N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M. (In re Q.K.J.)

Citation48 A.3d 1075,211 N.J. 420
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
Decision Date14 August 2012
PartiesNEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. F.M., Defendant–Appellant. In the Matter of the Guardianship of Q.K.J. and T.J.J., Minors.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Beatrix W. Shear, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender Parental Representation, attorney; Ms. Shear and John A. Salois, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Geraldine O. Livengood, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Livengood and Jaime E. Stofa, on the briefs).

Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender argued the cause for respondents Q.K.T. and T.J.J. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; James A. Louis, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel).

Jeyanthi C. Rajaraman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Ms. Rajaraman, Mr. Miller, Monica C. Gural, and Mary M. McManus–Smith, on the brief).

Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant F.M. (Fernanda) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her now five-year-old daughter, Quinn, and four-year-old son, Troy, Jr.1 Both children were born of a relationship between Fernanda and T.J. (Troy). The family court found that Troy had committed an act of domestic violence against Fernanda, had an intractable drug-addiction problem, and suffered from mental illness that induced delusional thoughts that he was God. On this basis, the court considered Troy a danger to the physical well-being of the children.

The termination of Fernanda's parental rights was premised on the court's findings that she was incapable and unwilling to protect her children from the dangers presented by Troy. The court barred Troy from having unsupervised contact with Quinn, the only child born of their relationship at the time. In violation of court orders and earlier consent agreements with the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or Division), Fernanda allowed Troy to have access to Quinn in her home. Fernanda's inability to shield Quinn from her father led to the child's removal from the home and later to the removal of Troy, Jr. after his birth.

After a four-day guardianship hearing, the family court determined that DYFS established by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of both children required the termination of Fernanda's parental rights. The Appellate Division affirmed.

First, we determine that the prerequisite for the commencement of termination of parental rights was met in this case—Quinn and Troy, Jr. were both in the “care or custody” of DYFS at the time of the filing of the guardianship complaint. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C–15(c). We come to this conclusion because Fernanda never raised any objection to “care or custody” before the family court, and therefore she is barred from doing so now based on the doctrine of laches.

Second, we uphold the family court's determination to terminate Fernanda's parental rights. We invest the family court with broad discretion because of its specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of children. We defer to the family court's findings unless they are so wide of the mark that our intervention is required to avert an injustice. So long as the record contains substantial and credible evidence to support the family court's decision, we may not second-guess its judgment. We conclude that the court's findings are adequately supported by the record.

I.

The record in this case was developed at a four-day termination-of-parental-rights hearing at which four DYFS employees, a psychologist, and Fernanda testified, and dozens of documents, including reports and court orders, were placed into evidence.

A.

Fernanda began dating Troy when she was fourteen and he was twenty-five years old. She had only completed the eighth grade when, at the age of seventeen, she gave birth to Troy's child, Quinn, in June 2007. At the time, Fernanda lived with her aunt and other family members in a two-bedroom apartment in Paterson. Troy resided with his mother in a home directly behind Fernanda's apartment.

Troy had an extensive criminal record; six years of his young life had been spent behind bars. He suffered from a serious drug-addiction problem and was chronically unemployed. In October 2007, he was diagnosed with “Schizoaffective Disorder Bipolar Type,” “Polysubstance Dependence,” and “Antisocial Personality Disorder.”

On the evening of November 9, 2007, Fernanda called the Paterson Police Department to report a domestic dispute she was having with Troy in her apartment. Quinn, at the time, was five months old. When the police arrived, Fernanda related that Troy had been arguing with her and that she feared that the exchange of words would escalate to a physical assault. Fernanda explained that, several days earlier, Troy had assaulted her, causing minor injuries to her face. She averred in a certification that Troy “put his hand on [her] and busted [her] lip twice.” Although Fernanda declined to press charges on her own or to seek a domestic-violence-restraining order, the police arrested Troy, charged him with simple assault, and contacted DYFS. A DYFS investigation then ensued.

On November 16, Fernanda told a DYFS caseworker that the assault occurred after Troy had taken ecstasy pills. She added that Troy's mental illness had recently worsened and that he sometimes talked to himself. In a case plan prepared by DYFS, Fernanda agreed that Troy would not be permitted to enter her home until an assessment was made concerning the risk to Quinn.

Later in November, after interviewing Troy, a DYFS caseworker determined that his “unmedicated mental illness pose[d] a risk to the family.” Although the DYFS worker determined that the allegation of child neglect was unfounded—apparently because Quinn was not present during the altercation between Fernanda and Troy—both parents agreed in another case plan that Troy would not have unsupervised contact with Quinn. Troy also agreed to submit to a psychological evaluation and anger-management counseling. DYFS later arranged for members of the Emergency Child Abuse Program to conduct random visits of Fernanda's home to ensure compliance with the case plan.

Troy's December 10, 2007 substance-abuse assessment revealed an extensive history of drug use—marijuana, cocaine, crack, hallucinogens (LSD and PCP), ecstasy, and amphetamines. He also admitted to numerous hospitalizations for psychological and emotional problems, including several in the previous month.

The next day, Fernanda reported to a DYFS caseworker that Troy's behavior had grown increasingly erratic. Troy claimed that he was “GOD and that his kingdom [was] coming on” December 25. Additionally, at times, for no apparent reason, he would turn to her and ask why she was “disrespecting him.” Although Fernanda did not fear for her or Quinn's safety, she believed that Troy needed to be hospitalized.

The following day, December 12, Troy repeated to a DYFS caseworker that he was God and that his kingdom was coming on December 25. He also said that he had a friend, the biblical Moses, who would help him and that “many influential people in high places” would take care of him. That same day, Troy was diagnosed at St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center as schizophrenic and released on medication, and Fernanda was warned by a DYFS caseworker that Troy was not to have access to Quinn.

On December 13, the DYFS worker told both Fernanda and her aunt categorically that Troy was not allowed to return to their home or to leave with Quinn. They were instructed that if they failed to comply, the Division would remove Quinn and place her in a foster home. These warnings were not heeded.

Shortly after midnight on December 14, 2007, a DYFS caseworker responded to Fernanda's apartment based on an anonymous tip that Troy was present there. The worker found Troy in a bedroom watching television. Quinn was asleep and appeared to be in good health. Fernanda explained that she thought Troy's presence was allowed because he had completed a psychiatric evaluation. The caseworker informed the parents that Troy would have to leave and was not permitted to return to the home unless authorized by the Division. They were told that failure to comply would place Quinn at risk of removal from the home. Afterwards, random visits to the home did not reveal a violation of the case plan.

B.

On December 31, 2007, DYFS filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, seeking care, custody, and supervision of Quinn pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C–12 and N.J.S.A. 9:6–8.21 to –8.73. A week later, based on the testimony of a DYFS caseworker at an ex parte hearing, the family court ordered that DYFS be given interim “care and supervision” of Quinn to avoid an “ongoing risk” to the child's “life, safety or health.” The show-cause order—captioned as a child abuse-neglect action—was premised on the earlier act of domestic violence, Troy's use of illegal drugs, and his mental instability. The court ordered Fernanda and Troy to show cause on January 28 why “an order should not be entered continuing [Quinn] under the care and supervision of the Division.” The court further ordered, among other things, that Troy undergo domestic violence counseling, a psychiatric evaluation, and anger-management training; that he comply with the recommendations of his substance-abuse program; and that he not enter Fernanda's home or have unsupervised contact with Quinn. Fernanda was directed “to comply with the order restraining [Troy] and notify the authorities and the Division of any...

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