N.J. Bankers Ass'n v. Grewal
| Decision Date | 21 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-15725 (BRM) (DEA) |
| Parties | NEW JERSEY BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. GURBIR GREWAL, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 81) filed by Defendant Gurbir Grewal ("Grewal"), as the Attorney General of New Jersey, and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 82) filed by Plaintiff New Jersey Bankers Association ("NJBA"). Grewal filed a Reply. (ECF No. 83.) Campaign Legal Center ("CLC") filed an Amicus Brief. (ECF No. 91.) NJBA filed a Reply. (ECF No. 92.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having held oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(a), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, Grewal's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and NJBA's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
NJBA is a trade association representing 88 banking institutions headquartered or having offices in New Jersey. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.) NJBA intends to contribute to political campaigns for state and local office and to political parties in New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 9.) NJBA also intends to make independent expenditures1 in support of candidates for state and local office, including by advertising in media outlets and mailing political materials to New Jersey voters, as well as contributing to independent-expenditure-only committees in connection with state and local elections. (Id.) NJBA claims, were it not for New Jersey's prohibition on contributions and expenditures by banks (codified in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45), NJBA would be eligible to engage in all of these activities. (Id.)
On November 6, 2018, NJBA filed a Complaint against Grewal, alleging N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45's ban on independent expenditures (Count I) and political contributions (Count II) violates the rights of NJBA and its members under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1.) NJBA seeks a declaratory judgment that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45's ban is unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting Grewal from enforcing the ban, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any such other relief as the Court may deem equitable and just. (Id. at 19-20.)
Pursuant to the briefing schedule set forth in a Consent Order (ECF No. 79), on August 7, 2020, Grewal filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 81.) On October 6, 2020, NJBA filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 82.) On November 24, 2020, Grewal filed a Reply. (ECF No. 83.) On December 8, 2020, CLC filed an Amicus Brief. (ECF No. 91.) On December 18, 2020, NJBA filed a Reply. (ECF No. 92.) The Court held oral argument on March 23, 2021. (ECF No. 98.)
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers tointerrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party," and it is material only if it has the ability to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" cannot "preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citing 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725, pp. 93-95 (1983)). "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial." Id. at 331. On the other hand, if the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production by either (1) "submit[ting] affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim" or (2) demonstrating "that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim." Id. Once the movant adequately supports its motion pursuant to Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings andby her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
There can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," however, if a party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.
The central dispute here is the constitutionality of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45, which provides:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, savings bank, co-operative bank, trust, trustee, savings indemnity, safe deposit, insurance, railroad, street railway, telephone, telegraph, gas, electric light, heat or power, canal or aqueduct company . . . shall pay or contribute money or thing of value in order to aid or promote the nomination or election of any person, or in order to aid or promote the interests, success or defeat of any political party.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45. The parties agree this matter is ripe for summary judgment. Draft Tr. Mar. 23, 2021 Oral Arg.
Grewal argues NJBA has no standing to challenge N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45, because the statute prohibits only contributions, and does not restrict NJBA's ability to make independent expenditures. (ECF No. 81-1 at 23-24.) First, Grewal states the statute's plain text expressly bars contributions, but it is silent as to independent expenditures. (Id. at 25.) Grewal maintains the term "money or thing of value" in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45 does not include independent expenditures in light of its usage in federal criminal statutes related to bribery and public corruption, and the phrase "contribute money or thing of value" just confirms a contribution can take non-monetary forms, but does not enlarge the meaning of "contribute" to encompass independent expenditures. (Id. at 26-27.) Grewal contends the terms "contribute" and "pay" are at best ambiguous: their dictionary definitions can not only be as broad as what NJBA proposes (e.g., the word "contribute" could mean to furnish or to use one's influence), but also be limited a donation to another specified object. (ECF No. 83 at 10.) Grewal insists the context of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45 supports its interpretation: the phrase "pay or contribute," together with the subsequent terms "any person" and "any political party," qualifies the meaning of "pay" to be more consistent with a reading that bars payments to a candidate or political party. (Id. at 11 n.2.) Second, Grewal alleges the history of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45 confirms the legislature's intent was to prohibit contributions only, not independent expenditures. (ECF No. 81-1 at 27.) Grewal asserts N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45, enacted in 1911, was modeled on its federal counterpart, 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a), which first appeared in the Tillman Act of 1907, and originally prohibited contributions only; in 1947, Congress amended the Tillman Act to extend its prohibition onexpenditures by inserting the term "expenditure" into the law, but a similar change never occurred to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45 even when it was amended in 2001. (Id. at 27-28.) Third, Grewal refers to several state election statutes and the Tillman Act that bars "contribution" and "expenditure" at the same time, which purportedly refutes NJBA's expansive definition of the term "contribution" in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45, and claims the term is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretations. (ECF No. 83 at 11-12.)
NJBA maintains N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:34-45 covers independent expenditures, because (1) the terms "pay" and "contribute" should be afforded their broad ordinary meanings, which cover much more than direct contributions, (2) the statute places no limitation on the recipient of "pay[ments]" or "contribut[ions]," and instead broadly prohibits "aid[ing] or promot[ing]" the election success of a candidate or political party, and (3) the statute bars the giving of a "thing of value," which...
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