N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | A-57-19,A-56-19 |
| Parties | New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.R.-R. and G.R.-R., Defendants-Appellants. In the Matter of G.R.-R., Jr., a Minor-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Argued November 9, 2020
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Laura M. Kalik, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant J.R.-R. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Office of Parental Representation, attorney; T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, and Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender of counsel, and Laura M. Kalik, of counsel and on the briefs).
Beth Anne Hahn, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant G.R.-R. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Office of Parental Representation, attorney; T. Gary Mitchell, Deputy Public Defender, and Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender of counsel, and Beth Anne Hahn, of counsel and on the briefs).
Sara M. Gregory, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Sara M. Gregory and Amy Melissa Young, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent G.R.-R., Jr. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Office of the Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel, and Noel C. Devlin, of counsel and on the briefs).
Steven M. Resnick argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Ziegler, Zemsky & Resnick attorneys; Steven M. Resnick and Angela M. Scafuri, on the brief).
ALBIN J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the issue is whether, in a case where the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) has established that a child has been abused or neglected while in the care of his parents, the family court can shift the burden of proof to the parents to prove their non-culpability.
Following his admission to a hospital, DCPP sought temporary custody of ten-month-old "Gabriel," alleging he was an abused or neglected child as defined in N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c). Specifically, DCPP charged Gabriel's parents, "Jenny" and "George," with causing multiple injuries to Gabriel, some consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome.
During a five-day bench trial in 2018, the court heard the testimony of five witnesses, including medical experts called by both sides, and reviewed multiple exhibits. The court concluded that Gabriel was an abused and neglected child and then considered whether DCPP had proven by the preponderance-of-evidence standard "who did what."
Relying on the burden-shifting template in In re D.T., 229 N.J.Super. 509, 517 (App. Div. 1988), the court held that, after DCPP proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Gabriel was a victim of abuse and neglect, the burden shifted to Jenny and George -- "the only two people [who] had dominion, control and also a legal duty to protect and care" for their son -- to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence "that they either inflicted or allowed to be inflicted these injuries."
In light of that legal paradigm, the court evidently determined that Jenny and George had not satisfied their burden. The court found -- without specifically identifying "who actually failed to supervise" or "who actually caused the injuries" -- that both Jenny and George were responsible for the abuse and neglect of Gabriel under Title Nine.
The Appellate Division affirmed, and the Court granted Jenny's and George's petitions for certification, 241 N.J. 199 (2020); 241 N.J. 200 (2020).
HELD: The Legislature placed on DCPP the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent abused or neglected a child, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1), and the Judiciary has no commission to exercise equitable powers to alter the statutory burden of proof set forth by the Legislature. The Court disapproves of the Appellate Division cases that have imported the doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur from the common law into a comprehensive statutory scheme to relieve DCPP of its burden of proving that a particular parent abused or neglected a child. The Court remands for a new hearing.
1. New Jersey's child-welfare laws balance two competing interests: a parent's constitutionally protected right to raise a child and maintain a relationship with that child, without undue interference by the State, and the State's responsibility to protect the welfare of children. Although Title Nine's "paramount concern" is the "safety" of children and its "primary consideration" is a child's "best interests," N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a), the Legislature enacted procedural protections to guarantee a parent or guardian, alleged to have committed an act of abuse or neglect, a fair process and hearing. Those procedural protections require that "any determination that the child is an abused or neglected child must be based on a preponderance of the evidence." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b). DCPP bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected a child. (pp. 17-18)
2. Title Nine places on DCPP the burden of proving that a parent abused or neglected a child but also grants DCPP the benefit of an inference in abuse and neglect cases based on the nature of the injuries suffered by a child. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(2) does not shift the burden of proof to the parents. Instead, it merely allows for the drawing of an inference from evidence, similar to the way the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur works in a common law negligence case: if the child was under the supervision of a parent when the child suffered an injury, and if there is no indication the injury was the result of a mere accident, then DCPP has presented prima facie evidence of abuse or neglect. Significantly, under traditional res ipsa, the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff, although the defendant has a strong incentive to dispel the inference. (pp. 18-21)
3. In D.T., a trial judge considered allegations that D.T.'s parents had committed child abuse and determined that DCPP's predecessor agency had failed to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that either parent committed or allowed the abuse." 229 N.J.Super. at 511-14. Although the Appellate Division declined to reject the trial judge's factfindings that the agency had failed to establish the parents' culpability, a majority of the panel concluded that shifting the burden of proof to the parents was appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 515-18 (). The majority remanded to the trial court for a new hearing, placing on the parents the "burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither improperly allowed nor committed the sexual abuse." Id. at 518. (pp. 21-23)
4. The burden-shifting paradigm referred to in D.T. -- sometimes called "conditional res ipsa loquitur" -- comes from the common law tort action in Anderson, 67 N.J. at 298-302. In that case, during surgery, the tip of a surgical tool broke off and became lodged in the plaintiff's spine. 67 N.J. at 294-95. The "plaintiff sued all who might have been liable for his injury," and the Court reasoned that "an equitable alignment of duties owed plaintiff requires that not only the burden of going forward shift to defendants, but the actual burden of proof as well." Id. at 295, 300 (emphasis added). Because all of the defendants owed a duty of care to the unconscious plaintiff undergoing surgery and were in the best position "to prove their freedom from liability," the Court held that the burden of proof shifted to the defendants. Id. at 302. (pp. 23-24)
5. The Court explains that it has no authority to import the burden-shifting equitable doctrine of conditional res ipsa loquitur from tort law into Title Nine, a comprehensive and carefully conceived statutory scheme in which the Legislature has determined that DCPP bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent or guardian has committed an act of child abuse or neglect. The Court's superintendence of the common law is different from its role in construing a statute or a statutory scheme. No statute in Title Nine remotely suggests that the Legislature intended to shift the burden of proof to a parent accused of abuse or neglect. If the Legislature intended such a burden-shift in Title Nine, it would have said so explicitly. DCPP is thoroughly equipped to investigate and prosecute allegations of abuse or neglect without resort to the burden-shifting approach adopted in Anderson, and the preponderance of the evidence standard is the least difficult standard of proof to vault. In imposing the burden of proof on DCPP, the Legislature recognized the momentous adverse impact that a finding of abuse or neglect will have on a parent's life and relationship with the child. (pp. 24-29)
6. The Court rejects the burden-shifting paradigm that D.T. enunciated for abuse and neglect cases because it is in conflict with the statutory framework of Title Nine. Here the family court's mistaken conception that the burden of proof shifted to Jenny and George rendered its factfindings fatally flawed and denied the parents a fundamentally fair hearing. The Court does not pass judgment on the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence presented by DCPP, but rather holds only that the family court must conduct a new hearing, follow the dictates of Title Nine, and determine whether DCPP has carried the burden of persuasion by...
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