id. ¶ 4.2. Initially, in March 2018, she was employed as an emergency room technician. Id. ¶ 5.3. Months later, she was offered a position as a registered nurse. Id. ¶¶ 5.3-5.4.
Before she accepted the position, Ms. Mykland disclosed that she was in a romantic relationship with a fellow female employee, Trish Lanphere. Id. Ms. Lanphere was a charge nurse and Ms. Mykland's supervisor. Id. They disclosed their relationship to Stephanie Earnhardt, who later told the couple that human resources allowed Ms. Lanphere to remain in her current position. Id. But shortly after, another employee complained that Ms. Lanphere was “displaying favoritism” towards Ms. Mykland. Id. Human resources then informed the couple that Ms. Mykland could no longer work while Ms. Lanphere was a charge nurse, resulting in Ms. Lanphere's stepping down from her position. Id.
Ms. Mykland's complaint contains a series of interpersonal disputes that she had with coworkers beginning in March 2018, when she was hired as an emergency room technician, until December 2019, when she was fired as a nurse. Dkt. # 17-2 ¶¶ 5.3-5.36. Sometimes, Ms. Mykland brought a dispute to human resources and management's attention. For example, on October 31, 2018, she spoke to Stephanie Earnhardt about her “personal issues” with another coworker, which affected her “work relationship” with that coworker and caused “staffing issues.” Id. ¶ 5.6. And again, on May 24, 2019, Ms. Mykland informed her employer that another coworker “spoke negatively” about Ms. Mykland to a different coworker. Id. ¶ 5.17. Ms. Mykland does not explain how these various disputes relate to her complaint, and the Court need not summarize them all here. Id. ¶¶ 5.3-5.36.
In the end, Ms. Mykland alleges that she was discriminated against. Sometime before her 2019 annual evaluation, she “complained of sexual orientation discrimination to St. Clare leadership and management.” Dkt. # 17-2 ¶ 5.32. She alleges that, in retaliation, she was given an overall rating of “below expectations.” Id. Besides her poor evaluation, she alleges that the hospital created the “Non-Fraternation [sic] 262 policy” in response to Ms. Mykland and Ms. Lanphere's homosexual relationship. Id. ¶ 5.33. She alleges that no such policy existed before she disclosed their relationship. Id. Finally, in November 2019, Ms. Mykland was put on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 5.35. She was being investigated for “popping” a tourniquet off a patient's arm, resulting in the patient's death. Id. She was terminated weeks later. Id. ¶¶ 5.35-5.36. On the other hand, the two other employees who had also been involved in the incident, one male and one female, “maintained their employment status.”
On November 16, 2020, Ms. Mykland sued CommonSpirit in Pierce County Superior Court. Dkt. # 1-2. CommonSpirit later removed the action to this Court. Dkt. # 1. Ms. Mykland is suing CommonSpirit for sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and for wrongful termination and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).
CommonSpirit moves to dismiss the complaint. Dkt # 7. Ms. Mykland moves to remand. Dkt. # 23. Both motions are ripe and pending before the Court.
Remand to state court is warranted, Ms. Mykland argues, because CommonSpirit has failed to meet its removal burden. Dkt. # 23 at 3-4. According to her, CommonSpirit cannot demonstrate that the amount in controversy here exceeds $75, 000, and thus the Court lacks original jurisdiction. Id.
District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant may remove a civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992). To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor of remand, and any doubt as to the right of removal must be resolved in favor of remand. Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. The party seeking a federal forum has the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction is proper. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2006).
“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75, 000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The amount in controversy includes damages and, if authorized by statute or contract, attorney's fees. Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1998)). To assess jurisdiction, a court may consider facts in the removal petition and “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995)).
The parties are, undisputedly, citizens of different states. Dkt. # 17 ¶¶ 11-13. Ms. Mykland appears to be a Washington citizen. Id. ¶ 11. CommonSpirit, a non-profit corporation incorporated in Colorado with its principal place of business in Illinois, is a citizen of those states. Id. ¶ 12; see also Dkt. # 17-4. CommonSpirit has thus established diversity of citizenship.
Ms. Mykland argues that there is no evidence that the controversy here exceeds $75, 000. Dkt. # 23 at 3-4. Because her complaint does not demand a dollar amount, Dkt. # 17-2, it is not facially apparent that the jurisdictional requirement is met. As the removing party, CommonSpirit must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that more than $75, 000 is at stake. The Court finds that CommonSpirit has met its burden.
Should Ms. Mykland prevail on her claims, CommonSpirit argues that its potential liability could be substantial. Dkt. # 26 at 3-9. It identifies two types of potential relief, “general and/or special damages” and attorney's fees.[1] To assess the amount in controversy, the Court may consider these amounts because Ms. Mykland brings claims under the WLAD, Dkt. # 17-2 at 26, which permits her to recover damages and attorney's fees. RCW 49.60.030(2); Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018) ().
CommonSpirit argues that Ms. Mykland stands to recover great sums under her WLAD claims. Jury verdicts in similar discrimination cases, it says, have ranged from $85, 000 to millions of dollars in emotional stress damages alone. Dkt. # 26 at 4-7. The Court may consider such evidence. Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (). Reviewing CommonSpirit's jury verdict evidence, the Court agrees that many of the cited cases are factually similar to this one and that the jury awards for emotional distress damages in those cases have indeed exceeded $75, 000. See, e.g., Dkt. # 26-2 at 2-5 ().
CommonSpirit further estimates that Ms. Mykland's attorney's fees could be in the tens of thousands of dollars. Dkt. # 17 ¶¶ 28-34. It cites the work that Ms. Mykland's counsel has performed to date, such as filing a 22-page complaint, serving written discovery, and moving to remand. Id. ¶ 29. It further reasons that there is much more work ahead, such as the taking of depositions and responding to CommonSpirit's anticipated summary judgment motion. Id. ¶¶ 30-33. The Court finds CommonSpirit's representations and reasoning persuasive. The Court need not calculate Ms. Mykland's attorney bill with exactitude for it to conclude, given a reasonable rate of $250 hour, that fees could amount to tens of thousands of dollars throughout this litigation.
Taking emotional distress damages and attorney's fees together the Court is satisfied with CommonSpirit's evidence and concludes that it has carried...
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