N.Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Hungerford

• Decision Date: 11 June 1902
• Citation: 75 Conn. 76,52 A. 487
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO. v. HUNGERFORD.

52 A. 487

75 Conn. 76

NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. CO.

v. HUNGERFORD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 11, 1902.

Error from superior court, Hartford county; William T. Elmer, Judge.

Action by William C. Hungerford, administrator, against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. Judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

The judgment of the superior court sought to be reversed is as follows: "This action by writ and complaint claiming five thousand dollars damages as on file came to this court on the first Tuesday of January, 1901, and thence by continuance to the present time, when the parties appeared. On May 13th,

1901, the defendant suffered a default, and moved to be heard in damages, which motion was allowed. The court, having heard the parties, assesses the damages at the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars. Whereupon it is adjudged to the plaintiff to recover of the defendant twenty-five hundred dollars damages and his costs taxed at —— dollars and——cents." The complaint claimed damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant. It appears from a copy of the record of the proceedings in the superior court, annexed to the writ, that the defendant appeared, and filed a demurrer specifying nine distinct reasons for the insufficiency of the complaint; that on March 16, 1901, the judge filed a memorandum, "Demurrer is overruled;" that afterwards the clerk made the entry, "Defaulted by defendant for hearing in damages May 13th, 1901;" that judgment was rendered February 20,

1902. The writ specially assigns 10 errors, the first being that the court overruled the demurrer, and the others that the court erred in not sustaining the demurrer for each of the 9 reasons therein specified. No other error was in any way assigned.

John T. Robinson, for plaintiff in error.

E. Henry Hyde, for defendant in error.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). The nature and effect of a judgment by default has been well illustrated by pointing out the analogy between an action at law and a syllogism. The major premise is a proposition of law, as, for instance, whoever does certain specified acts to the injury of another is bound to pay that other the damage thus inflicted. This proposition is not pleaded, but is necessarily involved in stating the facts alleged in the complaint. The minor premise is a statement of facts, as, for instance, the defendant has done certain acts (being the acts referred to in the proposition of law) to the damage of the plaintiff. These facts are alleged in the complaint. The conclusion is the judgment or sentence of the law, which necessarily follows the establishment of the truth of the two premises.

When a defendant duly served with process fails to appear, he is in default, and such default is treated as an admission by him of the truth of the proposition of law and of the facts as alleged in the complaint. Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237, 247. The plaintiff is entitled to have such default recorded, and thereupon is entitled to judgment. When the action is such that the damage suffered definitely and certainly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the admission by the defendant goes to the whole extent of the material facts alleged, and the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for that definite sum. But when the action is of a different nature, as when the plaintiff seeks to recover unliquidated damages for injuries suffered through the wrongful conduct of the defendant, the admission has a different effect. In such case, the extent of the wrong is not required to be definitely stated, and the amount of damage claimed is not presumed to be the actual damage resulting from the wrong. The defendant, by his admission, conclusively establishes, as against himself, the truth of some wrong and some damage. Before judgment can be rendered, the amount of damage, including the extent of the wrong, must be ascertained, and inquiry in the nature of a supplemental trial of fact may be had. Under the English practice and that of most, if not all, of our sister states, such inquiry is referred to a jury; but under our practice, by immemorial usage, latterly regulated by statute, the inquiry is made by the court. The defendant who has been defaulted may appear, and move for leave to be heard upon this inquiry, and take part in the supplemental trial. If he does not appear, the inquiry is an informal hearing for the assessment of damages; if he does appear, the inquiry is in the nature of a supplemental trial, involving the determination of questions of law and fact, and the determination of the damages to be assessed after such trial. It is so far in the nature of a judgment rendered after the trial of a cause upon its merits that it may be set aside, upon appeal, for errors of the court in conducting the trial.

The record, however, which leads up to the judgment, consists only of the writ and complaint, the default, the defendant's motion for a hearing in damages and its allowance, and, impliedly, the amount of damages found upon the hearing. Unless steps are taken under statutes framed for the purpose of enlarging the record with reference to an appeal, the judgment refers only to these facts of record, and thereupon pronounces the sentence of the law. Such judgment cannot be held erroneous on proceedings in error, by reason of an insufficient complaint, if the statement of a cause of action appropriate to the judgment is reasonably involved in its averments, although it may be defectively stated. In the present case the judgment sought to be reversed is of the above description, and is not erroneous unless the complaint is wholly insufficient in substance to support a judgment.

It appears, however, from the transcript of the proceedings in the superior court, that the defendant (plaintiff in error) duly appeared in...