Mylum v. Dillard's Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:11cv418 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | JACQUELINE MYLUM, Plaintiff, v. DILLARD'S INC., Defendant. |
Before the Court is Defendant Dillard's Inc.'s ("Dillard's") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 15.) This motion has been fully briefed. (Docket Nos. 16, 25, 30.) Neither party requested a hearing, and the Court has determined that oral argument would not aid the decisional process. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441,1332,1 and 636(c).2 For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Dillard's Motion for Summary Judgment.3
On October 5, 2010, between approximately 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., Mylum and her aunt arrived at the Dillard's store located at Virginia Center Commons, 10101 Brook Road, Glen Allen, Virginia. Mylum and her aunt entered Dillard's through the mall entrance and browsed the dresses in the women's department immediately on the left. Mylum had shopped at this Dillard's store at least once a month and was familiar with the store, including the shoe department. Aside from her purse, Mylum carried nothing in her hands while shopping.
Mylum eventually left her aunt in the women's department and went to the shoe department in Dillard's. Dillard's displayed shoes on metal shelving units approximately six feet tall with flat shelves. Mylum admits that the store was well lit, that she had no trouble seeing the details of the shoes, and that she could see through the shelves to the other side. Mylum did not notice any other people in the shoe department at that time.
Mylum spent no more than five minutes in the shoe department, "went around the shoe shelves," and then decided to return to the women's department to meet her aunt. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem. Supp.") Ex. 2, Deposition of Jacqueline Mylum ("Mylum Dep.") 39:21.) In the process of returning to the women's department, Mylum walked down an aisle of the shoe department, looking at the shoes on display. As Mylum reached the end of the aisle, she turned right while still looking at shoes on the upper shelves and kicked a v-shaped mirror located at the end cap of the aisle. She looked down, noticed that the mirror was about to fall, and reached down to grab the mirror. In doing so, she lost her balance and fell, injuring hershoulder. Mylum admits she would not have fallen had she not reached down to stop the mirror from falling.
Although she had never viewed a pair of shoes in a mirror at this Dillard's store and had never seen a similar free-standing, v-shaped mirror, Mylum describes the mirror at issue as "one of those mirrors that you look at your shoes in." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Ex. 3, Declaration of Sydnia F. Morgan Ex. B, Transcript of Recorded Statement of Jacqueline Mylum 17:12-13.) The mirror, framed in dark, stained wood, contrasted with the light carpet and metal shelving and stood no more than knee-high and less than two feet tall. Mylum admits that she did not see the mirror prior to her fall because she was looking at shoes on the upper shelves. Although partially obscured by the shelving, Mylum admits that the mirror was visible and in plain sight from the direction she had traveled4 and from other locations in the shoe department.
After her fall, Mylum filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the County of Henrico against Dillard's, seeking $250,000 in compensatory damages. Mylum asserts that Dillard's "negligently allowed a small mirror to be placed in an [a]isle down which patrons of the storecustomarily passed while shopping, although [Dillard's] knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that it posed a danger to the patrons." (Compl. ¶ 4.) (Docket No. 1-1.) Dillard's timely filed an answer, asserting the defense of contributory negligence. On June 30, 2011, Dillard's filed a Notice of Removal in this Court.
Dillard's now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), arguing that Mylum was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.5 In response, Mylum contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether she was contributorily negligent, precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate only when the Court, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Once a party has properly filed evidence supporting the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts illustrating genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. These facts must be presented in the form of exhibits and sworn affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A court views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Whether an inference isreasonable must be considered in conjunction with competing inferences to the contrary. Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, the nonmoving "party is entitled to have 'the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed.'" Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)). Ultimately, the court must adhere to the affirmative obligation to bar factually unsupportable claims from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, All U.S. at 323-24).
A court exercising diversity jurisdiction applies the substantive law of the forum state. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938); Cole v. Food Lion, L.L.C, 370 F. Supp. 2d 434, 436 (E.D. Va. 2005). In Virginia, to establish a prima facie negligence claim, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving "the existence of a legal duty, a breach of the duty, and proximate causation resulting in damage." Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (Va. 2003); see also Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 66 S.E.2d 441,443 (Va. 1951). As the Supreme Court of Virginia has articulated, "[t]he rules applicable to slip-and-fall cases are well settled." Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Parker, 396 S.E.2d 649, 650 (Va. 1990).
Id. (quoting Colonial Stores v. Pulley, 125 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Va. 1962)) (alterations in original). However, "'[s]uch notice is not required where the dangerous condition is open and obvious, and is patent to a reasonable person exercising ordinary care for his [or her] own safety.'" Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 677 S.E.2d 272, 274 (Va. 2009) (quoting Knight v. Moore, 18 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Va. 1942)). If it appears that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care and that such failure was a contributing cause of the accident, the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and is barred from recovering against the defendant. Tazewell Supply Co. v. Turner, 189 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Va. 1972).
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recently " Fultz, 611 S.E.2d at 275 (quoting Moses v. Sw. Va. Transit Mgmt. Co., 643 S.E.2d 156, 159-60 (Va. 2007)) (alteration in original). "When, as here, the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence arises from the plaintiff's injury by an open and obvious dangerous condition, the plaintiff has the burden to show conditions outside herself which prevented her seeing the dangerous condition or which would excuse her failure to observe it." Id. (citing S. Floors & Acoustics, Inc. v. Max-Yeboah, 594 S.E.2d 908, 910-11 (Va. 2004)). Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has "specifically declined to hold that, as a matter of law, a pedestrian's failure to look down while stepping forward must constitute contributory negligence in every case," Little Creek Inv. Corp. v. Hubbard, 455 S.E.2d 244, 246 (Va. 1995), the court has nonetheless held that "[a] person who trips and falls over an open and obvious condition or defect is guilty of contributory negligenceas a matter of law." Scott v. City of Lynchburg, 399 S.E.2d 809, 810 (Va. 1991); see also Gottlieb v. Andrus, 104 S.E.2d 743, 747 (Va. 1958).
Whether an alleged dangerous condition is open and obvious, and likewise, whether an invitee failed to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety, may, under certain circumstances, constitute jury questions. Scott, 399 S.E.2d at 810; Knight, 18 S.E.2d at 270. However, where no conflict exists in the evidence, or where reasonable persons cannot disagree as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented, the Court may decide the issue in lieu of a jury. Fultz, 677 S.E.2d at 275; Knight, 18...
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