N.Y. Life Ins. Co v. Davis

• Decision Date: 08 February 1899
• Citation: 96 Va. 737,32 S.E. 475
• Parties: NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. v. DAVIS et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

32 S.E. 475

(96 Va. 737)

NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

v.DAVIS et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Feb. 8, 1899.

Insurance—Fraud—Insurable Interest.

1. Assured applied for a life policy for the benefit of his estate, and afterwards assigned it to his employer, who, with others, had encouraged him to take it out. There was no evidence of an agreement to assign at any time prior to the assignment, though the assignee advanced the premium. Held that, though the policy be void as against the assignee by reason of his procuring the death of assured, it was not shown to be void in its inception, as against the estate.

2., The assignee of a life policy, having no insurable interest in the life of assured beyond the premiums advanced, can recover thereon only the premiums.

Appeal from circuit court, Henry county.

Suit by one Davis against the New York Life Insurance Company and others. There was a decree for complainant, and the company appeals. Affirmed.

E. W. Saunders, for appellant.

Wm..M Peyton, Hairston & Gravely, B. B. Munford, and Peatross & Harris, for appellees.

RIELY, J. On May 29, 1895, a policy of insurance was issued by the appellant to John W. T. Davis upon his life for $1,000, and on June 30, 1895, it issued to him another policy upon his life for $3,000. Both policies were taken out by Davis for the benefit of his estate, and were both assigned by him, on June 27, 1895, to W. W. Lester, who had advanced for him the premium on each policy.

On February 24, 1890, Davis died under circumstances indicating that he had been poisoned, and suspicion pointed to Lester as the perpetrator of the suspected crime. He was arrested, indicted, and tried in the county court of Henry county, but acquitted.

In the meantime, the father of Davis, he being the distributee of the deceased, filed his bill to enjoin Lester from collecting, and the insurance company from paying, to him the money due on the policies, and to compel the payment of the policies to the administrator of the deceased when appointed, except so far as necessary to reimburse Lester for the premiums he had advanced. The father subsequently qualified as the administrator of his son, and the suit thereafter proceeded in his name as such fiduciary.

The company resists all liability on the policies, upon the alleged ground that the application for the insurance was not the result ofn

the volition of Davis, and did not emanate from him, but that he was induced by Lester to take out the policies, and that it was only at the instigation and by the persuasion of Lester that he did so; that Lester, at the time he induced Davis to effect the insurance, had formed the purpose to procure from Davis an assignment of the policies, and then take his life, in order to collect the policies; and that, when the policies were issued to Davis, Lester did procure from him an assignment of them to himself, and subsequently murdered him.

It was conceded that, if the policies were taken out by Davis in good faith and were valid in their incipiency, their subsequent assignment to Lester, although procured by him with a view to the murder of the insured and the collection of the policies, would not prevent a recovery on them for the estate of the deceased.

Upon the company rests the burden of making good its defense and establishing the alleged fraud. This it undertook to do, and it may be conceded that a number of facts and circumstances were shown in evidence which tend to excite suspicion that there was some foundation for the accusation of the company; but, upon a full and careful consideration of all the evidence, it falls short of that clear and satisfactory proof required to establish fraud. Fraud may be proved by circumstances as well as by direct evidence, but the circumstances, as in the case of direct evidence, must clearly and...