Mysse v. Martens
| Citation | 926 P.2d 765,279 Mont. 253 |
| Decision Date | 14 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-261,96-261 |
| Parties | , 12 IER Cases 525 Patricia Elaine MYSSE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Duane C. MARTENS, Mark Pinkerton, Donald P. Bailey, individually and as Public Officers, and Rosebud County, a Montana Political Subdivision, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
K.D. Peterson, Peterson & Schofield, Billings, for plaintiff and appellant.
Steven J. Lehman, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, for defendants and respondents.
Patricia Mysse (Mysse) appeals from the order of the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. We affirm.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing Mysse's due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
2. Did the District Court err in dismissing Mysse's wrongful discharge claim under the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act?
3. Did the District Court err in dismissing Mysse's age discrimination claim under 29 U.S.C. § 623?
4. Did Mysse raise any valid tort claims or a valid claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Mysse's claims arise out of her termination from her position as Coordinator for the Rosebud County Council on Aging. Mysse was originally hired by Rosebud County in 1972 for a six-month pilot program to provide transportation for senior citizens in Rosebud County. She was 49 years old when she was hired. At the end of the six-month period she was hired to continue the program for an indefinite term. In 1978 she received her job description from an organization entitled Action for Eastern Montana which works with senior citizens in the seventeen counties situated in eastern Montana. She operated under two separate job descriptions, one for Coordinator and one for Transportation.
The Coordinator job description contained a requirement that Mysse create a transportation schedule. It also required the employee to carry out other assignments at the direction of the County Commission on Aging. The Transportation job description contained a requirement that the employee make the schedule available to the public through newspaper and radio advertising. Both job descriptions required that the employee possess an acceptable mode of transportation, a Montana chauffeur's license, and freedom to travel. Both job descriptions contained methods for mileage reimbursement.
For nineteen years Mysse transported senior citizens in her own automobile upon request. She never transported more than three senior citizens at one time. She never established a schedule but, instead, advertised in the paper that transportation was available upon request and arranged transportation accordingly.
In 1990, the Rosebud County Board of Commissioners (Board) surveyed senior citizens on their transportation needs in consideration of using grant monies to purchase a bus. Mysse believed that the Senior Citizen program did not need the bus. She voiced her opposition to the purchase of the bus to the Board. Mysse later testified that she explained to the Board that she was never able to get more than three persons together at any one time and she believed that the bus, which held twelve people, could not be used or coordinated effectively. Although the Board purchased the bus in 1990, Mysse continued to transport senior citizens in her own automobile without making a set schedule.
On January 24, 1992, at a Rosebud County Board meeting, the Board informed Mysse about complaints received from senior citizens regarding her non-use of the bus. At least one representative of Action for Eastern Montana was at the meeting and indicated that if the bus was not used for the transportation of seniors, the County could lose the bus due to the fact that it was purchased with specific grant monies. The Board informed Mysse that arranging a bus schedule and driving the bus were conditions of her job in general, and significant responsibilities of her job as Transportation Coordinator.
Mysse was given an opportunity to respond at the meeting. She stated that she would not drive the bus and that she would not create a schedule as she did not think a schedule would work. The Board told her she would either have to drive the bus or she would lose her job. Thereafter, Mysse informed the Board she was quitting. The Board then asked her to reconsider and to either try driving the bus herself, or to find volunteers willing to drive the bus.
The Board sent Mysse a letter the same day giving her notice that she had to arrange a regular bus schedule and drive the bus or that she would be discharged from her employment with Rosebud County. The letter further informed her that she had three days to respond either in person or by written response. Mysse did not respond and on January 29, 1992, the Board sent her a termination letter setting out the specific reasons for the dismissal. The stated reasons were her refusal to comply with the terms of her job description in scheduling and driving the senior citizen bus. The letter informed her that if she thought she had been treated unfairly she could discuss the problem further with the Board. If no resolution could be reached she was to submit a written complaint within five days and she would be afforded an opportunity to be heard and produce witnesses. These procedures were pursuant to Rosebud County's Personnel Policy on Grievance.
Mysse filed a complaint with the Board and approximately thirty days after her termination she appeared at a post-termination hearing. At the hearing Mysse alleged that her termination was illegal and she requested monetary compensation for the balance of her employment through her twenty-year milestone with Rosebud County and for retirement benefits she would have received if she had remained employed for twenty years. Mysse presented various witnesses who testified to her exemplary service throughout her years as Senior Citizen Coordinator. The record is silent as to whether Mysse received any benefits beyond what she earned in her nineteen years of employment with Rosebud County.
Mysse originally filed an age discrimination claim with the Human Rights Commission. Subsequently, Mysse filed a complaint with the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County, alleging deprivation of rights or, in the alternative, wrongful discharge. On September 21, 1993, the Human Rights Commission dismissed her case and issued a right to sue letter. The District Court granted Mysse's motion to file an amended complaint and Mysse filed the amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged deprivation of rights or, in the alternative, discrimination or, in the second alternative, wrongful discharge.
Rosebud County moved for summary judgment. The Honorable Joe L. Hegel, Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, granted Rosebud County's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Mysse's claims. Judgment was entered February 8, 1996. Mysse filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
All of Mysse's claims involve the issue of whether she was terminated for good cause or because of some wrongful action on the part of the Rosebud County Board of Commissioners. The District Court granted summary judgment to the County and the individual Board members because it found that Mysse was discharged for good cause, namely, refusing to obey lawful directives of the Rosebud County Board of Commissioners.
Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782, 785. When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 264-65, 900 P.2d 901, 903. In Bruner, we set forth our inquiry:
The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred.
Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitted).
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing Mysse's due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for persons deprived of constitutional rights by another person acting under color of state or federal law. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution, prohibit a government entity from depriving persons of property without due process of law. Mysse claims that she was deprived of her constitutional rights to due process when the Board terminated her employment without a pre-termination hearing. Before Mysse is entitled to due process for the loss of her job she must first demonstrate that she has a protected property interest in her employment.
In Boreen v. Christensen (1994), 267 Mont. 405, 884 P.2d 761, this Court held that administrative regulations of the Department of Military Affairs, mandating that disciplinary action including discharge be taken only for "just cause," created a property interest in employment for the discharged employee. This Court limited its decision in Boreen to only those employees who "can point to some written contract, state law, or regulation which states or otherwise provides a specified term of employment and, hence, a property interest in continued employment." Boreen, 884 P.2d at 770.
In the instant case the parties and the District Court have assumed that the Rosebud County...
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