N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richland Cnty.
Decision Date | 29 June 1914 |
Citation | 148 N.W. 545,28 N.D. 172 |
Parties | NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. v. RICHLAND COUNTY. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
A railroad right of way, if actually benefited, may be assessed for a local drain which is constructed under the provisions of chapter 23, Rev. Codes 1905, and this irrespective of the fact whether the fee is in the railroad company or not.
A supreme court can announce no public policy of its own but merely what it believes to be the public policy of the people of the commonwealth by which it is created. It has no power to create or command but merely to construe, and where the people have spoken, either in the form of a constitutional enactment or a valid and constitutional statute, it must be controlled by their decisions and conclusions.
Chapter 23, Rev. Codes 1905, which provides for the assessment of railroad rights of way for the benefits conferred by the construction of local drains, does not violate the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution nor the so-called commerce clause (section 8, art. 1) of that instrument, even though it is sought to be applied to interstate lines.
Appeal from District Court, Richland County; Allen, Judge.
Action by the Northern Pacific Railway Company against Richland County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
This action was brought by the Northern Pacific Railway Company against Richland county, for the purpose of determining adverse interests in and to an easement or right of way of the plaintiff company; the claim of the plaintiff being for a franchise or right of way as opposed to an ownership in fee. The answer admits the ownership of the franchise or easement but asserts a lien arising from a levy for benefits assessed against the property for and on account of the construction of a drain under chapter 23, Rev. Codes 1905. Judgment was rendered in the district court decreeing a lien in favor of the defendant to the amount of $3,180.70, and an appeal has been taken to this court upon the judgment roll merely and for the sole purpose of testing the legality of the proceedings.Watson & Young, of Fargo, and Purcell & Divet, of Wahpeton, for appellant. C. J. Kachelhoffer, Gustav Schuler, and W. S. Lauder, all of Wahpeton, and John L. Koeppler, of Beach, for respondent.
BRUCE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The objection of the appellant goes directly to the jurisdiction of the drainage board to make any assessment, or at any rate to create any lien, against the right of way of the defendant company. It is that the alleged lien is void for the reason that special assessments for a local improvement of the kind in question cannot be made against a right of way or easement of a railroad company, and especially of one which is interstate in its character. It is argued that any sale which must necessarily be had to enforce such a lien would be the sale of a fragmentary portion of the roadbed which would not only disrupt the road and prevent the public service which the company was created to furnish but would and could furnish to the purchaser no right or interest, as the land could only be used as a railway right of way, and without legislative sanction and permission no such right of user exists. It is claimed that such a proceeding would violate both the federal Constitution and the fourteenth amendment thereto, and is not contemplated by chapter 23, R. C. 1905. It is claimed that chapter 23 only contemplates the taxation of property in which the fee exists in the person sought to be charged. The portions of the statute which appear to be pertinent are as follows:
“Upon acquiring the right of way, if the assessment of benefits has not already been made under the provisions of section 1824, the board of drain commissioners shall assess the per cent. of the cost of constructing and maintaining such drain, and of providing the right of way therefor, which any county, township, city, village or town shall be liable to pay by reason of the benefits of such drain to the public health, convenience, or welfare, and which any railroad company shall be liable to pay by reason of benefits to accrue to its property, and which any lot, piece or parcel of land shall be liable to pay by reason of benefits to accrue thereto, either directly or indirectly, by reason of the construction of such drain, whether such lands are immediately drained thereby, or can be drained only by the construction of other and connecting drains, but such assessment shall be subject to review by the commissioners as hereinafter provided.”
There is much to be said in support of the contention of appellants. Railroads are quasi public institutions. They have the right to make a reasonable profit on the investment which they represent. The state, on the other hand, has the power to regulate rates when that profit becomes excessive. It is clear that no profit can be made until the operating and fixed charges are met, and, the higher the operating and fixed charges, the higher the rates will be that must be charged in order to make a fair return upon the investment. Special assessments, in fact all taxes, must indirectly increase the cost of operation and raise the point from which the profit begins, as well as the point at which the state is entitled to...
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State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor
...the legislative power in determining such policy are those fixed in the state and federal Constitutions. See Northern P. R. Co. v. Richland Co., 28 N. D. 172, 148 N. W. 545, L. R. A. 1915A, 129; 6 Words and Phrases, 5813 et seq.; 4 Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) 27 et seq. See, also, State v. ......
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State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor
... ... Constitutions. See Northern P. R. Co. v. Richland ... County, 28 N.D. 172, L.R.A. N.S. 1915A 129, 148 N.W ... 545; 6 Words & Phrases 5813, et ... ...
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...and in the absence of a constitutional inhibition can be adequately and fully expressed by the Legislature of a state. N. P. Ry. Co. v. Richland County, 148 N. W. 545. It is true that the statute in North Dakota does not provide that actions for personal injuries shall survive the death of ......