N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp..

Decision Date31 May 2011
PartiesNEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant–Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Richard F. Engel, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Paula T. Dow, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. Engel, Allan Kanner (Kanner & Whiteley), Rebecca J. Davis (Kanner & Whiteley), and Elizabeth B. Petersen (Kanner & Whiteley) of the Louisiana bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel and on the brief).Theodore V. Wells, Jr. (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison) argued the cause for respondent (Archer & Greiner, P.C., and Mr. Wells, attorneys; Marc A. Rollo, Steven J. Fram, Haddonfield, Arthur H. Jones, Jr., Daniel J. Toal (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Alice A. Brown (Exxon Mobil Corporation) of the Texas bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).Before Judges CARCHMAN, GRAVES and WAUGH.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CARCHMAN, P.J.A.D.

This appeal addresses the issue of whether plaintiff Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) is barred by the statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14–1.2, from pursuing a common law strict liability claim against defendant Exxon Mobil 1 seeking to obtain natural resource damages under the Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10–23.11 to –23.11z (Spill Act). We must determine whether N.J.S.A. 58:10B–17.1 (the extension statute) applies to a claim for relief based on common law strict liability.2

The Law Division judge concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claim and that the extension statute did not apply. He dismissed the fourth count of plaintiff's complaint asserting that cause of action. We granted leave to appeal and now conclude that the extension statute preserves this common law cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse, reinstate the fourth count of the complaint and remand for further proceedings.

I.

We first set forth the procedural history. In August 2004, DEP filed two complaints against defendant, asserting Spill Act claims and common law claims of public nuisance and trespass, and seeking natural resource damages for the discharge of hazardous substances at two sites in Linden and Bayonne. Exxon Mobil I, supra, 393 N.J.Super. at 397, 923 A.2d 345. After we decided the loss of use claim issue in DEP's favor, DEP moved to amend the complaints, over defendant's objections, to include strict liability counts.

Thereafter, the trial court heard argument on defendant's motions for partial summary judgment asserting, among other things, that the statute of limitations had expired on DEP's common law claims for nuisance and trespass, and that the extension statute, N.J.S.A. 58:10B–17.1, did not apply. The judge granted that motion, and DEP did not seek interlocutory relief.

Defendant then moved for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss count four of DEP's complaint, alleging a common law strict liability claim, under that same statute of limitations rationale. The judge granted defendant's motion and dismissed that count. We granted leave to appeal.

These relevant facts are best summarized in our decision in Exxon Mobil I, supra, 393 N.J.Super. at 397, 923 A.2d 345, and in the trial court's January 22, 2009 letter opinion. Included in that latter summary, the judge said:

During the course of operations at the Bayonne and Bayway refineries, crude oil and refined products were lost through spills and leaks. Neither party disputes that these products, which include, inter alia, monocyclic aromatics, PAHs, amines, pesticides, and various inorganics such as chromium and arsenic, are considered hazardous substances. The contamination at both of these sites is well-documented. It was estimated in 1977 that at least some seven million gallons of oil, ranging in thickness from 7 to 17 feet, are contained in the soil and groundwater underlying a portion of the former Bayonne site alone. As of 2006, 17 non-aqueous phase liquid plumes were present in the groundwater at Bayonne. The documented level of contamination in the waters and sediment of the Platty Kill Canal in Bayonne is so high that ExxonMobil has recommended permanently closing and filling in the canal with an impermeable barrier (estimating 50,000 cubic yards of impacted sediments). Additionally, Morses Creek has been subject to years of discharges resulting in a hydrocarbon content ranging from 640 to 280,000 ppm which has subjected the area to a gelatinous, oily emulsion overlying gray silt.

Focusing on the statute of limitations, prior to 1991, statutes of limitation did not run against the State, pursuant to the common law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Caldeira, 171 N.J. 404, 407, 794 A.2d 156 (2002). When the Court abolished that doctrine in 1991, “insofar as it would preclude the application of general statutes of limitations to the State,” the Legislature responded by adopting the ten-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14–1.2. Caldeira, supra, 171 N.J. at 408–09, 794 A.2d 156 (quoting N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 125 N.J. 66, 76, 592 A.2d 559 (1991)).

N.J.S.A. 2A:14–1.2(a) provides:

a. Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any civil action commenced by the State shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.

In July 2001, that general statute was amended by L. 2001, c. 154, § 7, so that it referenced another new provision, the extension statute, governing environmental contamination matters:

The provisions of this section shall not apply to any civil action commenced by the State concerning the remediation of a contaminated site or the closure of a sanitary landfill facility, or the payment of compensation for damage to, or loss of, natural resources due to the discharge of a hazardous substance, and subject to the limitations period specified in section 5 of P.L.2001, c. 154 (C. 58:10B–17.1).

[ Ibid.]

The extension statute was again amended and currently provides:

b. (1) Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any civil action concerning the payment of compensation for damage to, or loss of, natural resources due to the discharge of a hazardous substance, commenced by the State pursuant to the State's environmental laws, shall be commenced within five years and six months next after the cause of action shall have accrued.

[ N.J.S.A. 58:10B–17.1(b)(1) (emphasis added).]

When it was initially enacted in July 2001, that last phrase read “shall be commenced within four years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.” L. 2001, c. 154, § 5. The further expansion to “five years and six months” was adopted in December 2005 by L. 2005, c. 245, § 1.

The extension statute further defines the term “State's environmental laws,” providing that it

means the Spill Compensation and Control Act,” P.L.1976, c. 141 (C.58:10–23.11 et seq.), the Water Pollution Control Act,” P.L.1977, c. 74 (C.58:10A–1 et seq.), P.L.1986, c. 102 (C.58:10A–21 et seq.), the “Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act,” P.L.1997, c. 278 (C.58:10B–1.1 et al.), the “Industrial Site Recovery Act,” P.L.1983, c. 330 (C.13:1K–6 et al.), the “Solid Waste Management Act,” P.L.1970, c. 39 (C.13:1E–1 et seq.), the “Comprehensive Regulated Medical Waste Management Act,” P.L.1989, c. 34 (C.13:1E–48.1 et seq.), the “Major Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Act,” P.L.1981, c. 279 (C.13:1E–49 et seq.), the “Sanitary Landfill Facility Closure and Contingency Fund Act,” P.L.1981, c. 306 (C.13:1E–100 et seq.), the Regional Low–Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility Siting Act,” P.L.1987, c. 333 (C.13:1E–177 et seq.), or any other law or regulation by which the State may compel a person to perform remediation activities on contaminated property [.]

[ N.J.S.A. 58:10B–17.1(c) (emphasis added).]

In its January 22, 2009 letter opinion, the trial court agreed with defendant that the statute of limitations had expired on DEP's common law claims for nuisance and trespass, and that N.J.S.A. 58:10B–17.1 did not apply. Defendant had argued that DEP was required to file the claims within ten years of January 1, 1992, because the extension statute was inapplicable. Referencing the extension statute's definition of “State's environmental laws,” the trial court wrote that the nuisance and trespass claims at issue in that motion were not among the enumerated statutes, and they “also are clearly not statutory law but are common law claims. They also, at their foundation are not environmental laws per se but laws of general application to a wide variety of situations.” After setting forth the parties' contentions, the letter opinion continued:

The court is confident that the legislature's intent in referring to a “law or regulation[,”] in light of the previously mentioned nine statutes, did not intend to incorporate general common law into the limitations exceptions of 58:10B–17.1c. This reading is consistent with the principle of ejusdem generis raised by Exxon ... [citing to and block quoting from State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584, 695 A.2d 236 (1997) ].

Reading the statute on its face, the court is not convinced that such a broad reading should take place in order to apply general common law claims into a statute which clearly was intended to apply to only certain types of laws. This court is simply left with no authority for the presumption...

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4 cases
  • N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • 25 Agosto 2015
    ...DEP moved to amend its complaints to include common law strict liability counts. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 420 N.J. Super. 395, 398, 22 A.3d 1 (App. Div. 2011) (hereinafter " Exxon II"). Exxon then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the strict liab......
  • N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 12 Febrero 2018
    ...we reversed and restored DEP's claim for "loss of use" NRD damages. In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 420 N.J. Super. 395, 397–98, 22 A.3d 1 (App. Div. 2011) ( Exxon II ), we reversed the trial court's dismissal of DEP's strict liability claim, which......
  • N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 12 Febrero 2018
    ...at 410, we reversed and restored DEP's claim for "loss of use" NRD damages. In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 420 N.J. Super. 395, 397-98 (App. Div. 2011) (Exxon II), we reversed the trial court's dismissal of DEP's strict liability claim, which was ......
  • N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Hess Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 7 Abril 2020
    ...or statutory remedies"). "Spill Act liability does not eliminate common law liability . . . ." N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 420 N.J. Super. 395, 401-02 (App. Div. 2011). The Spill Act permits the DEP to pursue remedies under both the common law and the Spill Act because ......

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