N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. Cooper

• Citation: 430 F.Supp.3d 15
• Decision Date: 31 December 2019
• Docket Number: 1:18CV1034
• Parties: NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NAACP, Chapel Hill—Carrboro NAACP, Greensboro NAACP, High Point NAACP, Moore County NAACP, Stokes County Branch of the NAACP, Winston-Salem—Forsyth County NAACP, Plaintiffs, v. Roy Asberry COOPER III, in his official capacity as the Governor of North Carolina; Robert Cordle, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; Stella Anderson, in her official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; Kenneth Raymond, Jefferson Carmon III, and David C. Black, in their official capacities as members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

430 F.Supp.3d 15

NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF the NAACP, Chapel Hill—Carrboro NAACP, Greensboro NAACP, High Point NAACP, Moore County NAACP, Stokes County Branch of the NAACP, Winston-Salem—Forsyth County NAACP, Plaintiffs,

v.Roy Asberry COOPER III, in his official capacity as the Governor of North Carolina; Robert Cordle, in his official capacity as Chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; Stella Anderson, in her official capacity as Secretary of the North Carolina State Board of Elections; Kenneth Raymond, Jefferson Carmon III, and David C. Black, in their official capacities as members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, Defendants.

1:18CV1034

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed December 31, 2019

Andrew T. Tutt, James W. Cooper, Jeremy C. Karpatkin, Ralf O. Dunn, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Caitlin Swain-McSurely, Penda Denise Hair, Forward Justice, Washington, DC, John C. Ulin, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Leah J. Kang, ACLU of North Carolina, Raleigh, NC, Irving L. Joyner, Irving Joyner, Attorney at Law, Cary, NC, for Plaintiffs.

Amar Majmundar, Olga E. Vysotskaya De Brito, Paul M. Cox, Stephanie A. Brennan, N.C. Department of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Loretta C. Biggs, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the above-named Defendants in their official capacities, challenging the validity of specific provisions of Senate Bill 824, titled "An Act to Implement the Constitutional Amendment Requiring Photographic Identification to Vote," ("S.B. 824" or "the Act"). (See ECF No. 1); 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 144. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that portions of S.B. 824 violate § 2 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 52 U.S.C. § 10301, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 105–146.) Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 72.) The Court heard oral argument on December 3, 2019. For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2018, North Carolina voters approved a ballot measure amending the North Carolina State Constitution to require voters to provide photographic identification before voting in person (the "voter-ID amendment").¹ (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 62, 64.) As the voter-ID amendment is not self-executing, see N.C. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 (4), 3 (2), on December 5, 2018, the North Carolina General Assembly (the "General Assembly" or the "legislature") passed S.B. 824 as implementing legislation.² (See ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) The Governor vetoed S.B. 824 on December 14, 2018. (Id. ¶ 78.) Nevertheless, the General Assembly codified S.B. 824 into law—Session Law 2018-144—by an override of the Governor's veto on December 19, 2018. (Id. ¶ 1); 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 144. S.B. 824's central requirement is that every voter present a qualifying photo ID before casting a ballot. 2018 N.C. Sess. Laws 144 § 1.2.(a).

The instant lawsuit was filed in this Court one day after S.B. 824 became law. (ECF No. 1 at 37.) In their Complaint, Plaintiffs challenge the provisions of S.B. 824 which "impose voter-identification requirements," as well as the provisions "that expand the number of poll observers and the number[ ] of people who can challenge ballots."³ (Id. ¶¶ 106–07.) Plaintiffs allege that "[t]hese provisions, separately and together, will have a disproportionately negative impact on minority voters," (id. ¶ 80), ultimately resulting in "the effective denial of the franchise and dilution of [African American and Latino] voting strength," (id. ¶ 7). Plaintiffs' Complaint further alleges that the challenged provisions "impose discriminatory and unlawful burdens on the right to vote that are not justified by any legitimate or compelling state interest." (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs seek this preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants "from implementing, enforcing, or giving effect to the [challenged] provisions of S.B. 824." (Id. ¶ 147.)

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). To make a sufficient showing, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will result in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. Each factor is considered independently; even if a plaintiff has shown likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, the balance of equities and the public interest can still weigh in favor of denying a preliminary injunction. See id. at 23–24, 31 n.5, 129 S.Ct. 365.

Whether to grant a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the district court. Westmoreland Coal Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. , 910 F.2d 130, 135 (4th Cir. 1990). Traditionally, courts employ preliminary injunctions for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo—the "last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy"—and preventing irreparable harm during the course of litigation, thereby preserving the possibility of a meaningful judgment on the merits. Pashby v. Delia , 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co. , 675 F.3d 355, 378 (4th Cir. 2012) ); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2003). Because the issuance of a preliminary injunction "is a matter of equitable discretion[,] it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course." Winter , 555 U.S. at 32, 129 S.Ct. 365. Rather, "[i]n each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’ " Id. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell , 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) ).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to "pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction." Id. This carefulness is especially warranted in the voting-rights context, where court orders "can themselves result in voter confusion" and, where "once [an] election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress." See Purcell v. Gonzalez , 549 U.S. 1, 4–5, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006) ; League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina , 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter "LWV"].

III. HISTORY OF VOTER-ID LEGISLATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

In recent decisions, the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have set forth the history of voter suppression efforts in the South generally and North Carolina specifically. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder , 570 U.S. 529, 552, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ; North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory , 831 F.3d 204, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2016). However, to fully understand and contextualize S.B. 824, its mechanics, its proposed implementation, and the motivations of those who enacted it, a brief review of that history is necessary here. No one disputes that North Carolina "has a long history of race discrimination generally and race-based vote suppression in particular." McCrory , 831 F.3d at 223. For "[i]t was in the South that slavery was upheld by law until uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow denied African–Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise citizens on the basis of race." Shelby Cty. , 570 U.S. at 552, 133 S.Ct. 2612. North Carolina was no exception; as discussed further below, the state has "shameful" chapters—both distant and contemporary—in its "long and cyclical" history. See McCrory , 831 F.3d at 223 ; (ECF No. 91-2 at 71).

In light of this history, Congress subjected forty North Carolina jurisdictions to "preclearance" under § 5 of the VRA. McCrory , 831 F.3d at 215. As a result, the state was not permitted to make changes to voting procedures or qualifications without first demonstrating that the changes "had neither the purpose nor effect of ‘diminishing the ability of any citizens’ to vote ‘on account of race or color.’ " Id. (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973c )). Decades of preclearance enabled steady growth in minority electoral participation, and "by 2013 African American registration and turnout rates had finally reached near-parity" with whites'. See id. at 214 ; (ECF No. 91-4 at 10 (acknowledging "the recent parity in black and white turnout" but characterizing it as "fragile" and sensitive to "new costs imposed on voters")).

The General Assembly first attempted to enact a voter-ID bill in 2011 while the state was still subject to preclearance. (ECF Nos. 91 at 13; 97 at 20.) The governor at the time vetoed that bill, and an override attempt failed. (ECF No. 97 at 20.) In the spring of 2013, the legislature again took up voter-ID legislation in the form of House Bill 589 ("H.B. 589"). See McCrory , 831 F.3d at 227. In its early form, the photo-ID requirements outlined in H.B. 589 were limited and, compared to later iterations, "much less restrictive."⁴ See id. at 216, 227 ; (ECF No. 91-1 at 44, tbl. 8 (comparing the early version of H.B. 589, the version ultimately enacted, and S.B. 824)). However, on June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Shelby County v. Holder invalidating § 5's coverage formula, after which North Carolina was no longer subject to preclearance. 570 U.S. at 556–57, 133 S.Ct. 2612. Following that ruling, the legislature "requested and received racial data" on the use of various voting practices in the...