N.J.O. v. State
Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-2444 |
Citation | 292 So.3d 491 |
Parties | N.J.O., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Stephania A. Gournaris, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
N.J.O. seeks review of the disposition order that found him guilty of one count of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of possession of marijuana, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the police. We affirm the disposition order to the extent that it finds N.J.O. guilty of possession of marijuana. However, based on the entirety of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying N.J.O.'s motion to suppress the statement he made to law enforcement officers after N.J.O. expressed his intent to invoke his Miranda 1 rights by requesting that he be allowed to have "someone" with him during questioning. And given the trial court's comments at the disposition hearing that resulted in a sentence harsher than that recommended by the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), the admission of the statement was not harmless. Therefore, we reverse the remainder of the disposition order and remand for a new trial on the attempted robbery charge and a new disposition hearing.
N.J.O. was arrested after he allegedly pointed a gun at a former classmate in an attempt to rob him of cash.2 At the police station, a detective and two other officers sought to interview N.J.O. At the start of the interview, the detective read N.J.O. his rights. During that process, the following occurred:
(Emphasis added.) Following this colloquy, N.J.O. made incriminating statements concerning the attempted robbery.
During pretrial proceedings, N.J.O. moved to suppress his statement, arguing that the comment he made after the detective asked if he was willing to talk to them showed that he had invoked his rights by requesting that "someone" be with him during questioning and that this invocation of his rights had been ignored by the officers when they continued to question him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
At the subsequent bench trial, the court heard testimony from the victim, who knew N.J.O. from school. The court also heard testimony from the officers, and it heard the remainder of N.J.O.'s taped statement, during which he admitted to planning the robbery and attempting to carry it out by luring the victim to the area of the robbery. Ultimately, the robbery was foiled because the victim did not have any cash on him. Based on this evidence, the trial court found N.J.O. guilty and sentenced him to a harsher sentence than that recommended by DJJ because of the portion of N.J.O.'s statement in which he explained the planning that went into the attempted robbery.
In this appeal, N.J.O. contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement because his request to have "somebody" with him was an invocation of his right to counsel which was ignored by the officers and because the officers' actions in continuing to question him resulted in him involuntarily waiving his rights. Having listened to the recording of the interaction between N.J.O. and the officers, we agree.
As a general rule, law enforcement officers must give suspects the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before conducting a custodial interrogation. If, having been properly given those warnings, the suspect waives the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, officers may then proceed with questioning. However, if the suspect invokes his rights rather than waiving them, questioning must not begin. See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) ( ; State v. Venegas, 79 So. 3d 912, 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ( ); Green v. State, 69 So. 3d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ( ).
To invoke Miranda rights at the inception of questioning, a suspect must make a statement that indicates that he or she wishes to do so. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the suspect may indicate "in any manner" that he or she wishes to invoke his or her rights. See Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 966. "The words ‘in any manner’ simply mean that there are no magic words that a suspect must use in order to invoke his or her rights." State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 719 (Fla. 1997). And since there are no "magic words" that must be intoned, the question is whether the suspect's statement was sufficiently clear to advise the officers that he or she was invoking those rights.
Here, the record shows that after being informed of his Miranda rights, N.J.O. invoked his right to have counsel present with him. When the detective asked N.J.O. whether he wanted to waive his rights and speak with the officers, N.J.O. clearly stated that he did not understand the legal questions that were being asked and clearly stated that he wanted somebody to be with him. N.J.O. also indicated that he was concerned that questions would be "worded funny," he expressed his concern that the detective was using "big words" that N.J.O. did not understand, and he apologized for being difficult. This statement was sufficiently clear to inform the officers that N.J.O. wanted to invoke—not waive—his Miranda rights.
At that point, the officers should have stopped questioning N.J.O. because once a suspect has invoked his or her rights, it is improper for officers to attempt to coax or cajole a suspect into waiving those rights. See, e.g., Shelly v. State, 262 So. 3d 1, 17 (Fla. 2018) ( ); Gree...
To continue reading
Request your trial