N.Y. State Citizens' Coal. for Children v. Carrion

• Decision Date: 17 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–3485 WFK.,10–CV–3485 WFK.
• Citation: 31 F.Supp.3d 512
• Parties: NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS' COALITION FOR CHILDREN, Plaintiff, v. Gladys CARRION, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children & Family Services, in her official capacity, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

31 F.Supp.3d 512

NEW YORK STATE CITIZENS' COALITION FOR CHILDREN, Plaintiff
v.
Gladys CARRION, Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children & Family Services, in her official capacity, Defendant.

No. 10–CV–3485 WFK.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed July 17, 2014.

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Grant Joseph Esposito, Adam James Hunt, Joel C. Haims, Leah Andrea Ramos, Paul Galante, Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

John P. Gasior, Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Kraft, State of New York, Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, District Judge:

Plaintiff, a New York nonprofit organization, invites this Court to grant permanent injunctive relief fundamentally altering New York's system for setting foster care maintenance rates. Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court declines Plaintiff's invitation and holds that 42 U.S.C. §§ 672(a) and 674(5)(A), provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, do not provide a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court's instructions

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in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), expounding on its previous ruling in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), make clear that these provisions lack the requisite “rights-creating language” and individual focus necessary to infer that Congress intended a private right of action. The Court shares the view of the District of New Jersey that “[i]t would be the height of federal judicial arrogance for this Court to supplant the efforts of [the state's] legislative, executive, and judicial branches with respect to the everyday functioning of the child welfare system in the broad, over-reaching way suggested by Plaintiff [ ].” Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d 476, 514 (D.N.J.2000) (Brown, J.). For these reasons, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

“Preliminary to discussing the particular facts giving rise to this case, [the Court] review[s] the statutory scheme at issue.” New York ex rel. New York State Office of Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 556 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir.2009).

I. The Child Welfare Act

In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (hereinafter “CWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq., 670 et seq. The statute was passed pursuant to Congress's authority under the federal Constitution's Spending Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The CWA set guidelines for a cooperative state-federal program to provide federal funding for foster care and adoption assistance.

The CWA establishes the scheme by which the federal government reimburses compliant states for a portion of the payments that the states make to individuals and entities in their foster care and adoption assistance programs. See New York ex rel. New York State Office of Children & Family Servs., 556 F.3d at 93. In order for a state to receive its matching federal funding, the state must comply with certain eligibility standards and constraints set forth in the CWA. See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (stating that the purpose of the CWA is to provide foster care assistance funds for states with compliant plans). As a precondition to receiving federal funding, each state is required to submit a “State plan” to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) for approval. See id.; § 671(a) (“In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary [of HHS].”). HHS's Administration for Children & Families (“ACF”) administers the CWA and supervises the states' plans. See 45 C.F.R. § 1355.31 –37.

Congress delegated many aspects of CWA oversight to the states, including the creation of state authorities responsible for maintaining foster care standards, state administrative review opportunities, and mandatory, periodic state review of disbursements. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10–12). Nonetheless, HHS maintains ultimate control of the federal funding faucet. Congress mandated that the Secretary of HHS promulgate regulations to ensure each state is in “substantial conformity” with federal statutory requirements, HHS regulations, and the state's own written plan. See § 1320a–2a(a). A state that fails to substantially conform with federal requirements is subject to mandatory corrective measures by HHS and ACF, including the withholding of federal funding. § 1320a–2a(b)(4). However, prior to withholding any federal funds, the Secretary is required to “afford the State an opportunity to adopt and implement a corrective action

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plan.” § 1320a–2a(b)(4)(A), (C). Accordingly, the CWA envisions a scenario in which a state that has failed to substantially conform—with federal statutory requirements, HHS regulations, or its own written plan—still receives federal matching funds while corrective plans are in effect. See § 1320a–2a(b)(4)(C).

There are thirty-three conditions that must be included in a state's plan in order to qualify for federal funding. § 671(a). The first requirement is that each state plan must “provide for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672.” § 671(a)(1). Foster care maintenance payments are defined as:

payments to cover the cost of (and the cost of providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a child's personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel to the child's home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.¹

§ 675(4)(A). In sum, a foster care maintenance payment is a state payment to a caretaker to cover the costs of the foster child's daily life.

Turning to § 672, Congress instructs that “each state ... shall make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child who has been removed from the home of a relative” so long as certain requirements are met. § 672(a)(1)(A), (B). The payments “may be made ... only on behalf of a child” who is eligible under § 672(a) and is in either “the foster family home of an individual ... or in a child-care institution.” § 672(b). States only receive federal matching funds for foster care maintenance payments that meet § 672's dictates. See § 674(a)(1).

II. The Parties

Before the Court is a Complaint by Plaintiff, the New York State Citizens' Coalition for Children, a nonprofit organization that “represents the interests of foster parents who provide care and supervision for children in foster care.” Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. The Coalition's members include more than twenty individuals and more than twenty-five groups and agencies, which purport to represent almost 400 foster parents. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff brings two causes of action for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant Gladys Carrion, Commissioner of the New York Office of Children & Family Services, in her official capacity. Id. ¶¶ 40–45. Plaintiff alleges that New York has failed to comply with the dictates of the CWA by accepting federal funding while reimbursing foster care providers with only a fraction of the funds required by federal law. Id. at ¶¶ 24–39. Invoking a purported private right of action under § 1983, Plaintiff seeks to prevent New York from continuing its alleged violation of the CWA and to ensure foster parents are reimbursed by New York, with both state and federal funds, in compliance with the CWA. See id.

III. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on July 29, 2010. The case was reassigned from the Hon. Dora L. Irizarry to this Court on October 17, 2011. Dkt. Entry of 10/17/2011. After a July 25, 2012 pre-motion conference, the parties were given leave to file dueling

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motions. Dkt. Entry of 7/25/12. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendant filed the motion to dismiss currently pending before the Court. On October 5, 2012, both motions were fully briefed and submitted to the Court. Dkts. 45–46.

Defendant's motion contends that Plaintiff has not established subject matter jurisdiction because there is no private right of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 672(a), 675(4)(A) of the CWA. Dkt. 45–1 (“Def.'s Br.”) at 10–14. Therefore, before its summary judgment may be adjudicated, Plaintiff faces the initial hurdle of establishing whether Congress permitted a § 1983 private right of action for the statutes at issue. That question turns us to the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d...